Justice, community and obligation: a study of recent liberal political philosophy by McCarthy, Austin
Durham E-Theses
Justice, community and obligation: a study of recent
liberal political philosophy
McCarthy, Austin
How to cite:
McCarthy, Austin (1990) Justice, community and obligation: a study of recent liberal political philosophy,
Durham theses, Durham University. Available at Durham E-Theses Online: http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/5978/
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or
charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-proﬁt purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in Durham E-Theses
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full Durham E-Theses policy for further details.
Academic Support Oﬃce, Durham University, University Oﬃce, Old Elvet, Durham DH1 3HP
e-mail: e-theses.admin@dur.ac.uk Tel: +44 0191 334 6107
http://etheses.dur.ac.uk
Justice, Community and Obligation : A study of recent liberal political philosophy 
Austin McCarthy 
Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the 
University of Durham 
November 1990 
Abstract 
Liberals disagree about the state's legitimate sphere of activity. Some emphasise 
individual liberty and self-determination, believing the requirements of these 
principles are best met by the free market. Social liberals argue that citizens are 
members of a political community, whose obligations are fu l f i l l ed through the state. 
How principles of justice are derived is a matter of controversy, but underlying 
them are certain ideas about citizens' relationships to the state and to each other. 
The theories of justice of Nozick, Hobhouse, Rawls and Walzer are compared. To 
what extent are citizens responsible for each other's welfare in contemporary liberal 
democracies? 
The state is characterized by Nozick as a protective association with the sole 
function of guaranteeing individual rights, and in which concern for others is a 
private matter; by Rawls as a cooperative association organised in such a way that 
the position of the least favoured is maximised; by Walzer as a community of shared 
understandings in which all are entitled to the goods necessary to sustain their 
membership; and by Hobhouse as a harmonious society of rational men in which 
individuals f i nd fulf i lment in the l ife of the community. 
I discuss political obligation, since how citizens are said to have obligations 
contributes to an understanding of descriptions of the state and the nature of the 
ties that bind citizens. 
Maclntyre suggests that individualism renders moral argument unintelligible. There 
is no way of deciding between the competing theories of Nozick and Rawls. Walzer 
believes that Maclntyre is mistaken in describing these disputes as a mark of 
incoherence, since they take place within the liberal tradition. 
I maintain that the differences within liberalism are so grave that it cannot be 
argued that we inhabit a world of shared values. The liberal democratic state 
cannot be described as the embodiment of community. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Liberal ideology embraces a wide spectrum of political theorists with diverse views 
on human nature, individual rights and the state. A limited state, individual liberty 
and political equality are essential elements in the family of ideas and values which 
constitutes liberalism, accepted by all philosophers belonging to the liberal tradition. 
However the emphasis that writers give to one or other of these concepts leads to 
very different conclusions about the nature of the state and the functions of 
government, and the extent of the state's legitimate interference in the lives of its 
citizens. 
Liberals argue that individuals have the right to be self-determining. The state, 
therefore, must be subject to the wi l l of the people through democratic institutions 
which, though imperfect, legitimise the state's authority. In the words of the 
Declaration of Independence "governments are instituted among men, deriving their 
just powers f rom the consent of the governed."^ Thus hierarchical or hereditary 
systems are clearly not liberal democracies, nor are theocracies, in which politicians 
are guided by religious leaders whose proclamations are authoritative; and whilst 
Marxist states may claim to be democratic they are not liberal, since power is 
exercised by the party on behalf of the people. 
However liberals themselves disagree about the state's proper sphere of activity. 
Some, such as Nozick, tend to emphasise individual liberty and self-determination 
(the central tenets of liberalism) above any other consideration, arguing that an 
unfettered market within a minimal state allows maximum freedom to individuals 
to pursue their own private ends. A l l are equally free to compete in the market, and 
all enjoy political equality as citizens. 
Others believe that an unrestrained free market wi l l result in an extension of the 
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freedom, power and influence of those who compete successfully, and a diminution 
of the worth of the formal political rights of those who do not have the competitive 
wi l l or the appropriate talents demanded by the market. The losers wi l l lack the 
means necessary to live a f u l l l i fe as citizens and members of the community, and to 
pursue their reasonable life plans. Furthermore they wi l l not be compensated for 
the lessened worth of their liberty. Great economic inequalities lead to a 
concentration of power and influence, whilst inhibiting the political participation 
of the least favoured, whose ability to control their own lives is seriously weakened. 
Thus government should control the market and redistribute wealth to ensure that 
basic needs are satisfied and to secure the position of those disadvantaged by the 
competitive economic system. These are the necessary prerequisites to enable 
citizens to enjoy their freedom to the fullest. In this view liberty is thought to be 
the positive power to pursue worthwhile ends, rather than the negative freedom 
from interference. Social liberals, then, believe that the people, united in a political 
community, should express their concern for one another through the agency of the 
state, and that freedom is extended through the redistribution of wealth. 
It is my intention to examine the key works of several contemporary political 
philosophers who have made major contributions to liberal theory. Thus I examine 
four different liberal theories of justice with the intention of gauging the extent to 
which these philosophers share understandings of the concepts of liberty, equality 
and the state. The discussion wil l centre round theories of justice, the nature of the 
liberal state, and the relationship between citizen and state. Robert Nozick is an 
outstanding, possibly extreme, example of that strain of liberalism notable for its 
uncompromising individualism and which assigns to the state a very limited role. 
Of the writers I have selected, only Nozick argues that the state should have no 
redistributive functions. Hobhouse, Walzer and Rawls all hold that in order to 
pursue their own conceptions of the good and to f u l f i l themselves, citizens are 
entitled to the resources necessary to do so. 
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The inclusion of L.T. Hobhouse, even though he is neither American nor living, is 
justified since he belongs to that school of liberalism which sought to modify the 
nineteenth century laissez-faire doctrine favoured by Nozick. 
John Rawls' "A Theory of Justice" is the most important and influential recent 
attempt to establish principles of justice for a state deemed to be a fair cooperative 
system for individuals who yet pursue their own (incompatible) purposes. 
Finally, at the opposite end of the spectrum to Nozick, I introduce the democratic 
socialist ideas of Michael Walzer who argues that within the state citizens are united 
in a community of common values, in which certain ideas about the distribution of 
social goods are intuitively known and understood. 
I mention Ronald Dworkin, but merely to further illuminate certain issues arising 
from the discussion on Rawls and Walzer. Although I give a brief account of his 
ideas on liberty and equality, they are of minor significance in the development of 
my thesis. 
I begin with an assessment of the minarchist Nozick, who argues that in a state of 
nature protective associations would be formed, one of which would eventually 
enjoy a monopoly position and be transformed into a minimal state. The state's sole 
legitimate functions would be the protection of individual rights and the provision 
of common security. The requirements of justice, liberty and equality are served by 
allowing each individual to pursue his own ends, subject only to the system of side-
constraints designed to protect individual rights. Principles of distributive justice 
establish rules for the acquisition and disposal of goods. How things come to be 
held is more important than basing distribution on need or desert or any other 
patterned end-state principle. 
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Hobhouse rejects such individualism. Men are social beings whose relationships are 
guided by ethical principles. The state upholds and promotes a harmonious social 
l i fe . He attempts to f ind a balance between extreme individualism and a 
collectivism in which the individual would be submerged by the community. The 
common good is inner harmony and harmony between citizens, who f ind true 
fulf i lment in contributing to their shared l i fe , although individuals should be free 
f rom arbitrary interference. The principle of harmony and the common good 
demand that certain needs are satisfied in order to maintain the condition of 
harmony, and Hobhouse considers various principles of distribution based on need 
and desert, effort and skill. Unlike Nozick, he considers that freedom is impaired 
by an unregulated market, and that property should be socially controlled. 
Rawls' principles of justice are designed to guarantee equal rights and liberties 
within a cooperative system in which social and economic inequalities should 
benefit the least advantaged. The principles are chosen by rational men in a 
hypothetical situation. A just society would adopt these principles and arrange its 
basic institutions in such a way that their demands were met. Citizens could then 
accept a duty of obedience to the state since they would agree that the principles 
are the ones they would have chosen in the same circumstances. A l l have equal 
rights, but economic inequalities are allowed i f they are to the benefit of the least 
wel l -off . I wi l l argue that this seriously diminishes the worth of liberty. Rawls' 
principles are formulated by self-interested individuals, and they are incompatible 
with an interpretation of the state as a community. As Raymond Plant has written, 
"Liberals ... while recognising the beguiling power of the appeal to community, have 
never really known how to incorporate a rich sense of community into liberal 
theory, because liberalism's commitment to individual freedom seems to cut across 
communitarian assumptions." Rawls argues that his principles are a political 
conception and would be acceptable to people with irreconcilable metaphysical, 
religious and philosophical outlooks. 
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The incorporation of the "sense of community into liberal theory" is attempted by 
Walzer, for whom principles for the distribution of social goods are to be found in 
the experiences, practices and understandings of particular societies. Each 
community is, to some extent, a welfare state in which each person is entitled to the 
goods necessary to sustain membership. What these goods are, and how they are 
distributed, wil l d i f fer f rom one tradition to another but it is within the state, the 
closest we can come to a world of common meanings, that debate takes place and 
decisions are made about such matters. No particular social good should be used as 
a means of domination or control. 
I briefly outline Dworkin's criticism of Walzer's explanation of the derivation of 
principles of justice, his attempt to ascribe to "Rawls' deep theory" a basic right to 
equal concern and respect, and his own interpretation of the liberal concern with 
equality and liberty. 
My interest centres on each writer's description of the liberal state and the political 
community. In what way and to what extent are citizens, strangers to one another, 
responsible for each other's needs in contemporary liberal democracies? In the f inal 
chapter I discuss political obligation as one way of illuminating this question. The 
discussion centres around Carole Pateman's critique of the problem of political 
obligation in which she is especially critical of the notion of abstract individualism. 
Consent theory has been modified so that the authority of the state does not depend 
upon the actual consent of its citizens. Now, some argue that citizens ought to 
consent to a just state. This is the position taken by Rawls in his account of duty 
and obligation and is, I suggest, one of three possible grounds for political 
obligation. For Hobhouse, too, political obligation is owed to a just government 
pursuing the common good. Walzer, however, changes his position f rom that in 
which a just government is one to which citizens have consented (this is a necessary 
though not sufficient condition for a just state), to one in which consent is 
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secondary to the obligation created by shared moral principles. Nevertheless 
participation remains a central feature of his political community. In Nozick's 
minimal state participation is irrelevant; in the just state i t is desirable, although 
secondary; in the state as community participation is a sign of membership. 
Alasdair Maclntyre argues that liberal individualism with its emotivist culture has 
rendered moral argument unintelligible. There is no way of deciding between the 
competing theories of justice of Nozick and Rawls, since we have lost a sense of 
tradition and no longer share a knowledge and understanding of moral principles. 
Walzer's response to this criticism is that the argument about principles of justice 
takes place within what is now our tradition, the liberal tradition, but liberalism 
tends to be disintegrative and needs correction by communitarians. I maintain that 
these disputes within liberalism are so grave that we cannot be said to inhabit a 
world of common meanings, that we have no values held in common sufficiently 
strongly to form the basis of understanding about the distribution of social goods, 
and that i t is a mistake to describe the liberal democratic state as the embodiment of 
community. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Nozick : The Minimal State 
Rights as side constraints 
Robert Nozick, the contemporary American political philosopher, is - to borrow 
Koerner 's phrase - an "unreconstructed classical l iberal"^, emphasising and 
justifying individualism to an uncomfortable degree whilst rejecting compulsory 
redistribution to achieve welfare benefits or egalitarian objectives. Barry writes 
that "his stress on the inviolability of rights and the "separateness" of individuals 
prevents his l ibertarianism f r o m collapsing into a Hayekian conservatism". 
Individuals have rights and protection of these rights is the state's sole legitimate 
function. Moreover, in order to stress the inviolability of rights and to limit the 
state to its minimum functions, he has developed a theory of side restraints. Moral 
concerns do not only function as moral goals. I f this were so i t might be possible to 
develop an argument which featured as a desirable end-state a "utilitarianism of 
rights" in which the concept of good includes the non-violation of rights. Thus the 
goal of the greatest good would be achieved by minimizing the violation of rights. 
But, Nozick writes, "this would still require us to violate someone's rights when 
doing so minimises the total (weighted) amount of the violation of rights in the 
society". He requires a much more stringent restriction on what may be done to 
people, in which rights are not a goal but are side constraints on actions and which 
cannot be violated no matter what the goal. He rejects non-violation of rights as a 
goal, arguing that specific side constraints demand that individuals not be used as 
means in these particular ways, whereas a goal-centred view would lead to 
individuals being used as means for a greater good. Nothing can be done to an 
individual without his consent for the benefit of a non-existent social entity or in 
the name of some higher social good. I f something is done to a person it is done for 
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the sake of other individuals. "To use a person in this way does not sufficiently 
respect and take account of the fact that he is a separate person".^ Nozick adds "no-
one is entitled to force this upon him - least of all a state or government that claims 
his allegiance (as other individuals do not)".^ But in view of everything which 
Nozick himself writes about the state (as I shall explain later) I am puzzled by this 
reference to allegiance, for i f the state is Nozick's minimal state its purpose is 
protection of rights. No allegiance is required, merely consent and obedience to 
those measures the state deems necessary to f u l f i l this function. On the other hand 
a state claiming allegiance on some other basis may well just i fy differential 
treatment of its citizens. 
Nozick, then, resists any "end-state maximising view" of the state in favour of moral 
side constraints governing actions which effect others. The importance of the 
individual is paramount although Nozick leaves incomplete his discussion of why 
this should be so. He does not just ify his claim that we have rights nor specify their 
nature. He conjectures that the ability to shape and plan one's own l i fe , to give i t 
meaning, is somehow a powerful enough idea on which to base his whole theory. He 
concedes that many questions remain unanswered ("why are there constraints on 
how we may treat beings shaping their lives"*' and so on). Nevertheless i t is worth 
pointing out the unsatisfactoriness of this argument, since i t is important in any 
discussion about whether or not we may have obligations to society or community 
other than those we choose to recognise, and since he is himself critical of the lack 
of a sound philosophical argument for egalitarianism. It may be that certain 
constraints on action could be accepted within a teleological framework which, for 
example, redistributes unequally held wealth so as to enlarge the personal freedom 
of the least well-off . In other words, in some circumstances rights could be violated 
to justify certain ends. (For example A's right to enjoy positive freedom - in T.H. 
Green's sense* - furthered through restricting B's and C's right to dispose of their 
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own income). Nozick does say more about permissible actions, and about principles 
of justice which may be deemed to form the basis of redistribution and I wi l l return 
to this theme. 
Development of the state 
I turn my attention now to Nozick's explanation (derived f rom Locke) of the 
development of the state f rom the state of nature. Within the Lockean state of 
nature no-one may harm another, a harmed person may defend himself, seek 
reparation and restrain the offender. Since the natural law does not provide for 
every contingency personal disputes could linger on, with no final arbiter, nor 
guarantor to ensure agreements would be kept. Moreover any individual may be 
unable to enforce his rights. By contrast, the state's legal system works and is used 
because no other system is allowed and because it has the necessary monopoly of 
force to ensure its decisions are respected. In the state of nature protective agencies 
wi l l be formed - mutual protective associations built on cooperation in some cases, 
and in others on simple market forces, the sale of protective services. Eventually, in 
any given geographical area, one of these protective agencies would enjoy a 
monopoly and become an embryonic state, assuming that they act "within the limits 
of Locke's law of nature". 
Unlike classical contract theories no compact has been necessary to create this 
rudimentary state. Each person, in trying to satisfy his own needs, produces a 
system that has a pattern and looks as though it has been created intentionally. The 
state emerges through an invisible hand process based on market forces. There may 
be, of course, a contract between the individual and the agency (although Nozick 
* That is, the capacity to do something worthwhile and contribute to the common 
good. 
does not say this) specifying the services to be provided, the price to be paid and so 
on. I wi l l comment later on the meaning of citizenship in a Nozick-type of state. 
9 
However at the moment we are still at the stage of the dominant protection 
association. Unlike a state, the dominant protective associations do not claim they 
wi l l punish those who use force without permission "nor does it seem morally 
o 
legitimate for them to do so". Not only does the dominant protective association 
allow some people to enforce their own rights, i t does not protect all individuals 
within its sphere of influence, but only those who buy its services. I t thus differs 
f rom a state in certain crucial respects. 
Nozick asks the reader to confront an interesting problem. In the ultraminimal state 
(that is, at the stage after the dominant protective association) the sole legitimate 
function of the state is protection of rights, and yet some - those who choose not to 
buy protection - are left unprotected. In the name of protection of rights they are 
left unprotected because they cannot be forced to buy protection, nor can others be 
forced to pay for protection for them. However, in the minimal or nightwatchman 
state protection is given to all. Some subsidise the protection of others. This is the 
only legitimate form of redistribution allowed in this state. How can this 
redistribution be justified, but not others? Is the evolution f rom an ultraminimal to 
a minimal state not bound to violate the moral side constraints which determine 
how individuals may be treated, when we consider the problems of redistribution to 
provide protection for all, and of the state's monopoly of power and its right to 
punish those who enforce their own systems of justice? 
By what right does the state take to itself the sole authority to punish violations of 
rights? " I f the private exacter of justice violates no-one's rights, then punishing him 
for his actions (actions state officials also perform) violates his rights and hence 
violates moral constraints. Monopolising the use of force then, on this view, is itself 
immoral, as is redistribution through the compulsory tax apparatus of the state."^ 
Nozick's aim is to show that the dominant protective association (which does not 
provide protection for all, nor claim a monopoly of force) can become an 
10 
ultraminimal state (which has a monopoly of force but protects only those who buy 
protection), which in turn can become a minimal state providing protection for all, 
and that at each stage no violation of rights occurs. Moreover once the stage of the 
ultraminimal state is reached, i.e. once the state has a monopoly of power, i t would 
be morally impermissible for it not to provide protection for all. But, of course, the 
justification which Nozick wi l l use for the provision of protection for all wi l l avoid 
suggestions of redistribution! 
Compensation, fear and risky actions 
As a first step Nozick asks whether an individual's "moral space" can be transgressed 
without consent providing compensation is paid. He argues that certain actions 
produce fear and this "argument f rom general fear justifies prohibiting those 
boundary-crossing acts that produce fear even when it is known that they wi l l be 
compensated f o r . " ^ His argument f rom fear seems to me unnecessary and tortuous. 
To live in a world in which assault was allowed provided compensation was paid 
would be to live in a brutal uncivilised society. Nozick could have confined himself 
to another of his considerations, namely "a system permitting boundary-crossing, 
provided compensation is paid, embodies the use of persons as means." ^  This in 
itself would be sufficient to prohibit boundary-crossing acts including intentional 
fear-producing acts. 
Furthermore non-fear-producing boundary-crossing acts which wi l l produce certain 
benefits, performed without prior consent because it is too d i f f i cu l t or costly to 
obtain, and for which the victim is compensated, are also prohibited. Not only do 
these acts, too, envisage the use of persons as means and their "plans and 
1 7 
expectations liable to being thwarted arb i t ra r i ly" , but there is no social 
mechanism for determining whether the social benefits are great enough to allow 
the boundary-crossing, and no social entity which could benefit. 
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Discussing risky actions, Nozick outlines various procedures for compensating those 
who are (or might be) victims of risky boundary-crossing, without outlining any 
principle for deciding which risky actions might be permitted. Does the victim have 
a choice? For example he talks of reciprocity of risk, an exchange all would be 
willing to make - such as would be involved in car-driving - without reference to 
any moral principle which might be involved in allowing an activity which claims 
so many lives. Is i t simply a matter of transaction and compensation? And although 
he mentions innocent victims of risky activities, such as children, he does not 
explain how compensation can justify crossing their boundaries, for the car driver 
limits the freedom of others to travel in safety. 
Nozick then argues that to forbid certain actions to people because they have not 
the means to pay compensation "would i l l f i t a picture of a free society". 
Prohibiting such actions limits the individual's freedom, yet how can he be allowed 
to act riskily i f he cannot pay compensation? (Yet again this argument could be 
reversed: why should the victim have his freedom threatened, and would he agree to 
being compensated, given the choice?). He writes that those who benefit f rom the 
reduction in risk to themselves have to "make it up" to those who are restrained 
from performing certain important activities which nearly everyone does. Why 
should this be so? I f we are talking of an action which is risky no matter who 
performs i t , and which is yet more risky when performed by certain people, by what 
decision-making process is anyone allowed to impose the risk on others? I f an action 
is safe unless performed by certain people why should those who are unsafe be 
compensated for being forbidden to impose risks on others? The argument seems to 
be that they are disadvantaged because of some action or decision of the political 
community which is forbidding the risky actions. This is surely not the case. An 
epileptic is disadvantaged by his medical condition. The community might quite 
reasonably be unhappy about the risks involved in allowing him to engage in certain 
activities. But for which forbidden actions should the epileptic be compensated and 
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why? For the normal occupation of driving? For being excluded f rom certain jobs 
such as those involving the use of dangerous machinery? The principle of 
compensation is surely ill-suited to deal with such cases, especially since it provides 
no moral justification for allowing anybody to perform risky actions in the first 
place. There is a hint here that members of a polity have an obligation to ensure 
that the less-advantaged have every possible opportunity for self-fulfi lment but " i f , 
in Joseph Egerton's words, "the notion that an individual owes a moral duty to 
others is accepted, then i t inflicts serious damage to Nozick's position".^ 
The argument of risk is then transferred into the area of activities of independents 
exercising risky and dangerous private systems of justice. Can such activities be 
forbidden and, i f so, by whom? Nozick writes that "others would be entitled to 
group together and prohibit the totality of such activities"^, which seems straight-
forward, but he continues by asking whether each risky system should be prohibited 
and who has the right to decide? "No person or group is entitled to pick who in the 
totality wi l l be allowed to continue".**' 
I f several people submit to certain restrictions to yield advantages to all, Hart's 
principle of fairness suggests they "have a right to similar acquiescence on the part 
17 
of those who have benefited from their submission". Acceptance of benefits binds 
one. I f i t is then claimed that those to whom the obligation is owed can enforce the 
obligation this "seems to make unanimous consent to coercive governments in a state 
18 
of nature unnecessary". Nozick wants to know whether this principle can be used 
to limit the actions of the independents in the state of nature. I t should be noted, 
however, that although Nozick himself claims that what persons may do to one 
another limits what they may do through the state, yet the state's fundamental 
coercive power in enforcing permissible moral prohibitions does not rest on any 
consent of the person to whom the coercive power is applied. In other words Nozick 
himself agrees that individuals can use coercion against others in certain situations 
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and that the state, acting as the agent of the individual, can do likewise. He rejects 
the implication in Hart's argument that the group has rights greater than those of 
the individuals comprising i t , and he rejects the idea that being under a special 
obligation gives the person to whom the obligation is owed the right to enforce the 
obl igat ion. Nozick also f inds that enforcing the pr inciple o f fairness is 
unacceptable, and that "even i f the principle could be formulated so that it was no 
longer open to objection, i t would not serve to obviate the need for other persons 
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consenting to cooperate and limit their own activities". However, as we shall see, 
his rejection of Hart's argument seems odd indeed, since the dominant protective 
association, by virtue of its power, enforces its wi l l and its system of justice, and 
limits the activities of the independents, vis a vis the association's own clients, 
without regard to the consent of the independents. 
Nozick, following his rejection of Hart, says that independents cannot be forced to 
cooperate in a scheme designed to limit their risky activities. But why should this 
be so, since clearly no independent has the right to use a risky procedure, no matter 
how frequently or infrequently, and no matter what the resulting level of fear? 
The problem is, who has the right to stop them? Anyone acting in self-defence may 
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stop any particular independent acting in this way and persons in a state of 
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nature "may forbid the use of far more risky procedures" than their own. And yet 
"no person or group is entitled to pick who in the totality [of users of risky 
22 
procedures] wi l l be allowed to continue." Why not? Nozick's argument assumes 
the availability of criteria for judging a system of justice and its level of risk in a 
state or in the state of nature. In the state of nature cooperation is one obvious way 
to limit risk, and since any individual, acting in self-defence, can stop any other 
person using a risky procedure against him, then so could such individuals acting 
cooperatively, and so could the dominant protective association since its clients 
"may empower [i t] to exercise for him his rights to resist" unfair procedures of 
justice being applied to him. Nozick says that this is so, and therefore the totality 
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of risky procedures (each and every one of them) may be forbidden by any group or 
dominant protective association. Perhaps Nozick means that whilst all risky 
procedures could be prohibited, a situation in which risk was limited by allowing 
some independents to continue and others not, regardless of the consent of the users 
of the risky procedures, would be intolerable. I f this is so then the situation would 
be intolerable, not because of any argument about consent but because no-one has 
the right to use such risky procedures, and indeed has the duty not to do so. 
The dominant protective agency, like any individual, may appraise any procedure 
of justice to be applied to its clients and punish anyone who uses an unfair 
procedure. This assumes, of course, certain criteria which are generally admitted, 
and that all are acting with moral restraint. But neither an individual nor an 
agency can punish anyone for using a system just because it has not gained their 
approval - i t might be a perfectly reasonable system. In other words, all (including 
the dominant protective agency and its clients) must submit to any fair and reliable 
procedures. The agency wil l prohibit known unreliable procedures being applied to 
its clients. But i f we take away the assumption that the dominant protective agency 
wi l l act in a morally acceptable manner we confront an awkward situation. I have 
assumed that up to now the dominant protective agency is operating in "a nonstate 
situation in which people generally satisfy moral constraints and generally act as 
they ought"^, since this was Nozick's starting point. Of course i f this situation is 
assumed then it is open to question why such powerful protective agencies would be 
needed at all, accruing to themselves unlimited power without constitutional 
restraint. Would there be a clientele for the services offered? 
In discussing the dominant protective agency's relationship with the independents 
Nozick says there is no guarantee that the agency would judge an independent's 
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procedure impartially. Although the agency's approval should not be arbitrary 
(the procedures must be properly judged), because of its power it can in effect lay 
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down its own rules, and Nozick writes "it would take a brave soul indeed to proceed 
to apply a known procedure not yet on its approval list." But once the assumption 
of impartiality is gone and the dominant protective agency's monopoly of power 
establishes it as a fearful entity, why should i t be thought that it wi l l judge fairly 
any independent procedure? Furthermore what is the moral and legal status of its 
own system of justice and its own activities when these are sanctioned by market 
forces rather than through moral argument or even common agreement? Once 
market forces have led to the demise of the independents and the less competitive 
agencies, an unrestrained monopoly can exert its wi l l . Although Nozick claims that 
this is an invisible-hand process, the competition for clients is all too visible and it 
is the deliberate intention of an agency to see o f f its competitors so that it can enjoy 
its monopoly position. 
The dominant protective agency becomes the sole effective judge of procedures and 
of the permissibility of the use of violence, with no restraint on its future actions 
once its monopoly of coercive power is sufficiently effective. Of course, any 
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legitimately conceived state could be corrupted and Nozick argues that each 
agency must act within the limits of Locke's laws of nature to claim legitimacy; but 
these are commercial agencies operating in a market to make a profi t , and the 
concept of legitimacy is surely not applicable to such a situation. I f laws of nature 
which limit actions are so clearly known, and i f procedures of justice can be known 
to be reliable, why should an embryonic state be more acceptable because it is 
created through the invisible-hand mechanism of the market rather than through 
the deliberate considerations of rational men? It would be in everyone's interest to 
limit the size of the agencies through restraints on the market and to ensure that 
they always act within the bounds of the laws of nature. But this could only be 
achieved through the formation of a state with a monopoly of coercive power, 
rendering protective agencies obsolete! That is, to prevent unrestrained power 
accruing to an agency, individuals in a state of nature would foresee the problem 
16 
and form some kind of state which they felt they could control. A deliberately 
constructed state at least may have built into it some mechanism to limit the actions 
of those in control of the forces of coercion, and is more likely to have a universally 
acceptable system of justice since, in the market forces model, clients wi l l join the 
most effective agency, not the most just. It is more rational for people to cooperate 
in setting up a state with known limits and an agreed system of justice than to risk 
everything to a battle for supremacy in the market place. They would surely want 
to preempt this risky process! Even i f Nozick's argument were to be accepted as a 
legitimate philosophical explanation of the state's creation, clients would insist on 
institutions to control i t , to prevent i t ruling rather than protecting, and to lend 
some moral force to its claim to be the sole arbiter of justice. 
Protection for all and the nature of the minimal state 
Nozick goes on to argue that i f the dominant protective agency forbids the use of 
unreliable procedures this w i l l leave some independents unprotected, and the agency 
must give protection to these independents against its clients; it is morally required 
to do so. But why should this be so? The independent has no right to use an 
unreliable procedure in the first place. It therefore has the same options as 
everyone else - join the dominant protective agency or use a reliable procedure. Note 
that Nozick's argument is that in providing protection to non-clients the dominant 
protective agency's actions are not redistributive, which he would regard as an 
infringement of the liberty of the taxpayer, but are justified through the principle 
of compensation. This is a very necessary step in his argument because he is 
demonstrating that the minimal state would be created without rights' violations. 
Since compensation is not redistribution, those who are paying for the protection of 
others do not have their rights violated. Neither are the independents' rights 
violated since risky procedures can be forbidden provided compensation is paid. 
But this is an argument that I have already rejected. Having attained a monopoly 
of power the dominant protective agency - the sole effective arbiter and dispenser 
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of justice - is not under an obligation to provide compensatory protection to users of 
unreliable procedures. The agency wil l not interfere in the affairs of an 
independent using a reliable procedure, and this option is open to any independent 
not wishing to pay an agency for its services. Moreover, at no point in this 
transition from being the dominant protective agency to becoming the ultraminimal 
state (in which there is a monopoly of power and all have protection), is proper 
consideration given to the position of those independents who use reliable systems 
of justice. That is, the monopoly power wi l l allow it to enforce its system against 
one of its clients, but would not help in its perfectly reasonable task of enforcement 
against a non-client, so that these independents are in a weaker position than those 
barred from using unreliable methods and who are compensated. The moral duty of 
the agency to provide protection to those it forbids to use unreliable procedures 
cannot be founded on considerations of compensation. An individual in the state of 
nature can prevent another from using an unreliable procedure against him but does 
not have to offer compensation. The dominant protective agency has, without prior 
approval, constructed a situation in which only i t can act effectively. Therefore it 
has a duty to offer equal protection to all on the same terms. Those who choose not 
to be protected need not be so; those who cannot afford protection should be offered 
it , even i f this is redistributive, since the clients of the agency have contributed to 
the situation in which membership is desirable and (possibly) necessary. 
At this stage Nozick claims to have demonstrated how a state would be created 
without anyone's rights having been violated, a state having as necessary conditions 
a monopoly of force and offering protection to all. However i t is clear that some 
rights are violated - the rights of those who have to pay for the protection of others, 
and the rights of the independents who cannot e f f ec t ive ly use reasonable 
procedures, and who deserve compensation. According to Nozick the all-important 
starting point is that all are constrained from infringing the rights of others. I f a 
state or agency is formed which alone can prevent wrongful use of force or 
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defective procedures, all should be offered a chance to join and so safeguard their 
rights. Nozick claims the monopoly is not imposed since it has arisen through 
market forces. Unlike a state the monopoly does not claim to be the sole authoriser 
of violence, but in fact it is the sole effective judge, so Nozick deems this condition 
of the state to be satisfied. But even allowing all Nozick's arguments we are left 
with a monopoly with might as its only claim to legitimacy. Although some have 
consented to using the agency, many have been forced to use its services, in effect, 
as the competition was eliminated. The sum of individual transactions has produced 
a result unforeseen by the individuals, but not by the agency. Strength has 
eliminated the opposition, not adherence to just procedures or principles. The 
creation of a state through an invisible-hand process proves nothing about the 
nature of that particular state, and even less about the nature of the states we 
actually live in. 
Although the operators of the ultraminimal state are morally required to transform 
it into a minimal state which offers protection to all, this moral requirement does 
not originate in any sense of community, but is based merely on the duty to 
compensate for actions denied. However there is a stronger, more compelling 
argument. Nozick claims that the rights of the minimal state are no different to 
those possessed by any and each individual in the state of nature. What is different 
in this new situation is the ability of any individual to exercise his rights. I have 
emphasised the point that despite Nozick's claim that the dominant protective 
agency, a de facto monopoly, has no rights other than those of its clients as 
individuals, there is a distinction between having a right and being able to exercise 
that right. But in fact Nozick does give the agency special status in virtue of the 
size of its membership. For example, it has greater entitlement than any smaller 
grouping or individual to exact punishment. Clearly the sum of the rights of the 
clients, invested in the agency, enhances the worth of the rights. Market forces, not 
care or a shared culture, have brought people together in a rudimentary state. For 
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Nozick the state is not coterminous with community, nor does government act as the 
community's agent. Indeed, no community action, other than that based on complete 
unanimity, would be possible. The state cannot raise taxes (other than for its 
protective services) since no ownership rights may be violated, and, as I have 
already pointed out, there is no mechanism for determining whether social benefits 
are great enough to allow boundary crossing, and no social entity which could 
benefit. Clearly Nozick's minimalist position excludes notions of welfare and 
community action through the agency of the state. But in a state of nature people 
interested in protecting their own rights and ensuring that others f u l f i l their duties 
might deliberately cooperate in founding a state with these objectives in mind, 
recognising that living together as a community required certain constraints on their 
actions. In founding the state all would recognise the benefit of involving as many 
people as possible since this would give the greatest peace of mind to the greatest 
number. 
This is at least as persuasive as Nozick's spurious argument that all are offered 
protection by either buying i t or being offered i t as compensation for being 
forbidden to use procedures they had no right to use in the first place. The minimal 
state is constitutional insofar as all enjoy equality and freedom before the law, but 
it lacks constitutional checks on its actions. As Nozick recognises, in the end what 
matters is who actually has coercive power and how it is exercised. The Nozickian 
state offers a stark contrast to the participative social democracies which I wi l l 
describe. His notion of obligation is essentially negative, and within the context of 
the state there are no obligations to help others based on ties of community or of 
mutual concern and respect. 
Distributive Justice and State intervention 
Nozick argues that redistribution is a violation of property rights and therefore any 
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state other than the minimal state, whose sole aim is protection for all, cannot be 
justified. Property rights are paramount for Nozick, showing his "very narrow view 
T O 
of the nature of human beings, one which rejects the notion of duty." A l l 
holdings arise f rom processes of g i f t or exchange and there is not, nor ever has been, 
a fair distribution. Holdings are just i f they conform to his principles of 
distributive justice, which specify how unheld things are to be acquired (justice in 
acquisition) and how they may be disposed of subsequently (justice in transfer). 
Injustices are corrected through the principle of rectification of injustice in 
holdings, which makes the best possible estimate of what would have happened had 
the injustice not taken place. He rejects "end-state" principles of entitlement which 
seek to determine who should have what according to some principle of fairness or 
desert. 
Although Nozick claims that how exchanges are made is more important than the 
result, yet "a process normally giving rise to a permanent bequeathable property 
right in a previously unowned thing wi l l not do so i f the position of others no 
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longer at liberty to use the thing is thereby worsened", and this principle, the 
Lockean proviso, governs future situations too, for he says that the owner of a 
waterhole would have dif f icul ty to unreservedly call i t his property any longer i f 
all other waterholes were to dry up. In other words adherence to the Lockean 
proviso makes even Nozick's theory depend to an extent on an end-state situation, 
since all initial holdings and all subsequent transfers must not transgress the 
conditions imposed by the proviso, and otherwise legitimate transfers may have to 
be rescinded. Nozick suggests that the owner of a waterhole should charge a just 
price, but Barry points out that in the absence of competition i t is impossible to say 
what is a just price: "the implication ... seems to be that there is some "just" price for 
a good which does not involve exploitation; but this is wholly alien to the tradition 
in which Nozick claims to be writing". 
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Although Nozick argues that the Lockean proviso is not an end-state principle , his 
argument is unconvincing since the purpose of the proviso is to prevent certain 
situations arising (albeit through controlling the exchanges which would lead to the 
undesirable situation). That is, how the situation arises is important but is 
secondary to the result, otherwise the result could not be overturned. Just as end-
state theories would require continuous interference in people's lives, so too would 
adherence to Nozick's system of transfer as limited by the Lockean proviso, 
especially as populations grow and resources diminish, necessitating a redistribution 
of land, for example. Nozick does not believe this to be so. Scarcity would push up 
prices making it more d i f f icu l t for monopoly situations to arise. " I believe that the 
free operation of a market system wil l not actually run afoul of the Lockean 
proviso" he writes. An end-state principle eliminates the choice to do as one 
wishes with one's possessions and introduces redistribution through taxation, 
tantamount to forced labour. We have no duty to contribute to the welfare of 
others, other have no rights against us in this respect. Any individual feeling he has 
such a duty should contribute through a system of charity. There is no good 
argument for using the state as an agency for achieving certain desirable ends. 
Those who disagree wil l have to show why all should contribute to the welfare of 
the least wel l -off including those with special needs and in a weak bargaining 
position, such as the old and sick. It is as though Nozick's individuals are born into 
the world preformed, bearing no marks of generations of shared experiences and 
cultural developments, and therefore with no sense of belonging to a community or 
of duty to fellow members. The whole concept of "having a right" has little value in 
this context. The worth of the right to life is minimised since it does not include 
the right to the necessities to sustain l i fe , such as food. 
He argues that the right to l i fe cannot provide a foundation for a theory of 
property rights; the theory of property rights is needed first, and this can then be 
applied to a "supposed right to life". Surely not. The right to l i fe is the most basic 
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right, f rom which other rights, including property ownership, should be derived. 
This must be the point of the Lockean proviso! Nozick argues that the right to l i fe 
"requires a substructure of things and materials and actions"^ to which others may 
have rights and entitlements, and their right to ownership is inviolable, but he gives 
no adequate justification for the primacy of the right to property ownership. Nor 
does he explain how anyone can have permanent rights to a previously unowned 
thing to the detriment of future generations, his only criterion being that the 
ownership wi l l not deprive others of something essential to l ife. Nor does he 
provide convincing arguments to refute the suggestion that property ownership 
rights should be overridden in certain circumstances. A chain of voluntary 
unforced exchanges in the market place could leave many people with an excess of 
food. The Lockean proviso wi l l not come into play i f the exchanges do not result in 
a worsening of the position of those no longer at liberty to use the excess (including, 
we must suppose, the starving, whose position is not worsened since they could not 
buy the food in the first place). 
Again, he argues that a medical researcher who synthesises freely available 
chemicals into a new substance does not worsen the situation of others who need it 
by depriving them of i t . But he is quite wrong in saying that those who need the 
new substance but do not have it are no worse of f . A new situation prevails, in 
which a cure for their condition is available, when previously no such cure existed. 
It cannot be disinvented and those who need it and are deprived of i t are in a worse 
situation. It is simply inadequate to suggest that they obtain and synthesise the 
materials themselves, unless they are readily available and the chemist is willing to 
disclose his technique. Nozick imposes no moral duty on the inventor thus 
demonstrating the inadequacy of his theory of rights, and exposing the lack of a 
theory of duty. Not only is Nozick's argument morally unsound because of the 
shaky theory of rights upon which it is based, it is also incorrect to say that the 
researcher's ownership does not breach the Lockean proviso, since what is important 
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is not the appropriation of some of the freely available chemicals but of all the 
synthesised substance. Exclusive property rights in this new, previously unowned 
substance wi l l worsen the position of those not at liberty to use it. 
The problem for Nozick is that market forces create morally intolerable situations. 
Hence the Lockean proviso. In the above example the means to life could be quite 
legitimately denied to a sick person with no moral opprobrium attaching to the 
inventor. In which case the right to life is worthless. The result of the unfettered 
free market is to place those who are naive, f r a i l , feckless, temperamentally 
unsuited to bargaining, in a weak position, and less able to safeguard their rights 
and possessions. Individual agreements in , say, a series of buying and selling houses 
may result in many being unable to afford to buy. Providing sufficient homes may 
be beyond the means of existing charities. We live in a structurally complex world 
in which our communities are affected by events, national and international, 
beyond their control. Over a period of time the system of exchange leaves many 
wel l -off and many unable to fend for themselves, and neither the Lockean proviso 
nor the principle of rectification can be called upon to help i f no injustice has taken 
place at any stage - i f , for example, a labourer exchanges his skills for a fair wage 
until there is no demand for his skills on the market. Obviously Nozick would 
argue that no free exchanges can be overturned in order to provide for the 
unemployed. He correctly points out that those who argue for end-state principles 
also hold that the labourer is entitled to the fruits of his labour, that how something 
comes to be held is important, but for Nozick the "how" is the only consideration.* 
The theories of justice of Hobhouse, Rawls and Walzer are a response to laissez-faire 
* Note that Nozick's theory is based on entitlement, not desert, a point made by 
Maclntyre , and which wi l l be discussed in chapter 6. 
liberalism's disastrous consequences. It would be impossible to correct the gross 
inequalities which have arisen because of past unjust exchanges, to achieve a 
situation which Nozick would regard as fair. 
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Nozick arrives at the conclusion, based on the principles of justice in holdings 
(acquisition and transfer), that there can be no argument for a state more extensive 
than the minimal state, since there is no need for an agency to deal with problems 
of distributive justice, but merely for an agency to apply, where necessary, the 
principle of rectification and to provide security. A more extensive state can be 
justified only as a temporary measure to rectify large-scale past injustices. In the 
minimal state all wi l l acquire what they wi l l , those weakened in the bargaining 
process wi l l have to fend as best they can against the wealthy and against the 
cumulative effects of past exchanges, their own and others'. Even though all may 
cooperate with whomsoever they like there is no vision of community in which all 
are included, to which all contribute and f rom which all benefit. 
And just as an extensive state is not needed to achieve ends associated with 
principles of distributive justice, neither is i t needed to achieve greater economic 
equality " in order to avoid the pol i t ica l inequalities w i t h which economic 
inequalities are often correlated". He argues that the state's use of its power to 
raise taxes to enrich some at the expense of others is illegitimate. I f this power is 
removed, as i t would be in the minimal state, there is no motive for wanting 
political power, since nothing is to be gained by having it. Except to safeguard the 
considerable income to be made f rom client-citizens having to buy security f rom the 
monopoly - not so much protection as a protection racket; and there are those who 
simply like to wield power for its own sake! 
Concluding remarks 
Nozick's minimal state, whose sole function is protection of individual rights, is 
very likely to be the perpetrator of extensive rights' violations, with no claim to 
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legitimacy other than might and no competitors to check its actions. There is no 
reason to believe that an agency with a monopoly of power would continue to 
protect its clients rather than exploit them, or refrain f rom exploiting the 
independents. Market forces are not a substitute for moral argument in deciding 
which systems of justice are permissible. As I have observed a rationally created 
state, which tries to limit the forces of coercion, and which is based on widely 
accepted principles of justice upheld through the application of reliable procedures, 
is more desirable than an agency based on profit , whose clients are swayed by 
considerations of effectiveness, not justice. 
When Nozick writes that the dominant protective agency is morally required to 
offer protection to all, his notion of morality is based on a defective compensation 
thesis, rather than on the stronger argument that would follow f rom a recognition 
that, given the chance to act rationally, people could and would cooperate in 
creating a state in which all would be protected and enjoy security and peace of 
mind. This is a necessary condition for living together in an acceptable manner. 
I have commented on Nozick's theory of rights and his criticisms of redistribution. 
Individual liberty is a basic precept of liberalism, yet individuals do not operate as 
atoms. We live in communities, are born into relationships, acquire responsibilities. 
In the following chapters I wi l l discuss the theories of philosophers to whom social 
relationships are as fundamental a starting point to any discussion on the nature of 
the state as restraint on boundary-crossing actions is to Nozick. Nozick's liberalism 
emphasises liberty and unrestrained market forces, with no place for community or 
for man as a social being. Even in his Utopian framework all relationships are 
contractural in nature. 
Consent is deemed to be indispensable to the authority of the liberal state, so much 
so that its definition has been stretched beyond tolerable limits. It may be felt that 
Nozick is the ultimate consent theorist; nobody may cross another's boundary 
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without consent. However consent is not relevant in the formation of the minimal 
state, since no-one consents to a specific agency having a monopoly of force, nor 
even to the principle that one agency should have such a monopoly, nor to the 
principles of justice in holdings. An individual must give his consent before his 
boundaries can be crossed, but there is no consent to the functions and activities of 
the dominant protective agency (other than a possible business contract between the 
agency and the client) in the sense of a political or social contract. Nozick would 
argue that none is necessary since the agency has very limited functions and its 
coercive power is used in such a way that the consent of those against whom it is 
used i t not required; that is, it uses force just as an individual would legitimately 
use force to protect himself in certain situations. 
Nevertheless the clients do not participate in the decision-making processes of the 
dominant protective agency, nor exercise any control over its coercive power. 
Theoretically a client could withdraw his custom, but since there is only one 
effective force there is no real choice. The market forces which allowed the 
monopoly to arise would be powerless to moderate its activities. Pateman suggests 
that representation is a key feature of liberal democracy , but in the minimal state 
there is no concept of democratic control to provide the political and social 
framework within which the dominant agency could legitimately operate. Such 
democratic control would be neither possible nor necessary. 
The idea of citizenship could only be developed at a sub-state level, but ideals of 
cooperative decision-making, participation in joint ventures, the search for common 
ideals and a shared purpose are all compromised by Nozick's insistence on the 
contractural nature of all relationships. It would not be possible to realise these 
ideals through the state. The development of cooperative associations would starkly 
demonstrate and contrast with the lack of control over the state, and with the state's 
limited functions. Even i f we acknowledge that the modern state is not the ideal 
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vehicle to achieve communal ends, that people feel divorced f rom the decisions 
made on their behalf, the alternative is certainly not to allow a monopoly of force 
to rest in the hands of an agency whose sole claim to legitimacy is that it has seen 
o f f its competitors in the market place. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Hobhouse : The Harmonious State 
Nozick argues that individuals are free to the extent that they can pursue their own 
ends without interference, but that no individual has the obligation or duty to 
contribute to the well-being of others or to provide them with the means to pursue 
their ends. The discussion of isolated individualism does not end here, but 
meanwhile I turn my attention to a writer who believes that men are essentially 
social beings, mutually dependent, with inescapable obligations, and that the worth 
of liberty is greatly diminished for those individuals who do not have the means to 
satisfy their basic needs. The contrast between the social justice of Hobhouse and 
Nozick's entitlement theory of justice - justice in an asocial setting - stems from 
their very different understandings of the individual and his relationship to others. 
Their philosophical arguments are derivative of, rather than justifications for, their 
ideological starting points. Hobhouse's harmonious society is an antidote to the 
fragmented relationships resulting from Nozick's unrestrained individualism. 
In this chapter I wi l l examine "The Elements of Social Justice"* in which Hobhouse 
explains his theory of harmony, moving f rom abstract arguments about the nature 
of rights, duties, liberty, to justice and the individual, thence to economic justice, 
with a final section on the individual in a political setting. 
Individualism. Collectivism and Social Justice 
Hobhouse's system of social justice is not designed, like that of Nozick, to erect 
barriers around each individual, but to integrate the individual into an organic 
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whole. The conditions necessary for individual growth and the principles of social 
l i fe he calls social justice, and social and political institutions are the organs of 
social l i fe . The task is to design institutions which uphold the principles of social 
justice. There must be an ethical principle underlying and guiding all human 
relationships, and this principle of the good is defined as a harmony between 
"feeling and action and experience". Moreover our social feelings lead us to 
include "in the end all men whom my action may affect in the harmony that I can 
be satisfied with as really good". And note, these feelings carry "the burden of 
obligation".'* He considers these principles to be rational, leading to correct 
judgements of right and wrong, for i f we all preferred ourselves, and it was good to 
do so, then the same act could be reasonably held to be good and bad by different 
people. The ultimate good would be a complete harmony in which all contradictory 
feelings are reconciled, with all fundamental needs satisfied in a fu l f i l l ed l i fe . This 
harmony is not achieved through repression (of personal impulses, or by government 
of dissenting views) but through cooperation. 
Moreover individuals cannot be used as ends in pursuit of the greatest good since 
harmony demands we consider the feelings and experiences of all. He writes: "the 
happiness of many purchased at the expense of the few is better than that of the 
few purchased at the expense of the many. But i t is not harmony."^ The function 
of the state's institutions and laws is not merely to maintain social l i fe but to 
promote a harmonious l i fe . The state has a vital role to play in achieving 
Hobhouse's conception of the good, whereas Nozick's ideal of individual liberty 
demands a state which wil l not interfere in the independent lives of its citizens. 
Is there not a danger, however, that the individual could be sacrificed to the 
collective whole in the interests of harmony, that a minority's concerns could be 
consistently ignored? Hobhouse considers the dangers of both one-sided collectivism 
and one-sided individualism. The former "conceives the life of the community as 
30 
something qualitatively different f rom and superior to the lives of the component 
individuals",^ whereas one-sided individualism denies "the reality of the social 
group, refusing to conceive it as a distinct entity, insisting on resolving it into its 
component individuals as though these individuals were unaffected by the fact of 
association". Sometimes interests do conflict but this disharmony should be 
overcome as far as possible. Nobody should be crushed by the collective l i fe , but 
rather all should be completed by it and carried "to a higher harmony of wider 
sweep". In defining the common good he says i t is neither the sum of individual 
goods nor another kind of good opposed to individual goods, but it is the harmony 
of all individual goods. It is harmony within the individual and between 
individuals. Unlike Nozick he believes that organised society may set itself goals 
which appeal to all its members and contribute to its happiness. One problem is 
deciding on such goals. He regards national glory and power as false ends, and no 
doubt would regard them as such even i f all members of a community agreed on 
them, since pursuit of those goals would result in disharmony between nations. In 
other words any goals, to be legitimate, must conform to the demands of the ethical 
principle of harmony. 
Rights and Duties and Freedom 
One-sided individualism "attributes to the individual as against society anything 
which really belongs to him only as a member of society".^ This attitude is inherent 
in natural rights theory in which rights are treated as parts of a person, like limbs, 
not dependent on social circumstances (unlike duties). The obligation to keep faith 
begins as soon as men enter into a bargain, and the right to expect the bargain to be 
kept begins at the same time. These rights and duties are not established by 
political institutions but begin with social relations. Hobhouse comments on Locke's 
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saying that these rights and duties belong to man as man, not as members of society, 
f rom which i t could be inferred that they belong to men as individuals, prior to 
any social relationships - individuals standing "in casual temporary and external 
relations to one another".^ Hobhouse takes issue with such an abstraction. "The 
rights of men are not ... conditions precedent to society, but move and have their 
being in social life."** Rights and obligations go hand in hand; "right is a due seen 
from the point of view of the party to whom it is owed, and duty is the same thing 
seen from the point of view of the party owing it . The theory of rights which 
Nozick expounds tends to stress the rights rather than the obligations of atomised 
individuals entering into a random series of contractural relationships. Hobhouse, 
on the other hand, sees people as an integral part of a greater whole f rom which 
they receive many benefits and to which they contribute, and in contributing f i nd 
true fulf i lment . The principle of harmony seeks the good in the shared l ife. 
The purpose of a system of rights and duties is to promote the common welfare. 
Again there is a hint that the individual could be sacrificed to the greater good, 
because the lesser must at times give way to the greater. Although this breaches the 
principle of harmony, which demands that all be considered, Hobhouse seems to 
o f f e r no guidance in deciding between con f l i c t i ng claims which appear 
irreconcilable, and this is true not just of competing individuals but of minority 
groups within a collectivity. In the words of C M . G r i f f i n "no political principle in 
particular can be derived f rom the belief that what is harmonious is to be preferred 
to what is not". A l l have a share in the common welfare which is promoted by the 
system of rights - i t is the sum of their rights; and to it all must contribute - i t is the 
sum of their duties. Since the fulf i lment of each personality is an element of the 
common good each individual may claim the conditions necessary to i t . He defines 
a right as a claim on others, a legal right as a right recognised in law, a recognised 
moral right as a claim upheld by the moral judgement of the community and a true 
moral right as being demonstrably justifiable by relation to the common good, 
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whether or not i t is actually recognised. But no moral right can possibly conflict 
with the common good "as therein every rational aim is included and harmonized"^. 
Rights have moral validity not because they are conditions of personal development 
but because personality is an element of the common good in the principle of 
harmony. No individual right is allowed which could prove detrimental to others, 
and thus the individual appears to be protected. 
Nozick offers a precise procedural system of justice which might appear more 
attractive in that claims can be decided by how a situation arose rather than by the 
end result. Moreover the role of the state is severely restricted so that, in principle, 
the individual is protected from arbitrary interference. I criticised his theory on 
the grounds that it largely ignored man's duties as a social being, and Hobhouse is 
trying to define the principles on which this social relationship should be based. 
But because the community itself has claims against its members, and because the 
common welfare is paramount, one fears that the individual may be dominated by 
the community. But Hobhouse clearly does not see man as competing with the state. 
As G r i f f i n says "the idea of man versus the state is...absurd for H o b h o u s e " N o t e 
that two distinct sources of conflict have been mentioned - citizen against citizen 
and citizen against the state. Is i t fair to Hobhouse to say that he offers no 
principle for deciding between claims? 
He recognises that states at present are far f rom perfect and may well not act in the 
common interest. There is a distinction to be made between rational men in a 
community of harmony, in which individual and state would not come into conflict, 
and imperfect men pursuing their own ends in a state run by power-seeking 
politicians. The system of rights guarantees access to the means necessary to 
personal development and freedom from arbitrary interference. Nothing may be 
done to the individual which damages his welfare or ignores his needs and each 
individual is equally important to the common good. However as we shall see these 
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rights are limited in scope and do not give an individual freedom to do as he pleases 
with, for example, his wealth. The individual has no right to do anything deemed 
contrary to the common welfare. When citizens' claims compete then a choice is 
made bearing in mind the effect on the common welfare. This does not seem an 
unreasonable way to decide between irreconcilable claims of equal validity. The 
question is to define the common good! When rights and duties conflict the answer 
is neither to make one relation of l i fe dominate all others by erecting certain rules 
into absolute principles, nor to use the one supreme rule (the right of the common 
welfare) as the test in every case, because this would dispense with general rules and 
introduce great uncertainty into relationships. Every case would have to be judged 
on its merits. Rules do arise which govern our relationships and they must be 
judged by their contribution to the general harmony. To set them aside would be 
harmful to the common good. I take him to mean that such general rules as keeping 
contracts cannot be set aside - they are necessary for the conduct of human affairs, 
but in specific cases where the application of such a rule of right would conflict 
with another equally valid rule then a compromise (or, ideally, a synthesis) should 
be found. "Every valid claim of right rests on some real condition of the common 
good"**' he writes, but all relevant conditions have to be considered, i f necessary a 
synthesis arrived at, but i f any "real condition of the common good is violated, there 
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remains a disharmony" . 
Whereas Nozick starts with a principle of individual rights and derives his theory of 
the state and of individual behaviour f rom this principle, Hobhouse believes that i t 
is only f rom the experiences of a highly developed community that a system of 
rights and duties can be drawn, incorporating those factors which operate 
harmoniously, rejecting the disharmonious. Michael Walzer's theory of justice also 
relies heavily on the notion of shared experiences and understandings, as we shall 
see. Nozick rejects any general responsibility for others. I f property is acquired 
according to his just principles there is no right or duty of the state to redistribute 
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any of this property according to some general principle of welfare, nor has the 
individual a duty to others. In contrast Hobhouse insists on our general 
responsibilities to others as members of a community, and it is the experiences of 
the community which enable it to judge the rules by which i t lives, to consider the 
results of such rules and their contribution to a condition of harmony. 
Freedom for Hobhouse is the removal of external restraints and a condition of 
inner harmony in which impulses are checked, not opposing the wil l but for t i fy ing 
it . Man is not a being determined by the past, but one who values past experiences 
and considers the effect of each action. Decisions are shaped by values not self-
conceived and the individual responds within to external promptings. Personal 
development depends upon the individual making rational choices and the system of 
rights guarantees that he can do so. Securing individuals' well-being is an element 
of the common good. Freedom in society is in part freedom from arbitrary 
interference by another, that freedom guaranteed by Nozick's system of side 
constraints. Restraints are required to regulate the disharmonious aspects of a 
community's internal l i fe , to protect the freedom of others. 
He rejects the distinction made between self- and other-regarding actions, arguing 
that every act has some effect on the community, and that "the good of each is, on 
the principle of the common good, matter of concern to all". Thus the personal 
rights of the individual should not be in opposition to the rights of the community. 
It may be that without invading any acknowledged right a person may persuade 
another into a contract which is detrimental to the other's welfare, "and the state 
may be compelled, for this reason, to regulate contracts between parties of unequal 
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economic strength" , an example of adjusting the general rule for the common 
good. The community always retains the right to judge any act and its results. The 
weaker party to a contract has the right not to make the contract but not the means, 
and Hobhouse notes that the acceptance of disadvantageous terms by weaker parties 
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could result in a whole class being subjugated by another. I presume, although 
Hobhouse does not say so, that such a situation could be controlled on the grounds 
of the disharmony produced, but he notes that modification of the process has in 
the past been regarded as a curtailment of liberty. He argues that i t is a case of 
conflict of rights - the right to make contracts conflicting with "the right of a 
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competent and willing worker to the minimum conditions of a civilised existence" . 
And freedom of contract really does mean equality between the parties so that no 
compulsion is involved. "Free contract stands, like all other rights, in need of 
careful definition in all its bearings on the contracting parties and the good of the 
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community" There is a discrepancy between this explanation and his earlier 
assertion that no specific right of the individual may be transgressed in these 
circumstances. In this case we have a general rule of right which governs contracts; 
the rule has been modified as the result of experience. However the effects of 
actions cannot always be calculated in advance. In some circumstances even a rule 
which specifies such conditions may have adverse effects on third parties, and 
Hobhouse writes that the pursuit of a right cannot be legitimate i f it is "adverse to 
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some general condition of well-being" . He is concerned to l imit undue advantage, 
but what is undue advantage and how should i t be limited? Perhaps the vagueness 
in his description of rights and duties is inevitable since, unlike Nozick, Hobhouse 
is as concerned about the effects of actions as much as the inherent Tightness of the 
actions themselves. 
Hobhouse is aware of this problem. A right is a liberty which is restricted by the 
rights of all and by the rights of the community as a whole, and there is "a general 
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liberty of doing anything which does not invade any specific rights" . Is this 
definition of rights and liberties "indeterminate because rights rest on conditions of 
the common welfare which must ... be matters of opinion"?^ It is because the 
conditions of the common welfare are matters of opinion that we claim liberty of 
thought and action, "and it seems futile accordingly to construct a definition of 
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liberty which throws us back on the problematical and unknown" . That is to say 
we have these liberties for our personal development, which is a contribution to the 
common good, and in order to determine the common welfare which cannot 
otherwise be known; yet the liberty we claim is defined and restricted in terms of 
the common welfare which depends upon them to be known. In other words we 
need to identify, define, redefine the common good, and this wi l l always be a 
matter of opinion, so how can an appeal be made to the common good as though it is 
an objective standard? He answers that where ends do not clash there is a general 
liberty, but where two people cannot pursue their own ends without conflict then 
they cannot both have liberty. We have to choose between them, the choice resting 
on "the bearing of either end on the common welfare" according to our best 
judgement, but our best judgement wi l l be "the best in the circumstances" and is 
hardly definitive of the common good. 
In Hobhouse's discussion it is at times d i f f icu l t to distinguish between individual 
rights which are transgressed and the individual's welfare, and the right of the 
common welfare. Why judge an act or rule by the yardstick of the common welfare 
when it is an individual's rights and welfare which are at stake? The answer is that 
the whole system of rights is not designed to protect the individual qua individual 
but as a member of society, and what is being judged in each case is the likely 
effect of a rule's application on everyone else who may be touched by i t . In 
"Democracy and Reaction" Hobhouse says "the rights of an individual are what he 
may expect f rom a social organisation based on certain principles, and the test of 
his rights is this - that their persistent violation is in the end fatal to the principles 
of the organisation". However over or above this general consideration the 
community itself has certain rights. The individual has duties to the community 
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and Hobhouse asks "how far it can demand that service as a right?" , and "what 
right has the community, acting through its established organ, the Government, to 
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impose its wi l l upon a recusant minority?" He concludes that the community can 
enforce its wi l l in matters necessary to the common good. 
Liberty, says Hobhouse, is a condition of well-being and therefore a right, but rights 
are liberties to do specific things without interference so liberty cannot simply be 
anything that does not interfere with other rights, but "requires a positive definition 
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as that which itself wi l l not be interfered with" . The definition is important 
since i f liberty is a right i t must be taken into consideration when we are judging 
conflicts such as those mentioned earlier, and "other things equal i t wi l l always be 
the lesser liberty that we shall exclude" . I f the good of each individual is part of 
the common good should we not interfere with a person's liberty for the sake of the 
common good? Hobhouse replies that the individual wi l l not develop through 
coercion; he must be led to the fulf i lment of his personality through reason. 
Moreover the common good is based on harmony which requires toleration. Neither 
the individual nor society can attain growth and harmony through suppression of 
ideas. There is no f inal truth so individual freedom "becomes a necessity not merely 
for individual but for collective progress" . Rational minds wi l l discover the 
common good but we must accept that freedom of choice implies an individual's 
rejection of what is best for him. Freedom of choice is limited, of course, by the 
rights of others. 
"Since a right is itself normally a liberty, i t follows that the doctrine that liberty is 
limited by rights is not very remote f rom the suggestion that i t is limited by the like 
liberty of others" , but there are differences: the system of liberties is not "defined 
by the individual himself for himself, but must be defined by or on behalf of the 
community on the basis of the general well-being"^ 4, and to the rights of the 
individual are to be added the rights of the community as a whole. 
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Far from being indifferent to the individual the community needs the individual's 
judgement and character. I have already referred to Hobhouse's concern about the 
effects of actions over and above any considerations of procedural justice. Thus 
any group of individuals entering into an association may have powers which no 
individual has, and the powers of this new entity have to be judged and, i f 
necessary, constrained "by considering not only how they were built up, but what 
they are and how they are exercised" . 
For the individual liberty means "the open field for mind and character' 0 0, and the 
system of rights, and restrictions should be "conceived in the interest of such 
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development" . However the individual's liberty is limited by the other conditions 
of social organisation, and the majority can restrain a minority which seeks to 
thwart a "common plan" considered necessary for the common welfare. This is not 
simply a question of numbers - of the majority always having its way - "but the 
belief that is reasoned out according to the best of one's lights as to the necessities 
of the common good". In an important rider to these considerations Hobhouse 
points out that in practice the conduct of the state is less than perfect, both morally 
and practically, and its rights cannot be equated with the rights "which the 
community might very properly exercise i f it were adequately organised for the 
purpose of conducting its affairs in the best possible way" . However i t is the 
state's function to "secure the benefits of organisation and the maintenance of all 
personal rights against private oppression"^. There are two points arising f rom this 
which demonstrate the marked contrast between Hobhouse and Nozick. The first 
refers to wealth and benefits as the result of common rather than individual effort . 
Taxation is not loss of liberty for some "but an appropriation to common ends of 
wealth which arises out of common effor ts"^ . The state performs functions which 
"require the organised resources of the community as a whole"^. The second point 
also refers to the state's function in the distributive process. The state's role in 
protecting the individual from "private oppression" is common to both Nozick and 
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Hobhouse, and as Hobhouse says state control in this respect is an extension of 
liberty, as long as other private rights are not sacrificed "to the ubiquitous 
encroachments of state authority"^. But he also sees redistribution as an extension 
of liberty and Nozick, of course, would regard the state's role in this respect as just 
such an encroachment of private rights. 
I f the state is imperfect, under what conditions, Hobhouse asks, do law and 
government represent "the wil l or the good of the community"?^. Liberty is 
freedom to develop one's personality; law is a positive aid to freedom, not a 
constraint. It is the individual's good which is to be realised in society, not the 
state's. But the basis of liberty is harmony to which all lives contribute and so "it 
follows that free institutions are those which arise out of the character and wi l l of 
all the individuals who live under them by a process of growth"^ . From the 
importance of each individual to the whole is implied the principle of political 
democracy. His is a community based on harmony and cooperation, on a delicate 
balance between collective action and individual freedom. 
The purpose of political liberty is not to guarantee an individual's other rights. 
Rather i t is a duty which all share - it prevents domination by one group, it enables 
interests and claims to be heard and the common welfare to be determined. The 
basis of society, then, is not wi l l imposed by force, but cooperation. Restraints 
imposed for the common good are willingly accepted, not regarded as constraints 
but as guarantees of freedom through rational self-determination. 
Equality and Distributive Justice 
It may be said that rights belong to all equally not because of social and moral 
capacities, in which all are not equal, but because the human soul is "deeper than all 
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differences . But men have a variety of relationships, as parents, children, parties 
to contracts and so forth, and equal rights means that within these various 
relationships specific rights and duties apply to all, and all men have an equal right 
to enter into these special relationships. Thus at this stage equality means "equality 
in some fundamental rights, including ... the right of enjoying and entering into 
special relations . The starting point here is a common human nature. However 
i f we begin with considerations such as merit we may argue for a principle of 
"proportionate equality" based on equal treatment for those of equal merit. But the 
rights of children for instance do not depend upon merit, but "to a human being as 
such"4**. Strangely he argues that "to each according to his needs" is a proportionate 
rather than an absolute principle, since different quantities of necessities are 
needed by different individuals. But surely the principle is absolute, since everyone 
is entitled to satisfaction of their basic needs, the distribution of goods depending 
upon the particular circumstances of individuals. A proportionate system is based 
on effort or some other factor not attributable to all persons as persons. But 
Hobhouse argues that "the claim of a need is proportioned to its urgency. We may 
then regard even the most universal of common rights of man as proportioned to 
their needs"4 9. 
He then states the following propositions: 
" 1 . By equality is meant equality of proportion between 
claims and satisfaction. 
2. Claims are based either on need or desert... 
3. Desert may be measured by effort or attainment. 
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These principles are of general application. But further, men are born or enter into 
special relations to particular people. In regard to these equality means: 
4. (a) Equal reciprocal obligation... 
(b) Equal opportunity to all to enter into such special 
relations as are constituted by human choice". 
These rights "may be held to attach to personality as such... They may be held 
qualified by what the man has done, is doing, or about to do, that is, by desert"^. 
In the modern liberal state the law is applied equally and impartially. Rules of law 
are wise and good i f they are "the most effective that can be devised" to serve the 
common good. In this sense justice - the right ordering of human relations - "is the 
impartial application of a rule founded on the common good"^*. I f justice is a 
derivative of the common good is i t not also "some constituent of the common good 
on which the rules are ethically based"? The principle of harmony is based on the 
principle of justice which declares that moral judgements are universal; that is, 
they cannot be applied partially for this would contradict their rational character. 
The principle of harmony, which demands equal consideration for all, needs rules of 
law which wi l l serve the common good, and it is in this sense that justice is a 
derivative of the common good. 
A l l must be equally considered in determining the common good and their 
differences and diversities are recognised by the conditions o f harmony. 
Differences in what is due to or f rom an individual must be differences required by 
the common good, which is concerned to satisfy only those claims for the conditions 
necessary to harmony. This is an individual's "real good and its conditions his real 
need" . To meet the same need individuals may require different things, a 
principle upheld by Dworkin who distinguishes between treating people equally and 
treating them as equals (see Chapter 5). Urgent claims should first be dealt with, 
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but within "the adequacy of resources" all should be satisfied and the principle of 
distribution by need is a principle of equality. Added to these basic considerations 
is the necessity to maintain the functions which serve the common good, and since 
these functions require different conditions this implies different needs, bringing to 
mind Plato's Republic in which justice in the state is the performance by each group 
of its proper functions, the needs of each group being different. Hobhouse defines 
"distributive justice as equal satisfaction of equal needs, subject to the adequate 
maintenance of useful functions"^, that is, subject to a condition prescribed by the 
needs themselves (the needs being the conditions necessary to maintain the functions 
on which the common good depends, the common good being a condition of 
harmony, and his real needs being these necessary conditions!) 
Is justice "that apportionment which wi l l yield the greatest good" even i f the weak 
suffer, or are we all entitled to the same degree of consideration despite differences 
in actual development or capacity for development? Not the former, since i t would 
conflict with the rule of harmony for one person's interests to be neglected. Pursuit 
of excellence is an unworthy end i f at the expense of weaker members of society. 
Nor should collective achievement displace individual achievement. "If...the 
principle of harmony is maintained, then collective achievement is the harmony of 
personal achievements carried to their highest power and in this harmony every 
personality receives all the consideration which mutual consistency allows"^. Thus 
a collective achievement in which no individual is indispensable does not mean that 
each individual is without value; the achievement is the result of each individual's 
personal effort added to that of all other individuals to create something otherwise 
not possible. 
It is all too easy to argue for inequalities now that wi l l produce "lasting benefits for 
all" at some future time, so disharmony is only allowed to achieve a stated aim in 
the near future, another point also made by Dworkin. Having rejected the argument 
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for cultivating excellence at the expense of some to achieve progress, Hobhouse 
turns his attention to the problem of inequality caused by economic success. The 
possession of certain abilities enables some to do well in economic terms, and the 
resulting inequalities are perpetuated through inheritance. This inequality is a 
social danger, despite formal political equality, because economic power can be used 
to undermine civil and political liberties. 
Human achievement, as economic or military hegemony, leads to inequality both 
internally, and of one people over another. Not only is it a social danger but 
"modern law and ethics have...insisted on the equal enjoyment of certain elementary 
rights, including...the right of self-advancement"^. Whilst conceding that "the 
ethical importance of equality" needs to be more clearly defined - although his 
principle of harmony and the needs of individual development and the common 
good do seem to be f i r m foundations for the ethical justification of the principle of 
equality - he refutes "the easy view of the comfortable that inequality is inherent in 
57 
progress" . Differences in social position and wealth occur because of our varying 
gifts, attributes and capabilities, but advantages are often used to oppress, and 
inheritance gives advantage to those who have not earned it (and the creation of 
the inherited wealth was made possible by communal effor t) , so that the unity of 
society may eventually be destroyed. Our differences should not be translated into 
material inequalities of a destructive nature. ( I shall outline Hobhouse's theory of 
property rights later). He considers that equality of right "sets itself against" 
tendencies to oppress, and he opt imis t ica l ly observes that "the greater the 
responsibility put upon the strong and more capable to regard and serve the weaker, 
CO 
the keener is the stimulus to their faculties... . 
Hobhouse rejects any development in some which obstructs the development of 
others. Whilst recognising differences in development, his principle of harmony 
would not allow great social differences, so f rom Hobhouse's arguments i t could be 
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deduced that he would favour a strong principle of economic equality. He would 
then reject the Rawlsian justification of social and economic inequalities i f they are 
arranged to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged. But he introduces a 
principle of development which is unnervingly Rawlsian in character: "There may 
be great inequalities of development, but to satisfy ethical requirements they must 
be such that the further the development is pushed in any one person, the more i t 
tends on the whole to assist the corresponding development of all others whom it 
can ef fec t" 5 9 . 
I have already noted his objection to inequality now for the sake of future good, 
and he writes that "the social value of material wealth tends to increase as the 
distribution becomes more equable"^. Furthermore i f there are insufficient 
resources to enable all to fu l ly develop, then deliberate inequality (the good l ife for 
some being the best we can manage) is rejected since the common good cannot 
deliberately exclude some of those to whom it applies, a point forcefully made by 
Dworkin (see Chapter 5). I f there is shortage, distribution is based on need 
according to principles of maintenance of essential services, strong defending the 
weak etc., and no luxuries are allowed - "no amount of unnecessary comfort is to be 
balanced against deprivation of necessities in a single case"*^. 
We thus have principles of justice and distribution based on the common good, 
individual development and the principle of harmony. Distribution is based on 
need and maintenance of services essential to the common good, with great 
inequality of wealth inimicable to the conditions necessary to produce harmony. 
Equality, one of the principles of harmony, is defined as "equality of consideration" 
in defining the common good, equal satisfaction of basic needs, and distribution of 
wealth tending towards the equable. The justification of redistribution according to 
need is based on the right of each individual to the conditions necessary to his 
development - men living as social beings developing to their fullest as members of 
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society. This right in its turn derives f rom the principle of harmony. But how are 
the general principles of justice, including principles of distribution, to be 
interpreted in practice? What exactly can any individual claim f rom the common 
good to enable him to live in harmony? Where wealth is limited Hobhouse has 
formulated certain priorities for the satisfaction of needs; assuming an abundance 
of wealth what social and economic inequalities are permissible, given that in a 
harmonious society all contribute to the best of their ability to the common welfare? 
Are the equal needs of equal members to be met unconditionally? 
Retributive Justice 
Justice has to maintain the functions which serve the needs of the community. The 
most efficient way in which i t can do so is through the method of reward and 
punishment, which is based on the principle of "to each according to his deserts". 
What then has happened to the principle of "to each according to his needs", and is 
the system of reward and punishment the obvious system in a harmonious and 
rational society? Hobhouse argues that rewarding effort results in payment for 
failures and weaknesses; rewarding performance we pay a man for gifts with which 
he was born. I f we reward effort or moral w i l l , rather than success, can we say that 
the individual is entitled to his reward any more than he would be entitled to 
reward for the gifts he was born with, because development of moral wi l l is due to 
the forces fashioning a life? Can desert, then, be justified as a basis of reward? 
He avoids the problem of "ultimate causation" which would lead us to question 
whether anyone was ever responsible for their own actions. "A responsible agent is 
one who knows what he is about, no matter how he came to know..." and who 
knowingly directs "his action to some end because that end appeals to him . The 
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responsible agent can also examine the effects of his acts. Responsibility involves 
not only a rational process but also feeling, for it is feeling which guides the wi l l . 
Is the rational responsible agent, with disciplined wi l l , entitled to bear "the fruits of 
his voluntary acts"?^ Since acts have good and bad social effects i t is impossible 
for the individual to bear all the fruits. He argues that to make a man the sole 
bearer of the consequences of his acts implies a quite impossible individualism. On 
the other hand it is "impossible socialism" to offer vice and virtue as their own 
rewards. 
Thus i f a person's actions are based on his wi l l which in turn is developed by forces 
entirely outside his control - i f , in fact, his "wil l" is a matter of chance - then 
whatever his acts, good or bad, they are the result of the social setting in which he 
lives and to "society" therefore belongs the credit or the blame. I f on the other hand 
we believe in personal responsibility then credit or blame are due to the individual. 
We may believe a bit of both (as Hobhouse does) and want to apportion blame or 
reward accordingly, but we should look at the condition of the individual actor, 
not, like Hobhouse, at the effects of the action, although a rational being takes into 
consideration the likely results of his acts. 
Why is i t impossible to say, as Hobhouse argues, that a man cannot bear the whole 
fruits of his acts? In one sense this is true - i f my act has wrought misfortune on 
others they bear the cost, especially non-material costs. However I can be held fu l ly 
responsible for my act and made to bear its fruits insofar as I could be made to 
compensate others for their loss. I f my act brings unintended benefits to others 
perhaps they should compensate me for their good fortune! Since Hobhouse's whole 
argument rests on the premiss that men are not individuals in isolation, but members 
of society dependent on others to f ind true fulf i lment, he constructs an argument 
for desert based on the synthesis (or uneasy tension?) between individual 
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responsibility and communal influence and responsibility. 
I f we were sufficiently aware of our responsibility to the common good we would 
always do our best for the common good. This is what Hobhouse means by virtue as 
its own reward since we would cast aside purely self-interested considerations. But 
he says that we all have legitimate self-interests "not necessarily identical with the 
common good"*^. How can this be so? It is surely a logical impossibility for us to 
have legitimate self-interests which are not identical with the common good. He 
himself writes that it is for the common good that we should have self-interests, 
because the common good lies in "the exaltation of the personal life"***\ In fact, he 
writes, in pursuing our self-interests "we should be governed by certain principles of 
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universal application" . In other words, in pursuing our interests we observe 
certain rules which make possible living together peacefully in society, and we 
recognise our duty to contribute to the welfare of others. It is the social function of 
retributive justice - the system of rewards and punishments - to instil in men this 
sense of belonging to society, of seeing the effects of acts on others, and making 
judgements about future acts in this light. Although this is the function of 
retributive justice its roots lie in "the principle of harmony and its corollary the 
equal partnership in rights and duties" . He goes on to say that "to be adequate to 
the requirements of justice there must be such reciprocity between the community 
and its servants as harmonizes the private and common interest, and this is the 
function of reward , but how great a reward is the subject of economic justice 
which he discusses later. In principle the man who secures the common interest 
whilst serving his own should not lose. 
Punishment must be the minimum possible which allows society to protect itself and 
which discourages lawbreaking, whilst doing the least harm to the offender, the best 
form of punishment being the offender's realization of what he has done "for we 
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want him to enter into the ethical community as a conscious and responsible 
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agent" Thus at one level Hobhouse wishes the individual to be left to his 
conscience, but punishment is a form of deterrence, a means of social control, so 
that in this context people do bear the consequences of their actions. This concept 
of desert justifies the principle of justice to maintain the functions which serve the 
community. The system of reward is based on the principle of treating every man 
according to his deserts and this harmonises private and common interests. But the 
maintenance of functions is required by the common good and does not need to be 
justified by a principle of desert. Happily, perhaps, they coincide and are mutually 
supportive, but both are justified independently. 
Payment 
It is only by bearing in mind an individual's dependence on others that we can 
reconcile the private interest and justice to the individual (the fruit 's of a man's 
acts are his moral deserts) with the public interest which wil l share the reward. As 
Nozick pointed out those who argue for end-state principles also argue that the 
labourer is entitled to enjoy the fruits of his labour. Reward, as we have seen, is 
partly based on the maintenance of functions, but payment for service - a system of 
exchange - in which both parties to a contract are satisfied, seems to involve 
exchange of equal values, bearing in mind that consent does not necessarily indicate 
willingness, that one party may act with insufficient information etc. Judging such 
transactions requires an objective standard of fairness. I f something can be freely 
exchanged it has an "exchange value" and this gives rise to a simple principle of 
fairness based on exchange at equal values, and such an exchange "is just i f we 
consider i t as an isolated transaction in an open market where values are 
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determinate and all sorts of exchanges readily made" . Whereas Nozick argued 
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that in a free market value was determined by market forces and that provided the 
transactions did not transgress the correct principles of exchange, then right to 
ownership precluded interference and whatever pattern resulted f rom the sum of 
exchanges was just, Hobhouse says that exchanges are not isolated transactions. We 
have to look at the whole system to see whether or not i t is working fairly, and at 
the standard of value itself. Selling at a loss, for instance, because of market 
fluctuations could be an injustice. "Exchange is an incident in the production and 
distribution of wealth, and must be judged by its bearing on the whole of these 
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processes' writes Hobhouse, and "in the economic field justice wi l l be achieved by 
exchange at equal values provided that the standard of value is fixed by justice in 
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general" . The principles to which the standard of value must relate are those of a 
just economic organisation, namely equal provision for equal needs, subject to the 
adequate maintenance of the functions which supply the needs; and, the private 
interests of the performer of a function must harmonize with those of the 
community. 
The economic system serves the community - individuals as members of a 
community - rather than isolated individuals making a series of discrete exchanges. 
I t is directed towards meeting the needs of all members of the community according 
to the urgency of the need (whilst maintaining necessary functions). Children, the 
aged and the disabled, as our dependents, have a moral claim on us to give them the 
best we can afford to meet their needs. Other needs may be provided for without 
equivalent service provided that there "is no crippling burden on production" . A l l 
needs supplied without return must be either universal or for the special cases just 
mentioned. Other than these cases no wealth can be acquired except through social 
service. He further writes that "the lowest remuneration for work done" must be 
such that the least capable worker "actually required by the operation of the 
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industrial system" is maintained "in a condition of f u l l civic efficiency" , which 
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quaint phrase makes the worker sound like a useful unit of production, but what 
Hobhouse has in mind is that such a worker should earn at least sufficient to be 
able to care for himself and his family and to be able to develop his faculties to the 
fullest. 
In a system of free exchange unskilled workers are unlikely to reach this minimum, 
except through the intervention of trades unions or wages councils. Whilst these 
institutions might boost wages, the wages are still not earned, unless in a free 
exchange system earnings depend not only on an individual's "power of work, but on 
his power of getting himself paid for it" . This system would prevent those with 
little bargaining power f rom earning a just wage. On the other hand a just system 
would yield a situation in which each producer would be paid the civic minimum 
and each producer required by the system would produce more than he is paid - thus 
are harmonised the interests of the producer and of the community. The weakest 
worker in such a system earns his pay. 
The fact that a free exchange system does not give adequate reward to all reflects 
the basic immorality of the system in which the quality of an individual's l i fe and 
his chances for self-fulfi lment depend upon his marketable skills, the market being 
the mechanism for deciding the values placed on skills and talents. It is unclear 
what Hobhouse would suggest as the minimum wage for a worker not required by 
the industrial system. What, for instance, of a gardener setting flower beds in a 
public park, contributing to the common good, or anyone else engaged in non-
essentials which enhance our lives? Any man hired for his labours and skills 
deserves such a wage that wi l l enable him to live in dignity and comfort 
commensurate with the general level of wealth available to a society. That is, the 
economic system, as Hobhouse argues, must serve the community, and the individual 
is not to be treated as an economic unit whose value depends on market forces. I f a 
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community is poor then expectations have to be lower to reduce unemployment, for 
the higher the wages paid to some the less money wi l l there be to pay others. 
Assuming prime needs are met there wi l l be a general spread of unmet secondary 
needs or comforts. Although Hobhouse writes that when all prime needs have been 
met the requirements of the minimum standard become less rigid - and in a rich 
country would be higher than in a poor one - I would still argue that the principle 
of harmony should have something to say about both maximum and minimum wages 
in order to avoid great discrepancies of wealth within the community. Hobhouse 
does mention this as I shall explain shortly. 
There are problems with a minimum wage which is designed simply to meet basic 
needs in a community which wi l l satisfy these needs anyway. In Hobhouse's words 
"the prime needs of all must be met without regard to their work simply because 
they are prime needs... It is therefore, i t may be said, something of a mockery to tell 
the unskilled worker that he is earning what he would in any case receive f rom the 
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community fo r his needs as a human being" . Hobhouse replies, rather 
unsatisfactorily, that whilst a worker can do what he likes with his money, others 
must spend their money on specific needs and under conditions specified by the 
community. Taking aside the idler, who simply refuses any obligation to work or 
contribute to the community, this argument not only makes second-class citizens out 
of dependents, denying them liberty and opportunity for self-fulfi lment as proper 
members of the community simply because of age or disability or lack of marketable 
skills, but is hardly satisfying to the worker on minimum wage who may well 
perceive little or no difference since all his income must go on satisfying his basic 
needs. As Hobhouse recognises, this is a disincentive to work: "it is clear ... that the 
whole o f our argument substantiates the alternative r ight to labour or 
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maintenance , by which I take him to mean the lowest paid would have the right 
not to work. Of course, some would work f rom considerations of self-respect, status, 
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companionship. The answer that suggests itself is that the idler has his basic needs 
met; that dependents such as the elderly or disabled have that support necessary to 
enable them to lead l ife to the fullest; that the minimum wage for a worker, given 
sufficient availability of wealth, is significantly above that which would just 
satisfy basic needs in order that the lowest paid worker has a real choice about how 
he spends it and how he leads his l i fe . This problem does not arise for Nozick since 
he argues that a man's goods are his to dispose of as he pleases, and there is no 
obligation to the needy, and no just wage other than that set by the free market 
which is accessible to all. But perhaps the di f f icul ty is unavoidable in a system 
designed both to maintain differentials in wages (to give reward for merit, for 
instance, or as an incentive), and to alleviate the worst excesses of a laissez-faire 
economy which would leave many workers very badly o f f , and at the same time has 
to meet the needs of those in special circumstances. 
For Hobhouse the problem is the proper basis for differentials, effor t or skill. Is 
the coal miner to be given greater reward than an academic who, with less physical 
effort makes a more valuable "social contribution"? He rejects the notion that a 
producer is entitled to the whole of the total value of his product, because the 
cooperating society is the major factor in wealth production - we depend on others 
for the tools we use and the system within which we operate. Similarly, he rejects 
the value of the free market which may be too little or too much. His own system 
of exchange, based on the principle of harmony between producer and consumer, 
means that exchange takes place at equal value. I f the miner and the academic do 
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their best "as a matter of social duty" , and i f i t costs no more for one to give us 
the fruits of his labour than it costs the other to give us the fruits of his intellect, is 
this not a sufficient basis to determine reward? He argues that because of the 
great variety of men's motives, "some measure of remuneration by achievement as 
distinct f rom effort does ... promote achievement" . The question is whether the 
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differentiation is just, "an intrinsically desirable element in a social system" , or 
only an unfortunately necessary price we have to pay. The common good 
encompasses all personal interests, which include the need for individuals to make 
the most of their lives in their own way. I f an individual gives fair value for all he 
enjoys then both he and society gain. This is really unconvincing since the least 
skilled worker wi l l not be given the incentive and opportunities offered to the more 
skilled. So opportunities for self-development are brought within the exchange 
system and used as economic incentive. Having argued that a free market tends to 
disharmony and has to be modified, Hobhouse is suggesting that incentives are 
necessary to encourage performance, which may be empirically true but is not the 
common good. 
I f , then, there is to be reward by achievement, how is its value to be assessed? In 
simple cases by proportional output, but between different kinds of work "there 
seems to be no standard of comparison except the economic equation of demand and 
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supply of available ability" . Abil i ty which makes a great contribution to wealth 
and is rare has a value which "is most nearly yielded by the remuneration which 
does, in fact, just serve to call forth and maintain an adequate supply of the 
necessary ability" . Reward so based is simply an operative fact, not an ethical 
principle. Payment by output is just, he has argued, given the civic minimum wage, 
and supply and demand simply measures "differential values of outputs of varying 
quali ty"^. But, of course, the desirability of such a system of measurement is 
questionable. I t does not give a reward based on value to society (other than in 
cases of wealth creation), especially where such valuable work is relatively 
unskilled or uses skills which many people have; and where "output" has little value 
placed on i t , an individual's opportunities are limited, as I have already pointed out. 
Neither the minimum wage system nor the system of supply and demand gives 
proper worth to the lower paid worker, since both systems are based on output; in 
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the case of the minimum wage the community must get back more than it gives. It 
seems that the skilled worker needs greater rewards to encourage him to share his 
talents and ability. 
It is not a matter of justice that the talented deserve greater rewards than the 
unskilled workers. I f the common good is served by individual development then 
every person needs the same "liberty, scope, opportunity" . Forces of supply and 
demand do not necessarily give proper reward for useful social work because, as I 
have argued, the skills involved are not necessarily scarce, and therefore the system 
does not work for the good of the community; wealth tends to accumulate and 
become very unevenly distributed. In wedding the measure of supply and demand 
to reward based on value, Hobhouse has managed to destroy the latter. He tries to 
ameliorate the worst effects of supply and demand by pegging incomes at a point 
beyond which they cannot possibly contribute to the satisfaction of real needs. 
Similarly, Rawls argues that above a certain level of material well-being, the better-
o f f members of society wi l l become less interested in the accumulation of more 
wealth and wi l l turn their attention to cultural pursuits. Such a policy is certainly 
necessary for Hobhouse to achieve his objective of "the harmonization of real 
O f . 
needs' but the limit is open to discussion. Set too low it would, of course, destroy 
the concept of supply and demand. But setting any limit may well serve as a 
disincentive to those very people who might expect the richest rewards. 
Thus he writes that "we must admit remuneration in proportion to the value of work 
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done as a maxim of economic justice" , which "makes possible a system of free 
00 
exchange - which wi l l never take place except at equal values'' . He is wrong 
because of the inadequacy of his definition of value. The system of supply and 
demand does not result in equal reward for equal value. Hobhouse, in trying to 
modify the free market system by limiting maximum pay and guaranteeing basic 
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needs, has not succeeded in establishing a just system of distribution of wealth. 
Unfortunately his system wil l not yield the good he expects of it; i t wi l l simply 
avoid the worst excesses of complete freedom of exchange at the top and bottom of 
the scale. He offers no truly objective standard for judging social worth. His 
system wi l l not give the expected benefits to society since those who do the most 
valuable work often do so despite the lack of incentive. 
He calls the principles of justice applied to social organisations Social Liberalism, 
which is distinguished f rom socialism with its centrally-planned economy. Despite 
the difficulties which I have noted Hobhouse himself envisages a society in which 
the good of each and all is harmonised; a society carefully balanced between 
unfettered individualism and a collectivism which would direct all aspects of 
economic and social l ife in the name of equality. Justice harmonises needs by 
providing equally for equal needs, and it harmonises functions with needs by 
maintaining them according to their priority in the satisfaction of needs, which 
determines their value, together with a consideration based on the di f f icul ty of 
having the function performed. Reward based on value of work harmonises the 
needs of the individual with those of the community. 
The foundation of justice is equality: "every person ... must be equally taken into 
on 
account in framing the plan of harmony" , writes Hobhouse, and he continues "the 
only ultimate ground of difference is some requirement of the working system of 
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harmony as a whole" . But this "only" yields great inequalities as I have pointed 
out, even to the extent of justifying greater opportunities for self-fulfi lment for 
those with marketable skills. Distribution is based on qualitative as well as 
quantitative criteria, "and in this relation the equality of justice is a proportionate 
equality" . Hobhouse takes the term from Aristotle - equality in proportion of 
merits to rights so that equal merit attracts equal reward. The problem for society 
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lies in defining worth and merit and then in asigning to worth a scale of values on 
which the system of rewards is based. However a system such as that advocated by 
Hobhouse wi l l increase inequality and tend to depress the worth of some members 
of society because rewards are economic rewards, and the distribution of wealth in 
this way apportions opportunity and power according to the arbitrariness of supply 
and demand. 
Property 
Hobhouse goes on to argue that distribution of wealth depends on property control 
and ownership - the liberty to do as one pleases with one's possessions. "So far as 
the direction of my l ife and the exercise of my faculties depend on the free disposal 
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... of material things, i t depends on my possession of property" . But what property 
and under what conditions are crucial questions, since one person's ownership (and 
hence freedom of use) may significantly effect others. An owner of land may 
restrict access, whilst "the possessors of capital have advantages in contracting with 
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workers which give them a very large measure of control over labour . Property 
ownership is freedom and power. These two functions of property ownership must 
be reconciled. "The economic expression of liberty", i.e. property ownership, is seen 
as a social function, socially controlled. Whilst "property as economic power must be 
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vested in the last resort in a self-governing community , the individual requires 
property "for the free conduct of his personal l i f e " ^ . Economic power, i f i t is to 
promote liberty, has to be communally directed, with effective participation for all 
in decision-making, and no individual having the power to dispose of the lives of 
others. 
I f property is both communally and individually owned, what is the apportionment? 
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Distribution based on justice is distribution according to need, effort , result, 
maintenance of functions. Does distribution based on claims to freedom coincide 
with the needs of justice? To have some freedom the worker requires an adequate 
income which is his out and out property to build up a home "and surround himself 
with those little personal belongings" . This measure of an individual's claim to 
property, he writes, "coincides precisely with the requirements of economic 
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justice" as previously set out. But surely this is not so. I f we were to use an 
objective measure of what is needed to make a home, then there would be a 
tendency toward equality of income (taking into account the number of dependents, 
special needs and so on). An individual's idea of what is needed to make a home 
could stray f rom this measure. The requirement of economic justice to which he 
referred distributes wealth not only by need, but also by merit and achievement, so 
that certain categories of skilled workers have much more opportunity for 
surrounding themselves with those little personal belongings, and greater personal 
freedom in deciding where and how to live. 
Regarding the communal claim to property Hobhouse writes that the community 
go 
carries out certain functions "which require their due return" . Now i f these 
functions include common security, education, public health, then the community 
claims wealth to pay for these activities, and because of the way economic l i fe is 
organised i t claims this wealth through a system of taxation. These conscious 
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activities, together with "the mere fact of social life" through which we all absorb 
skills and knowledge are "the grounds on which the community has a claim to the 
wealth produced by its m e m b e r s " H o w e v e r he also writes that "the state 
organization is to begin with the basis of security, and therewith ... of property 
itself. That consideration alone gives to the community the last word in deciding 
what rights of property i t wi l l recognise, and on what terms''*^. He rejects the 
view that all property is individually owned and that distribution is therefore 
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theft, that the function of the state would simply be to defend property rights. 
State interference with property ownership is regarded by Nozick as a restriction on 
liberty, whereas for Hobhouse redistribution enhances liberty since all must have 
the means to self-development, and ownership of property should not entail power 
over others. 
But what does Hobhouse mean when he says the state is the basis of security and 
therefore of property itself, because he writes as though this gives the state a claim 
over and above those claims based on social life? Property is social in two senses. 
The first I have already outlined. Secondly, i t is the organised force of society 
which protects owners; without this organisation property rights would be useless. 
Property rights are not absolute rights which the state must protect, but are rights 
only made possible through a social system which includes law and security - society 
makes possible the creation of wealth. It must be borne in mind that Hobhouse 
regards rights as subsequent to social relationships and as conditions of an 
individual's welfare. It is in this context that one can understand him saying that 
the community is the f inal arbiter in rights of property, basing its decisions on 
ethical principles. Thus natural resources, for instance, belong to the community, 
which may allow them to fa l l into private hands, under certain conditions. We may 
contrast this with the position taken by Nozick, who would allow natural resources 
to be acquired by anybody with the inclination to do so, save only for the 
conditions of the Lockean proviso. 
Inherited wealth is to be limited so that no child may live on it and "enjoy 
functionless wealth" , or, as Watzer would argue, to prevent wealth being 
converted into political power (see Chapter 4). The wealth an individual was 
allowed to accumulate (and dispose of as he wished) in his own lifetime devolves to 
the community at his death. This brings me back to asking how much wealth should 
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an individual be allowed in the first place, and i f accumulation of wealth is an 
economic driving force, then so too is its establishment as family wealth. Hobhouse 
must also have in mind the obligation of all to contribute to social l i fe through their 
own efforts, rather than to live on unearned income or use this capital to acquire 
further wealth, which could lead to grave economic and political injustice. The 
accumulation of wealth by a minority group wi l l weaken the very social l ife which 
made the acquisition possible in the first place, since power and influence are 
wielded by the wealthy, who wish to consolidate their positions. Private ownership 
of natural resources, and inherited wealth, are unnecessary "in a community which 
is fu l f i l l i ng adequately the functions of a common life" . 
Wealth is necessary to promote the material basis of the common good, but in an 
imperfect world where men's desires do not always coincide with the common good, 
some use of wealth is limited for the common good. For example, the insanitary 
house may be a source of wealth to its owner, but a hazard to the life of the 
tenant. A l l production, distribution, and consumption of wealth "is conditioned, 
ethically speaking, by the function of wealth as the material basis of personal and 
social l i f e " 1 0 4 . 
Industry and commerce have an ethical foundation on which the rights and 
obligations of productive l ife rest. Hobhouse argues that industry should be guided 
to produce social wealth, and that production for personal satisfaction is justifiable 
i f it contributes to the development of personality. The value of the whole system 
is judged by its success in "serving the needs of the community and the 
development of the social personality"' 0^. He recognises the profit motive, a 
necessary element in production, but private enterprise exists under conditions 
which are specified by the public interest and which are under public control. The 
task is to secure efficiency whilst bearing in mind the interests of owners, 
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employees and consumers. We stand at the borderline between state socialism and 
social liberalism he says. The industrial organisation he favours "is one in which 
unearned wealth would accrue to the community; the universal and elementary 
conditions of private work and remuneration would be laid down by law...; 
industrial management would be in the hands of joint boards of consumers and 
producers, the Mun ic ipa l i t y , cooperative associations, or private enterprise 
according to the nature of the industry, and the relative efficiency for varying 
purposes of which various forms of organization prove themselves capable" 
State intervention is justified by social harmony and the requirements of justice, 
but Hobhouse defends the market economy, controlled by the state and given public 
ends. Needs are catered for and effort is rewarded. It is interesting to note that the 
tension between these two principles - the social market on the one hand, reward for 
individual effort on the other - is always present, and perhaps marks the essential 
weakness of the whole theory of social harmony, namely that only the best men wi l l 
work for the love of society, the remainder need inducement, yet the theory is based 
on the activities of rational men who are beyond such pettiness. 
The l i fe of men, then, is ideally a cooperative venture in which all willingly share, 
recognising a public interest which takes precedence over self-interest. It is within 
society that individuals develop their talents; i t is the context within which many 
people develop their capacities and functions. The market alone cannot determine 
which functions are socially necessary. The government is the agency of the 
community in a complex society, and it has a positive purpose, unlike Nozick's 
minimal state. This positive function is to provide equal opportunity and the social 
and economic conditions necessary for individual development, which includes 
caring for those in need and redistributing wealth according to the requirements of 
justice. It is a vision totally opposed to individualism. The moral purpose of the 
state is to develop the condition of harmony, and since men do not have properly 
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developed capacities the state must intervene where necessary. Individuals have an 
obligation to assist others. The ethical basis of all human relationships, and its 
reflection in a society's institutions, is the essence of Hobhouse's theory. Certain 
obligations are a fact of social l i fe , but whether the principle of harmony wi l l yield 
a satisfactory account of political obligation is a matter I wi l l discuss in Chapter 6. 
Democracy and Participation 
From the perspective of political institutions he writes that "the ultimate root of 
democratic principle is the conscious recognition" that l i fe is the joint product of 
all concerned, "with the deduction that i f any are to be truly and morally free, all 
must be free ... equal freedom in a common life is the simple meaning of 
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democracy" . Democracy is not simply a convenient decision-making procedure 
based on the equal right of each individual to share in collective decisions with his 
own self-interest in mind. Rather it is the political expression of a collective l ife 
with a collective wi l l . Freedom is self-determination for the individual or group 
and i t is the individual's or group's contribution to the common l i fe . The problem is 
deciding how to take each wi l l into account. Hobhouse notes the complexities of 
modern societies and states and the di f f icul ty in consulting everyone about all 
decisions. "Popular intervention is necessarily intermittent, occasional, and very 
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imperfectly instructed" . Moreover the labouring masses, whose individual 
development is still in progress, spending "their toilsome days in mine or factory 
struggling for bread have not their heads for ever fi l led with the complex details of 
international policy or industrial law" 1 1 ^. Their role is "to respond and assent to 
the things that make for the moral and material welfare of the country"^ ' . How 
can they do so with insufficient knowledge? What is true is his observation that 
"the power of conscious democracy is practically limited to certain critical decisions, 
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and largely to a veto on the proposals of the bureaucrat" . Thus a ruling elite 
makes decisions with occasional approval by the citizens in the form of an election. 
With majority decision-making a small majority can impose its wi l l on a large 
minority. I would add that individual development requires certain freedoms which 
the majority have no authority to curtail. He writes that "majority decisions are 
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necessary, and yet lack just that moral authority which democracy demands" . It 
should also be borne in mind that this discussion is about decision-making in a 
stable society with a well recognised sense of common purpose and acceptance of 
common values, and the bigger and more complex the society the less likely wi l l 
these conditions be met. This is a point of great significance, as I shall explain in 
my critique of Walzer. It is unlikely that a minority wi l l agree to accept majority 
decisions which they wi l l never be able to change (because they are a permanent 
minority on these issues) i f they are adversely affected by the decisions or i f their 
opposition is based on strongly held moral grounds. As Hobhouse says, i t is a 
mockery to suggest to a permanent minority that i t has equal rights and lives on 
equal terms to everyone else. A majority must not rule in its own interest, for 
democracy implies liberty and equality and a principle of community which may be 
d i f f i c u l t "to embody in any consti tutional ru l e"^ '* . Differences must be 
subordinate to a deeper agreement about the nature of a particular society within 
which no individual or sectional interest is overlooked. The majority must try to 
accommodate the desires of the minority. At this point i t may well appear, given 
these difficulties and Hobhouse's opinion of the masses, that he should opt for 
decision-making by enlightened men who ever hold the principle of harmony in 
mind. Although all voices may be heard in majority decision-making it does not 
mean that the outcome is just or satisfactory; the system serves neither of its two 
objectives - ensuring self-fulfi lment through participation, or reaching decisions 
acceptable to all and which are an expression of the common wi l l . 
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Hobhouse recognises that there wi l l always be some element of contention or 
disagreement, what he calls discommunity, and he therefore rejects the theory of the 
sovereign people which holds that the people having voted, individual and sectional 
interests cease. The people in a modern state cannot collectively exercise its wi l l 
other than through an agent. Parliament makes decisions on behalf of the people. It 
cannot enforce its wi l l on a reluctant people. And the wi l l of the people as 
expressed through the majority vote gives no moral authority to the people's agent 
since decisions are limited by the rights of individuals. 
Hobhouse's answer to the problems of political participation and decision-making 
brings to mind Michael Walzer. Hobhouse suggests "organisation with neighbours 
and fellow-workers." The citizen joins with others with whom he has common 
interests, makes decisions about subjects with which he is familiar. In sum, "the 
development of social interest ... depends ... on all the intermediate organisations 
which link the individual to the whole".' ' ^ It is interesting to note the 
development in Hobhouse's theory of these groupings whose members may well have 
allegiances or obligations which conflict with those to the state to which they 
belong. Michael Walzer's theory of political obligation, in its earlier stages, is based 
on membership of local or other common interest groups, in which he confronted 
this problem (see Chapter 5). However Hobhouse envisages a union of mankind 
based on territory, work guilds, churches, which unite men with common interests 
into a number of associations across a series of allegiances in an attempt to lessen 
the possibility of hostility between groups based on reinforcing cleavages such as 
race and religion combined. The groupings would be participatory units of 
democracy, with the state on a level with such associations. (At the national level 
the idea is not too dissimilar to Rawls' social union of social unions). A 
supranational body would control international relations, ensuring that the conduct 
of the state conforms to moral law. 
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The modern polity faces the tasks of first ly, bringing home to the citizen the need 
to participate; and secondly, making governments responsible to citizens. 
Participation in this context must not be taken as consent because no matter how 
decisions are made (and Hobhouse, like Watzer and Pateman, is trying to ensure that 
all interests wi l l be considered) the important point is that decisions conform to 
moral principles. It may be that the necessity to participate together with the 
stricture that decisions conform to moral principles brings us to a position which I 
wi l l mention in talking about Pateman, namely that participation and consent are 
necessary but not sufficient conditions of political obligation (see Chapter 6). 
The conception of the sovereign state independent of other communities divorces 
"political action f rom the moral law"*'*\ The ultimate community is the human 
race, but he defines community as that association "which is appropriate to the 
function that is in question" and this may be a church, an association, a union. 
We judge "appropriateness" not in relation to the state but in relation "to the l ife of 
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humanity" , by which measure the state too is judged. That is to say, ultimate 
moral authority does not belong to the state. Political obligation, "our obligation to 
serve the general w e l l - b e i n g " a n d to obey the laws of the state, is secondary to 
our obligation to supreme moral authority. Duties prescribed by the principle of 
harmony must be applicable as far as possible to all people - to all members of the 
human race. We have no freedom to apply different standards to others. Here 
Hobhouse differs f rom Walzer, as I shall explain (see Chapters 5 and 6), because for 
Hobhouse what is good is good unconditionally, and the only unconditional good is 
harmony, harmony in the individual and harmony in the community. 
65 
Conclusion 
Hobhouse has presented a theory of social justice - the individual is part of a whole. 
We have inescapable obligations to others, and rights and obligations are not 
precedent to social l i fe , but begin with and are part of social l ife. Whatever an 
individual achieves he does so with the help of others, i f not directly then through 
his reliance on the social and economic structure of society with all its benefits, and 
through inherited skills and knowledge. The economic system must be a directed 
system with an ethical end, namely the promotion of liberty and personal 
development within the community. By a community he has in mind a group of 
people with "a common sentiment or interest". 
Any theory which acknowledges the imperfections of the world we live in and 
suggests a way of behaving in an ideal world is faced with the problem inherent in 
the theory - how to persuade people now to act as they would in the perfect state. 
Nozick's state, on the other hand, may appear more attractive in its simplicity. He 
sees no ideal, offers no solution because there is no problem. However there is no 
community, no shared experience, no caring. Behaviour is based on individual 
r ights , not obligations to community. Nozick has no serious account of 
interdependence within social l i fe , nor of duties to succeeding generations, whereas 
Hobhouse regards men as essentially social, cooperating for the common good. 
However there w i l l always be d i f f icul ty in defining the common good, and there is 
a tension between the community of rational, selfless men and his recognition of the 
realities of human nature. Hobhouse believes that a condition of harmony is 
possible. In fact we often have to choose between competing and irreconcilable 
ends. We have different sets of values and conflicting ideas of the good, a point 
alluded to in the discussion on remuneration, and fu l ly recognised by Rawls, whose 
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theory of justice is to be interpreted as political, not metaphysical, and it is to this 
theory that I now turn my attention. 
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CHAPTER 3 
On Rawls' Theory of Justice 
John Rawls envisages a cooperative society similar to that of Hobhouse, in which 
conceptions of justice would be publicly acknowledged and the virtues of liberal 
democracy upheld as a common good. However his is a much more rigorous 
formulation of principles based on rational argument and in which the right takes 
precedence over the good - principles of right l imit the good which can be pursued, 
whereas Hobhouse gives priority to the common good. 
In this chapter I wi l l examine Rawls' idea of justice as fairness and its expression in 
the general and special conceptions of justice. I wi l l comment upon his notion of 
liberalism and the liberal state as I understand it f rom my interpretation of "A 
Theory of Justice".* I wi l l start by looking at the conditions under which rational 
men formulate principles of justice (the original position and the veil of ignorance), 
at the chosen principles and the lexical ordering, the distribution of wealth, the 
distinction between liberty and the worth of liberty, and procedural justice. I wi l l 
then make some brief observations about how Rawlsian principles are said to match 
our considered judgements. The debate about how principles of justice should be 
derived wi l l be continued in the next two chapters. I wi l l outline Rawls' theory of 
political obligation and civil disobedience. Finally I wi l l make some comments on 
Rawls' argument that justice as fairness is a political conception to be applied to 
liberal societies. 
The Original Position 
Rawls posits a contractural theory of justice and like other contractarians before 
him he devises a hypothetical situation, the original position, which is to be 
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understood as a philosophical attempt to provide the basis of justification for the 
theory, not as an actual historical condition. The parties in the original position 
wi l l not contract to enter a particular society or establish a particular form of 
government. "Rather, the guiding idea is that the principles of justice for the basic 
structure of society are the object of the original agreement. They are the 
principles that free and rational persons concerned to further their own interests 
would accept in an initial position of equality as defining the fundamental terms of 
their association. In the original position men must formulate principles 
governing their social l i fe and institutions - principles which assign basic rights and 
duties and "determine the division of social benefits. Men are to decide in advance 
how they are to regulate their claims against one another and what is to be the 
foundation charter of their society". This is a once and for all choice of principles 
of justice by rational men in a position of equal liberty. 
The purpose of the original position is to demonstrate that the principles would be 
chosen as a result of rational agreement. And on equality Rawls says that "it seems 
reasonable to suppose that the parties in the original position are equal ... obviously 
the purpose of these conditions is to represent equality between human beings as 
moral persons, as creatures having a conception of their good and capable of a sense 
of justice".^ To ensure impartiality - that is, to avoid any person trying to establish 
principles advantageous to his particular circumstances - the parties in the original 
position make their choice behind a Veil of Ignorance, unaware of their own 
abilities, their status in society, their particular conception of the good, the society's 
level of development and so on. "One excludes the knowledge of those contingencies 
which sets men at odds ...".^ Rawls considers that the original position "is fair 
between individuals as moral persons, that is, as rational beings with their own ends 
and capable ... of a sense of justice".*' The original positions is "fair"; the principles 
agreed are "fair", hence "justice as fairness". A question to be considered is whether 
or not principles can properly be devised in this way and, as we shall see, the 
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absence in the parties in the original position of any substantive moral principles is 
considered a serious drawback. 
The principles of a conception of justice are chosen which "regulate all subsequent 
criticism and reform of institutions" , and any constitution, legislature and laws 
must accord with the principles. We are then to apply these rationally chosen 
principles of justice to the actual circumstances in which we live, and Rawls 
formulates this stage of his argument in terms of hypothetical consent theory. "Our 
social situation is just i f i t is such that by this sequence of hypothetical agreements 
we would have contracted into the general system of rules which defines i t . 
Moreover, assuming that the original position does determine a set of principles ... i t 
wi l l then be true that whenever social institutions satisfy these principles those 
engaged in them can say to one another that they are cooperating on terms to which 
they would agree i f they were free and equal persons whose relations with respect to 
one another were fair". 
The Principles of Justice 
What principles would be chosen then by rational, mutually disinterested and equal 
individuals in the original position, principles which they must be prepared to live 
with no matter what the actual situation in which they f ind themselves? He argues 
that they would reject principles of utility which might lessen the prospects of some 
for the greater advantage of others, such principles being "incompatible with the 
conception of social cooperation among equals for mutual advantage". Because 
Rawls regards society as a cooperative venture, with everyone dependent on others, 
"the division of advantages should be such as to draw forth the willing cooperation 
of everyone taking part in i t , including those less well situated". 1 0 Realising this 
the parties in the original position, having decided between different conceptions of 
justice, would choose two principles, the first of which would assign basic rights 
and duties equally, whilst the second would allow social and economic inequalities 
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i f , and only i f , such inequalities benefited the least advantaged members of society. 
Moreover the parties in the original position would assign a lexical ordering to these 
principles so that the first must always be satisfied before the second, which means 
"in effect, that the basic structure of society is to arrange the inequalities of wealth 
and authority in ways consistent with the equal liberties required by the preceding 
principle". 1 1 
This lexical ordering is in contrast to intuitionist theories, which have no method 
for deciding between competing principles, and which deny that competing first 
principles can have an order of priority. In the case of utilitariasm, on the other 
hand, all disputes are settled by reference to the single principle of util i ty. 
The principles of justice wi l l be applied to, and wi l l regulate, the basic structure of 
society and our major social institutions. They assume a social structure of two 
distinct spheres. The first defines and secures political rights and duties; the second 
specifies and establishes social and economic inequalities. 
There is an initial general conception of justice: "Al l social primary goods - liberty 
and opportunity, income and wealth, and the bases of self-respect - are to be 
distributed equally unless an unequal distribution of any or all of these goods is to 
the advantage of the least favored". At first all would insist on equal distribution 
since it would be unreasonable to expect more than an equal share and not rational 
to agree to less. On the other hand i f certain inequalities make everyone better o f f 
(by encouraging more effective performance for instance) then why not allow them? 
In this general conception liberty is equal to other social goods and can be traded 
o f f against other benefits. However this general conception is only permissible in 
very special circumstances, namely "when social conditions do not allow the 
1 o 
effective establishment of these rights" (i.e. basic liberties); furthermore those 
with the lesser liberty must be compensated. 
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Up to a point, Rawls is arguing, i t is rational to pursue wealth at the expense of 
basic rights and liberties, especially when the exercise of political rights has little 
influence on the course of events. However the sacrifice of important political 
liberties is an unwise precedent to set since i t excludes citizens f rom the policy-
making process and establishes an elite who may be unwilling to restore the 
surrendered rights. Furthermore it is unclear how the suspension of liberties is a 
necessary step in establishing social and economic gains for the least advantaged. 
For i f we assume these rights are voluntarily forfeited then it must be the case that 
the least advantaged understand why they are taking this step, so they would 
willingly do what was asked of them to secure the same gains without having to 
give up the rights in question. As Barry says it wi l l not be possible to gain more 
wealth by trading liberty, unless one chooses "to be coerced into working harder 
than one thought worthwhile; and this it would clearly be irrational to do".*'* It is 
also worth pointing out that a political liberty which cannot be used effectively to 
influence policy - for these are the rights which may be foregone - is a right hardly 
worth having, and would have little trade-in value. I shall return to this theme of 
the relationship between wealth and effective liberty. 
Be that as it may the important point to note is that the general conception of 
justice does not apply once a certain level of wealth has been attained, and while i t 
is in operation society must be developing to the stage at which social conditions are 
such that a lesser than equal liberty would no longer be acceptable. And as Rawls 
says a just and good society does not depend upon a high material standard of l i fe . 
In any event he believes there wi l l be a natural transition f rom the general to the 
special conception of justice. 
The serial ordering of the two principles is reasonable and is a long-term tendency 
of the general conception, so that once the parties in the original position know that 
they can effectively exercise their basic liberties they wil l not agree to a lesser 
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liberty in exchange for economic benefits. This is a natural and universal 
preference. 
Thus we move to the special formulation of the principles of justice: 
First principle: Each person is to have an equal right to the most 
extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible 
with a similar system of liberty for all. 
Second principle: Social and economic inequalities are to 
be arranged so that they are both: 
(a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, 
consistent with the just savings principle, and 
(b) attached to offices and positions open to all under 
conditions of fair equality of opportunity. 
Further the principles are ranked in lexical order so that liberty can be restricted 
only for the sake of liberty.1"* 
The basic liberties referred to include the right to vote, freedom of thought and 
speech, freedom to hold personal property and so on. Restricting liberty for the 
sake of liberty means that i f i t is rational - and seen by all to be rational - that 
unrestricted liberty wi l l be harmful, then some liberties may be restricted, just as 
unrestricted freedom to use cars, for example, may mean loss of liberty for cyclists. 
Scanlon argues that in an extreme case such as invasion it may well be true that 
conscription indeed restricts liberty for the sake of liberty (defending free 
institutions), but in other cases restrictions are in the common interest. For 
example, demonstrations may be restricted when holding them might prevent the 
enjoyment of other goods such as sleep, but this restriction is not for the sake of 
liberty i t se l f . 1 6 
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Whilst the first principle establishes equal distribution of rights, the second states 
that distribution of wealth and income need not be equal but must be to everyone's 
advantage, injustice being inequalities not to the benefit of all. The serial ranking 
means that a departure f rom the principle of equal liberty "cannot be justified by, 
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or compensated for , by greater social and economic advantages". However this 
principle is jeopardised by the distinction Rawls makes between liberty and the 
worth of liberty as I shall explain later. We may, in passing, contrast Rawls' 
position with that of Nozick who, having declared the inviolability of individual 
rights, does allow some boundary-crossing provided compensation is paid, a 
necessary step in his argument that the minimal state can come into being without 
the transgression of individual rights. 
The basic structure of society distributes certain primary goods - those goods (rights, 
liberties, power, opportunities, income, wealth) which rational men are presumed to 
want. Exchanges of basic liberties are forbidden by the special conception and this 
is a natural preference. Why is this a natural preference? Rawls argues that not 
only is i t irrational to want, for example, ever-increasing wealth at the expense of 
liberty, but that excessive wealth becomes at best a distraction, at worst a hindrance 
to the well-ordered society. Effective liberty is not increased by ever-increasing 
wealth, over and above a level of well-being which enables the effective exercise of 
liberty. His argument is that at a certain level of material comfort men wi l l become 
more interested in the pursuit of social and cultural interests (requiring, for 
example, freedom of conscience) and wi l l aspire to the exercise of their political 
liberties in order to control their own destinies. It would not be rational for them to 
exchange liberty for further material benefits. I f society is too involved in ever-
increasing wealth i t is striving for unattainable goals. 
However i t may well be that some people do in fact prefer more and more wealth to 
the pursuit of cultural, spiritual or social interests, and they may even prefer this at 
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the expense of some of their basic political liberties. Wolff argues that there may 
well be rational plans of l i fe in which some trade-off could be quite appealing. The 
parties in the original position have no way of knowing whether their l ife plans 
would be such as to justify a strong emphasis on liberty as opposed to income, for 
example, and so have no reason to opt for the lexical ordering. Wolff insists that no 
general priority rule forbidding the exchange of any basic liberty can be supported 
by Rawls' argument since i t is an argument based on Rawls' ideals, rather than on 
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rational moral principles. Similarly Rawls himself concedes that some people may 
prefer fewer primary goods in the actual situation. 
Rawls argues that the principles harmonise with our ordinary judgements and 
provide a coherent structure for them, distinguishing between rights and liberties on 
the one hand and economic and social benefits on the other. "The lexical ranking of 
the principles specifies which elements of the ideal are relatively more urgent"^ 
and provides a benchmark for judging all societies. However i f the principles of 
justice define which considerations are morally relevant, is the notion of pure 
procedural justice or of a non-teleological theory contradicted? No, because the 
principles specify criteria for judging the justice of the basic institutions of society 
but are compatible with a wide range of goals. Moreover a society which is based 
on these principles wi l l not necessarily maximise the good (the good being defined 
as the satisfaction of rational desires) because, being a deontological theory, i t is not 
connected with ends; it does not interpret the right as maximising the good. The 
priority of the right over the good is the central feature of justice as fairness. 
The parties in the original position do not know what wi l l be their conception of the 
good. Thus i t is rational for them to prefer an equal share of basic primary goods; 
they can accept less i f they wish. But in general they know "they must try to protect 
their liberties, widen their opportunities, and enlarge their means for promoting 
20 
their aims whatever these are". 
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Rawls also argues that the choice of the two principles is justified by the original 
position, being a maximin solution to the problem of social justice. A maximin 
solution is one in which the losses wi l l be least significant, one which maximises the 
minimum pay-off. He contends that the two principles are those which a person 
would choose "for the design of a society in which his enemy is to assign him his 
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place". In maximin the worst outcome is superior to the worst outcomes of other 
alternatives, and hence would be chosen i f the parties had to protect themselves 
against such a contingency. Note that utilitarian principles, for example, could 
jus t i fy a lesser liberty for some i f the more general good was satisfied. 
A maximin argument can only be used for decisions taken under conditions of 
uncertainty, in a situation of great risk and in which no account must be taken of 
the likelihoods and possible circumstances. In the original position knowledge of 
likelihoods is impossible. A further condition is that the person choosing cares very 
little for what he can gain above the minimum he can be sure of. Since the parties 
in the original position do not know their specific conceptions of the good, nor their 
circumstances, they wi l l not be prepared to gamble and lose the minimum they can 
be sure of (equality of wealth, opportunity, liberty) which offers the best 
opportunity to f u l f i l their l i fe plans. 
Thus he argues that i f the two principles "provide a workable theory of social 
justice ... then this conception guarantees a satisfactory minimum". Now i f this is 
so, and basic liberties are guaranteed along with a minimum specification for the 
distribution of wealth "there may be, on reflection, little reason for trying to do 
1% 
better" , and he considers this would be decisive i f the lexical ordering of the two 
principles was established; but I have already pointed out that this may not be 
acceptable to everybody, that in fact some may want more material gains at the 
expense of equal liberty. Barber argues that Rawls' emphasis on equality and no-
risk makes his theory incompatible with market capitalism and that "the no-risk 
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predilection for security may be atypical of human choice in the face of 
uncertainty". 2 4 
Distribution of Wealth 
The second principle determines the grounds for inequalities in the distribution of 
wealth. Rawls considers society to be a cooperative venture to which all must 
willingly contribute and in which all are equally entitled to have their own l ife 
plans and have a reasonable chance of fu l f i l l i ng their plans. The principles of 
justice are formulated with these objectives in mind. Hence the difference principle 
states that inequalities must be to the advantage of the least wel l -off i f their willing 
cooperation is to be forthcoming. The principles of justice are applied to the social, 
political and economic institutions of society which determine rights, duties and 
distribution. Rawls argues that there are several ways of interpreting the two 
principles so that all may be advantaged. Firstly, in a system of natural liberty, 
with equal liberty and a free market economy, career opportunities are based on 
talents and this determines distribution. Over a period of time this initial 
distribution is "strongly influenced by natural and social contingencies. The 
existing distribution of income and wealth, say, is the cumulative effect of prior 
distributions of natural assets ... as these have been developed or left unrealized 
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..." , with chance, too, playing its part. The most obvious injustice is that 
distribution is "improperly influenced by these factors so arbitrary f rom a moral 
point of view".2*' 
The second interpretation, liberal equality, tries to rectify the deficiencies of the 
first interpretation by adding a condition of fair equality of opportunity, so that 
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"those with similar abilities and skills should have similar l i fe chances' - social 
class should not unduly affect aspirations, given similar ability. The liberal 
interpretation seeks "to mitigate the influence of social contingencies and natural 
fortune on distributive shares". The free market system is modified to preserve 
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conditions necessary for fair equality of opportunity. However Rawls considers 
that distribution based on natural ability and talent - the outcome of "the natural 
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lottery* - is no more morally justifiable than distribution which is the outcome of 
"historical and social fortune". Hobhouse, too, argued that i t was inappropriate to 
reward men for the gifts they are born with. Rawls writes that the difference 
principle "does not require society to try to even out handicaps as i f all were 
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expected to compete on a fair basis in the same race" , but i t is intended to allocate 
resources to improve the long-term prospects of the least-favoured. In any event the 
principle of fair opportunity is limited by the individual's family circumstances 
since social and class conditions and attitudes determine, at least to an extent, the 
development of natural capacities. 
It is the third interpretation, that which Rawls calls democratic equality, which 
combines fair equality of opportunity with the difference principle. He writes "... 
the higher expectations of those better situated are just i f and only i f they work as 
part of a scheme which improves the expectations of the least advantaged members 
of society. The intuitive idea is that the social order is not to establish and secure 
the more attractive prospects of those better o f f unless doing so is to the advantage 
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of those less fortunate". I f the difference principle is "a strongly egalitarian 
conception" why does Rawls choose to abandon his principle of equality in favour 
of economic incentives for some, because it is obvious that the difference principle 
may result in very great discrepancies in the distribution of wealth? The 
proposition is, as Hobhouse reluctantly argues - recognising that one must take 
human nature as it is - that certain people may need economic incentives to 
encourage them to put the maximum amount of effort into wealth creation 
activities. However Rawls believes that society is a cooperative venture to which all 
contribute willingly, and therefore such a system of incentives must operate to the 
advantage of the least favoured. Note that Rawls does not try to just ify the 
principle of incentives but merely points out that such an argument would have to 
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be used to vindicate any deviation f rom the position of equality. But is i t possible 
for such a system to be compatible with the first principle of justice, and more 
importantly would the parties in the original position agree to it? 
Entrepreneurs who require incentives are operating in a market economy; that is, 
they wi l l only sell their talents i f they believe they are getting the best possible deal 
- a better deal than others. They wil l then benefit everyone by creating more 
wealth to be distributed in such a way that the position of the least wel l -off is 
maximised. But such a market based system i l l fits Rawls' vision of the cooperative 
society in which all are willing participants. 
Firstly, he regards talents as natural assets which do not morally entitle their bearer 
to any special advantages and which should be used to the benefit of all, and the 
"two principles are equivalent... to an undertaking to regard the distribution of 
natural abilities as a collective asset".^ Why, then, is i t just to reward with more 
those who wi l l only be motivated in this way, leaving less for those who work out of 
a sense of duty, for example? What of a natural duty to use one's talents for the 
good of all? Obviously the argument is that more wealth is generated for everyone, 
but in a competitive situation there is a tendency to take advantage of those whose 
primary aim is not material gain. It could be said that a sense of duty done is 
adequate reward for some but not for others! 
Secondly, Rawls does not think inequalities wi l l be significant for another reason: 
there is a "tendency for them to be leveled down by the increasing availability of 
educated talent and ever widening opportunities" , and this, together with the 
operation of the difference principle, wi l l "insure that the disparities likely to result 
wi l l be much less than the differences that men have often tolerated in the past". 
Moreover Rawls believes that at some point it is irrational to prefer more wealth to 
other social goods. Here I believe his argument is psychologically unsound since 
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many of those thus motivated will want to accumulate wealth, either for its own 
sake as a tangible sign of success, or because of the influence and power i t can 
purchase. 
The sphere of political rights and duties should not be corrupted by those with great 
economic power, as Walzer argues.(see Chapter 4) However those with wealth and 
power tend to want to keep it rather than share i t , and also tend to dominate the 
institutions which enable them to do so. 
Rawls argues that the principle of util i ty, though expedient, is not just when some 
have less so that others might prosper, "but there is no injustice in the greater 
benefits earned by a few provided that the situation of persons not so fortunate is 
thereby improved". Now this argument might hold as long as society is a 
cooperative. In other words everyone must benefit not just for reasons of prudence 
(that they wi l l continue to cooperate willingly), but for reasons of justice - all 
contribute in some way and so all benefit. This is to reject Nozick's proposition that 
a man is entitled to the fruits of his own labour and that redistribution is 
tantamount to theft. But wi l l those who require the motivation of special incentives 
continue to believe that i t is just that all should benefit f rom their efforts? As the 
gap widens the notion of a cooperative may vanish. And the least advantaged wi l l 
increasingly have to take i t on trust that in the long term the system is maximising 
their position, since it wi l l be obvious that in the short term they would benefit 
f rom equal distribution once additional wealth has been created. 
In allowing this type of argument Rawls jeopardises his claim that society is a 
cooperative venture. We shall see that he believes that citizens may not uphold even 
a just constitution by making their due contribution i f they believe that others are 
not making theirs. I f this is so, then how much more likely is i t that they wi l l not 
cooperate when, even i f they do contribute, they see others with much greater 
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wealth and power and influence in a society which is supposed to have equality as 
the basis of its system of justice? In essence Rawls' theory is designed for liberal 
individuals and it cannot sustain the values of a cooperative community, although 
Rawls denies this, a point to which I wi l l return. 
Thus we can see how a situation of instability could arise. For example, according 
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to Sir John Bareham the top f i f t h of the population of the U K increased their 
share of available income f rom 38% to 48% between 1979 and 1987, whilst the 
bottom f i f th ' s share remained the same, yet the latter's income increased because the 
cake is bigger. I f we assume that in 1987 the position of the worst o f f was indeed 
maximised and they would be worse o f f under any other system, i t is clear that i t 
could be very d i f f icu l t to make the least advantaged accept this argument, since the 
gap between top and bottom has widened, and because we tend to measure our 
material well-being in comparative rather than absolute terms. The situation could 
be made even worse, bearing in mind Rawls' remark that the difference principle is 
not a system of redress which tries to compensate through allocation of resources for 
undeserved inequalities. It does require the allocation of resources to help the least 
favoured but " i f this end is attained by giving more attention to the better endowed, 
it is permissible; otherwise not" , so more and better education for the most 
talented could be justified on the grounds that i t would benefit the least wel l -of f in 
the long run. 
Could the parties in the original position hold all these views simultaneously: (a) 
society is a cooperative venture; (b) talents are natural assets which do not morally 
entitle their owners to special rewards; (c) some people require a special type of 
motivation which entitles them to a more than equal share of wealth? I f they must 
choose the option the worst outcome of which is better than the worst outcome of 
any other option, then they would argue for equal distribution in a cooperative in 
which all contribute to the best of their abilities. The reasons are firstly, the 
81 
incentives argument leads to the situation of instability already described. Secondly 
the least advantaged could do no better - there would be no "least advantaged" in 
material terms. Moreover they cannot agree to another system on the chance that 
they would be individuals with special talents to bargain with, since this is 
forbidden by maximin. A l l would have equal means to achieve their aims (although 
the aims of some may require a more than equal share of resources!) There would 
be no lesser worth of liberty for some to be explained away by saying that "the 
capacity of the less fortunate members of society to achieve their aims would be 
even less were they not to accept the existing inequalities whenever the difference 
principle is satisfied".4^ 
Liberty and the Worth of Liberty 
Rawls writes that "liberty is represented by the complete system of the liberties of 
equal citizenship, while the worth of liberty to persons and groups is proportional to 
their capacity to advance their ends within the framework the system defines. 
Freedom as equal liberty is the same for all ... But the worth of liberty is not the 
same for everyone. Some have greater authority and wealth, and therefore greater 
means to achieve their aims".^ He remarks that poverty and ignorance effect the 
worth of liberty but are not "constraints definitive of liberty". 4^ Then he goes on to 
say that the lesser worth of liberty is compensated for since the less fortunate would 
be even worse o f f were i t not for the difference principle. But this distinction 
between liberty and the worth of liberty undermines the first principle. He had 
said that a lesser liberty could not be compensated for by greater social and 
economic advantages4^, but here we see that the least advantaged must accept a 
lesser worth of liberty as well as economic and social disadvantage (the two going 
hand in hand). It cannot really be said that the lesser worth of liberty is 
compensated for by simply asserting that the least advantaged are better o f f than 
they would be without the difference principle - the compensation does not make 
good an unequal liberty or give to everybody an equal worth of liberty. The 
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compensation, i f such it is, is inadequate since it does not significantly effect the 
chances of the least favoured to influence events. As Daniels notes "the very 
inequality of wealth and power, which ... acts to increase the index of the worst o f f 
individual can at the same time act to decrease his worth of l iber ty" 4 4 . Thus there 
is a trade-off between equal liberty and economic advantage which was forbidden 
by the first principle. That is, the very fact of allowing such inequalities in the 
first place leads to a lesser worth of liberty for some. Moreover the least 
advantaged wil l almost certainly have a narrower range within which to make their 
rational choices, unless the society they live in is at a particularly high level of 
development. 
But i t is misleading and erroneous for Rawls to use this distinction between liberty 
and the worth of liberty to just ify the less than equal chances some "equal" citizens 
have to influence the factors which determine their social and economic status, and 
hence their prospects of achieving their l i fe plans. There is little point in having an 
"equal" liberty which cannot be used as effectively as another's same liberty. 
Furthermore this situation is hardly compatible with the maintenance of self-esteem. 
According to Daniels liberty is distributed in accordance with the first principle, 
worth of liberty in accordance with the second. The distinction between liberty and 
the worth of liberty means that "the incompatibility between equal liberty and 
unequal wealth and power, between the first and second principles, seems to 
disappear. Unequal wealth and unequal powers no longer cause inequality of 
liberty itself, only inequality in the worth of liberty". 4^ He goes on to say that i t 
would be rational to choose equal worth of liberty i f choosing equal basic liberties 
is rational; it would be rational "to reject inequalities in wealth and powers i f they 
create similar obstacles" to those which would inhibit equal worth of liberty of 
conscience, such as "adverse ma jo r i ty opinion or unfavourable u t i l i t y 
calculations".4^ He goes on, "there is no way to accept unequal worth of liberty in 
the original position. [It] cannot be compensated for by increases in other primary 
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goods, since the reasons for granting priority to equal basic liberties apply to equal 
worth of liberty with equivalent strength".^ The distinction between liberty and 
the worth of liberty "has no satisfactory rationale"^, the principle of equality of 
liberty is "a hollow abstraction ... i f it is not accompanied by equality in the ability 
to exercise liberty. Further, since equality in the ability to exercise liberty is 
directly affected by the distribution of wealth and powers ... a strong egalitarian 
sentiment in the political sphere may not be so isolatable as Rawls and earlier 
theorists had hoped f rom strong egalitarian demands in the social and economic 
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sphere". Rawls recognises this when he writes that the better-placed members of 
society have more chance of gaining political office and of taking advantage of 
opportunities, and are more likely than others to have political obligations^, but I 
shall return to this question later. 
In Rawls' argument the parties in the original position agree to the difference 
principle lest they f i nd themselves in the least-favoured position. They are 
concerned solely with their own welfare. However i t would be rational to share 
talents and resources in a cooperative venture because this is both a better guarantee 
of their own position and because it is more satisfying for social beings. Although 
the parties in the original position are mutually disinterested, they do have "a 
natural duty of mutual respect which asks them to treat one another civilly"^ and 
it adds to the stability of the system i f , in choosing self-regarding principles they 
incidentally choose principles which "publicly express men's respect for one 
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another". But the gain is not that this engenders any sense of community and 
cooperation, but rather "in this way they insure a sense of their own value". Why 
would the parties in the original position agree to a system which may result in 
some having to accept less simply because others would refuse to contribute on any 
other basis? This is hardly a just cooperative system, "a scheme of mutual benefit" 
or the public affirmation of each man's endeavours^, and does not meet the 
criteria of "the natural duty of mutual respect which asks them to treat one another 
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civilly" , or as ends in themselves. 
What is lacking in Rawls' theory, then, is a strong statement of principles of 
equality and community which would not be subject to modification as a result of 
arguments such as those justifying incentives. For i f the principle of equality is 
prey to such an argument then Rawls has not left aside "those aspects of the social 
world that seem arbitrary f rom a moral point of v iew" .^ He seems to want the 
advantages of a cooperative society but as a by-product of a scheme designed to 
ensure the best possible deal for self-interested individuals, and this is a very 
unstable basis for cooperation, as I have already argued. Thus he writes: "the two 
principles are equivalent ... to an undertaking to regard the distribution of natural 
abilities as a collective asset so that the more fortunate are to benefit only in ways 
that help those who have lost out. / do not say that the parties are moved by the 
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ethical propriety of this idea". Cooperation seems to be more a means to an end 
than the very basis of society. It should not simply be the most convenient way of 
securing one's own advantage, but the very foundation of social l i fe , of the good 
society of mutually respectful people who are concerned for one another's well-
being. 
Procedural Justice 
Rawls believes that eventually there wi l l be a levelling of incomes, without a 
significant wealth gap, but this may not be so and, as Hobhouse pointed out, i t is 
necessary to judge a social and economic system by its results. This is a sharp 
contrast to Nozick's entitlement theory of distributive justice, which states that 
whether or not a holding is just depends on how it came about. Justice as fairness 
defines a system of rules which determines how social and economic institutions 
wi l l operate, but no precise goals for society are specified. The two principles are 
compatible with a variety of social arrangements, and as long as they are operating, 
the outcome is just; that is to say, i t is a non-teleological theory of pure procedural 
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justice in which "there is no independent criterion for the right result: instead there 
is a correct or fair procedure such that the outcome is likewise correct or fair, 
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whatever it is, provided that the procedure has been properly followed". The 
outcome itself cannot be judged independently of the procedures through which it 
came into being, but Rawls believes the outcome wi l l (and should) satisfy the second 
principle of justice; that is, distribution must be to the advantage of the least well-
off . No such outcome is demanded by Nozick. 
Thus, what is crucial to pure procedural justice is not a criterion for judging the 
outcome, but for judging the basic structures "including a just political constitution 
and a just arrangement of economic and social institutions".^ Unlike Nozick, 
Rawls believes that a duty of government is to redistribute wealth because he 
believes that a particular pattern of distribution is specified by the second principle. 
Law and the branches of government act to ensure that the economic system works 
in such a way that "the resulting distribution of income and pattern of expectations 
wil l tend to satisfy the difference principle".^ We start f rom a position of equality 
and any diversion f rom equality must be justified. As an illustration Rawls writes 
that "the difference principle is a strongly egalitarian conception in the sense that 
unless there is a distribution that makes both persons better o f f (limiting ourselves 
to the two-person case for simplicity), an equal distribution is to be preferred".^1 
Moreover the results of applying fair procedures would always be the maximisation 
of the position of least favoured representative persons. However Rawls calls his 
system procedural because he is not looking at individuals and at a certain stock of 
goods and judging the relative position of individuals , but rather at "the 
arrangement of a basic structure". A l l must receive the social minimum. The 
difference principle is satisfied when the "total income of the least advantaged ... is 
such as to maximise their long-run expectations ..." Although Rawls writes that 
"the intuitive idea is to design the social system so that the outcome is just whatever 
it happens to be, at least so long as i t is within a certain range"*'4, the range is not 
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specified. It is obvious that the result of applying the second principle could vary 
f rom equality to great inequality. He himself writes that "nothing guarantees that 
inequalities wi l l not be significant".^ 
Considered Judgements 
Rawls' object is to show that the two principles of justice are indeed those that 
would be chosen by the parties in the original position, and the original position is 
designed to lead to this conclusion, for as Rawls says "we may conjecture that for 
each traditional conception of justice there exists an interpretation of the initial 
situation in which its principles are the preferred solution".^ Now there is a 
certain circularity in the argument about the conditions of the original position, 
because he suggests that a particular description of the original position is justified 
i f the principles chosen match our considered convictions of justice and "whether 
applying these principles would lead us to make the same judgements about the 
basic structure of society which we now make intuitively". I f the principles 
derived do not match these judgements "we can either modify the account of the 
initial situation or we can revise our existing judgements". For example the 
parties in the original position may decide it is not rational to save for future 
generations "so in this instance the Veil of Ignorance fails to secure the desired 
results. Therefore I resolve the question of justice between generations in a 
69 
different way by altering the motivation assumption". The coherence constraint 
means that the principles selected in the original position must generate judgements 
which more or less match with our considered judgements about what is just. 
"Eventually we shall f ind a description of the initial situation that both expresses 
reasonable conditions and yields principles which match our considered judgements 
duly pruned and adjusted. This state of affairs I refer to as reflective 
70 
equilibrium." In other words the original position is a device through which we 
can both assess and justify our considered judgements. It clarifies our intuitive 
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judgements, for i f we appeal directly to these intuitive judgements we have a 
problem in assigning weights to them. However this process seems to me to negate 
Rawls' arguments for denying to the parties in the original position any substantive 
moral principles, limiting them to knowledge of certain general assumptions about 
social institutions, with all contingent circumstances erased. He writes that the 
justification of a conception of justice "is a matter of the mutual support of many 
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considerations" , not least o f which , surely, is consideration o f our own 
experiences, which reveal to us the deficiencies of either out intuitive conceptions 
or of the social institutions which regulate their operation. 
Af te r all it is the principles which we hold now, which have been formed over time, 
and the operation of the institutions of the state and the principles which lie behind 
them, which are both being judged through the device of the original position, and 
which are being used as the yardstick against which the principles deriving f rom 
the original position are being judged. Barry says that "in real l i fe people disagree 
on moral principles because they have conflicting interests" , but i f they cannot be 
influenced by these conflicting interests, as in the original position, they can reach 
agreement. I f we allow the parties in the original position to have substantive moral 
notions "we have to say that in the absence of self-interested biases people would 
agree on this or that principle, which is not deduction but assertion". I return to 
this theme later when I examine the nature of Rawlsian society, and i t wi l l recur in 
my discussion of Walzer in the following chapters. 
Duty and Obligation 
The original position is necessary f rom a philosophical point of view as the device 
for the making of the hypothetical contract. The contract is necessary since it 
implies that men are ends in themselves capable of having their own conception of 
the good and who should be treated at the very least "in accordance with the 
principles to which they would consent in an original position of equality".^ 
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Membership in the society into which we are born is not a matter of choice - i t is 
not the result of a contract - but "a society satisfying the principles of justice as 
fairness comes as close as a society can to being a voluntary scheme, for i t meets the 
principles which free and equal persons would assent to under circumstances that 
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are fair". No obligation can be derived f rom a hypothetical contract. What then 
is the relationship between the citizen and a state based on Rawlsian principles, and 
to what extent does political obligation depend upon our consent, or upon any 
voluntary act, in Rawls' theory, given that we are to apply the principles to actual 
states which we are born into and have not joined voluntarily? 
Rawls distinguishes between duties and obligations. The former apply to us 
regardless of any voluntary acts and "they have no necessary connection with 
institutions or social practices". Obligations, and some natural duties, "presuppose 
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principles for social forms" , which is to say that principles for institutions must 
be chosen first, before those governing obligations and duties for individuals can be 
formulated. Natural duties "obtain between all as equal moral persons". They are 
derived f rom the contractarian situation; that is, they are the duties that would be 
acknowledged in the original position, but the parties in the original position would 
consider it appropriate that these duties should apply to all regardless of any act of 
consent. So, for example, we have a duty not to harm others or to inf l ic t 
unnecessary suffering. We also have a duty to support just institutions - "each is 
bound to these [just] institutions independent of his voluntary acts". 
From a contractural position certain principles de f in ing natural duties are 
formulated which apply to everyone unconditionally - political duty does not 
depend upon consensual acts. Everyone has a duty to support institutions which are 
just (or nearly just) as judged against the principles which would be chosen in a 
hypothetical situation, principles to which we all would agree in the same 
circumstances. Is i t not paradoxical that free and equal persons should have 
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unconditional duties imposed upon them? Rawls argues that we would willingly 
accept such duties because they underwrite the notion of society as a cooperative 
venture, confirm the bases of self-worth and mutual respect, and ensure the stability 
of the just society. 
But why do the parties in the original position insist that one such natural duty, and 
the most important, is that of supporting just institutions? Should not this 
particular duty be condit ional upon a voluntary act, i n keeping w i t h the 
contractural nature of the theory of justice? Rawls believes that since "the f u l l 
an 
complement of the equal liberties is already guaranteed" there is nothing to be 
gained by insisting on an act of voluntary consent. Moreover i f the requirement to 
support just institutions is unconditional then this is the most direct way to secure 
their stability. This natural duty is the minimum necessary to maintain social l ife. 
You must support just institutions because they comply with principles to which you 
would have agreed in an initial situation of equality. Consent is irrelevant and the 
need to f i nd a consensual act is obviated. This is important because Rawls 
recognises the di f f icul ty in identifying such an act. Furthermore, i f duty depended 
upon consent "citizens would not be bound to even a just constitution unless they 
Q 1 
have accepted and intend to continue to accept its benefits". Hence the instability 
of just institutions i f their support is a matter of voluntary acceptance. Even those 
who did give their support may wonder whether others regarded themselves as 
bound. "Therefore the parties in the original position do best when they 
acknowledge the natural duty of justice." 
It is clear, then, that Rawls' theory of political obligation differs f rom traditional 
contract theory in that the duty to support just institutions is not dependent on any 
act of one's own, explicit or tacit. In other words, the duty is not contractural in 
form. No contractural obligation arises f rom the fact that Rawls casts his theory in 
terms of hypothetical consent - we would agree to the principles of justice i f we 
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were in the Rawlsian original position. This simply defines the principles of justice 
which we have a natural duty to uphold. As Carr says, the original position is a 
device which dramatises the conditions we would accept for reaching the principles 
of justice and the restrictions we would want to place on them.^ 
But Rawlsian society would be a cooperative undertaking; obligations arise when 
people engage in a mutually advantageous cooperative venture and restrict their 
liberty so that everyone gains. Those who accept the restrictions have a right to a 
similar acquiescence on the part of all those who have thus benefited. However 
Rawls is unwilling to apply this principle, to put i t to the test in the case of the 
polity. The state is not a cooperative according to his own definition, although 
f rom a practical point of view his reasons for formulating the principle of duty in 
this way may seem compelling. For Rawls consent is not a necessary condition of 
political obligation for the majority of citizens. And, as I shall explain, he believes 
that citizens in the Rawlsian state would be bound together in a social union based 
on known and accepted principles. 
Obligations, as opposed to natural duties, are accounted for by the principle of 
fairness, which holds that a person is required to do his part as defined by the rules 
of an institution when firstly, the institution is just (that is, when it satisfies the 
two principles of justice); and secondly, "one has voluntarily accepted the benefits 
of the arrangement or taken advantage of the opportunities it offers to further one's 
interests".^ Those engaged in a cooperative venture must do their fair share. Note 
that obligations arise in this way because that is how the principle of fairness 
defines an obligation, and the first part of the principle means that i t is impossible, 
regardless of any voluntary consensual act, to be obligated to an unjust government. 
Rawls writes "it is, therefore, a mistake to argue against justice as fairness and 
contract theories generally that they have the consequence that citizens are under an 
obligat ion to unjust regimes which coerce their consent or w i n their tacit 
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acquiescence in more refined ways". Valid consent requires a just state as a 
necessary condition. 
Obligations, then, originate in voluntary acts which may be express (such as 
promising), or in the acceptance of benefits. The notion of accepting benefits 
cannot be applied to all citizens residing in a community (who may accept the 
benefit of common security, for example) and therefore become, by extension, an 
act of consent common to all citizens. The majority of citizens have no political 
obligation, as defined by Rawls, for there is no clear consensual act which the 
majority have performed. 
Obligations are normally owed to the other individuals with whom the obligated 
person is cooperating. So, for example, running for and winning office "gives rise to 
the obligation to f u l f i l the duties of office, and these duties determine the content 
of the obligation". Now the duties of office are not moral duties but 
responsibilities attached to a specific institutional position, although one may have 
a moral reason for discharging the duties "as when one is bound to do so by the 
principle of fairness". 
The obligations arising f rom the principle of fairness are not obligations of 
contract. Once "a complete conception of right is on hand, we can simply forget 
about the conception of original position, and apply these principles as we would 
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any others" he writes. That is to say, the principles of natural duty and fairness 
are derived f rom a hypothetical situation but this does not mean that duties must be 
contracted into. Similarly, whilst obligations depend upon voluntary acts they are 
not obligations because of either the original hypothetical contract or a later 
specific contractural act, but because the actor voluntarily performs an act the 
nature of which, as defined by the principle of fairness, gives rise to an obligation. 
So, for example, the political obligation acquired by an office-holder does not arise 
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f rom a contract. 
Rawls says "we should note that, since the principle of fairness may establish a bond 
to existing just arrangements, the obligations covered by it can support a tie already 
present that derives f rom the natural duty of justice. Thus a person may have both 
on 
a natural duty and an obligation to comply with an institution and to do his part". 
So an office-holder may have a natural duty to support certain just arrangements, 
coterminous with everyone else's similar natural duty; he may also have an 
additional obligation to support these arrangements in specific ways deriving f rom 
the duties of his office. 
It would be possible to make obligations depend on the natural duty of justice by 
construing "the requisite voluntary acts as acts by which our natural duties are 
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freely extended". However Rawls writes that "it seems appropriate to distinguish 
between those institutions ... which must inevitably apply to us since we are born 
into them ... and those that apply to us because we have freely done certain things as 
a rational way of advancing our ends"^, and the principle of fairness, f rom which 
obligations are derived, emphasises the distinction. 
The better o f f are more likely to acquire political obligations because they are more 
likely to achieve their ends through acquiring office (supposed to be open to all 
equally!), or through influencing people and events. I have already drawn attention 
to the problem of the worth of liberty in Rawls' theory. The better placed members 
of society are more able to take advantage of opportunities offered to them - the 
worth of liberty depends not only on a person's abilities but on the distribution of 
economic benefits. The weakness of the first principle is apparent - its worth 
depends on the distribution of wealth which is regulated by the second principle, 
and the hollowness of the distinction between liberty and the worth of liberty is 
exposed. Although I have criticised this aspect of the theory, Rawls is consistent in 
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arguing that since the more privileged members of society obtain greater benefits 
f rom the system of cooperation they have an added burden of responsibility - an 
obligation over and above their natural duty to support the just state. Even though 
Rawls has argued that this natural duty applied to all would increase stability, this 
could well be offset by the instability caused by economic inequalities in 
circumstances which I described earlier. 
Civil Disobedience 
Rawls recognises that no society wi l l be perfectly just and that "there is no feasible 
political process which guarantees that the laws enacted in accordance with it wi l l 
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be just". However we must accept unjust laws, or at least not oppose them through 
illegal means, i f the injustice is not too great because we are required to support just 
institutions, including the imperfect but necessary principle of majority decision-
making. We accept some injustices because all-in-all i t is better to have an 
imperfect procedure than none at all, provided that the burden of injustice is evenly 
spread over different groups over a period of time. Permanent minorities suffering 
injustice over many years may f ind the duty to comply problematic. And no one is 
required to acquiesce in the denial of his basic liberties. 
Even rational legislators may disagree about which policy wi l l most closely cohere 
with principles of justice. Discussion "checks our partiality and widens our 
perspective". However a range of options may be available and " i f the law 
actually voted is ... within the range of those that could reasonably be favored by 
rational legislators conscientiously trying to follow the principles of justice, then 
the decision of the majority is practically authoritative, though not definitive".^ 4 
This Rawls calls quasi-pure procedural justice, since its outcome does not define the 
right result. Those who disagree have not been able to persuade a majority to their 
point of view, and though they are required to uphold the decisions taken they are 
not required to think them just - they do not submit their judgement to the 
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majority's. 
Rawls formulates a theory of civil disobedience applicable to a nearly just society. 
He asks "At what point does the duty to comply with laws enacted by a legislative 
majority ... cease to be binding in view of the right to defend one's liberties and the 
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duty to oppose injustice?" An act of civil disobedience is a non-violent illegal act 
aimed at drawing public attention to a violation of the principles of justice, and 
should be limited to cases of substantial and clear injustice. "When certain 
minorities are denied the right to vote or to hold office, or to own property ... or 
when certain religious groups are repressed ... these injustices may be obvious to 
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all. 1 Indeed they may, and in a nearly just society one wonders how such blatant 
infractions of the principles of justice could be enacted into law. 
Moreover Rawls argues that, for the sake of fidelity to law, the persons engaged in 
civil disobedience should willingly accept their punishment, but this seems harsh 
indeed on minorities persistently robbed of their basic liberties, and whose respect 
for law may well be severely tested by their experiences. In such cases resort to 
civil disobedience is surely uncontroversial. On the other hand violations of the 
difference principle, applied to economic and social policies and institutions, are 
more d i f f icu l t to measure and "there is usually a wide range of conflicting yet 
• • Q7 rational opinion as to whether this principle is satisfied". 
Citizens who are members of minorities with such justified causes of civi l 
disobedience as those cited are unlikely to have a political obligation, since they 
cannot take f u l l advantage of the system of cooperation. More to the point, I think, 
is whether they have a natural duty to support a constitution deemed to be nearly 
just and which is so obviously unjust to this particular group. They do have 
obligations arising f rom the principle of fairness insofar as this principle comes into 
force in their private transactions, or in the small groups or associations which 
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individual minority members may join, including political groups. In these cases 
individuals may have a political obligation not to the state or to citizens generally 
but to fellow group members. Obligations of this type are discussed by Michael 
no 
Walzer, to whom Rawls refers and whose theories I discuss more fu l ly in the next 
chapter. 
The parties in the original position would agree to this conception of civil 
disobedience since i t emphasises the contractural nature of the principle of justice 
as those agreed among equals. "To deny justice to another is ... to refuse to recognise 
99 • • him as an equal." Civil disobedience draws attention to injustice and stabilises 
the constitution because submission would lead to further contempt for the victims, 
whilst resistance would break the ties of community. Although we normally accept 
the outcome of the voting procedure, in cases of serious disagreement a person may 
feel he cannot accept the majority decision and that civil disobedience is justified. 
Rawls argues that the individual is accountable for his deeds and has to make his 
own decision. The fact that we can disobey laws and have to make a moral choice 
means that the concept of duty (which is not dependent on voluntary acts) does not 
undermine the individual as an autonomous agent. A theory of civil disobedience 
recognises that the power of the state to make moral decisions is limited. Note that 
we are talking about an individual's interpretation of the principles of justice, the 
political principles on which the constitution is based, the objective criteria against 
which institutions, policies and laws are to be measured. This is the Archimedean 
point as Rawls call i t . Objections based on religious or moral views are a separate 
matter. "A person's conscience is misguided when he seeks to impose on us 
conditions that violate the principles to which we would each consent in [the 
original position]". ^  Rawls writes that "the degree of tolerance accorded to 
opposing moral conceptions depends upon the extent to which they can be allowed 
an equal place within a just system of l i b e r t y " ' ^ , and I now turn to his explanation 
of the political nature of justice as fairness. 
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Rawlsian Society 
In stressing the freedom of the individual liberal theorists are called to task for 
ignoring the values of community. Rawls recognises the problem when he asks 
whether the contract doctrine is "a satisfactory framework for understanding the 
values of community and for choosing among social arrangements to realise 
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them". Is the congruence between the right and the good only to be found in 
achieving the good of the community? Rawls argues that because, in the original 
position, each person is assumed to have a different conception of the good, it could 
be thought that the social order is conceived of as a private society, in which the 
basic arrangements are accepted not as good in themselves but as the best means to 
achieve personal ends. However Rawls rejects the idea that the original position 
should be interpreted as a private social order. "The account of goodness as 
rationality and the social nature of mankind ... requires a different v i e w . " ' ^ And 
in this view we value common institutions as good in themselves and recognise 
ourselves as members of a "social union founded upon the needs and potentialities 
of its members", 1 0 4 in which we delight in the excellence of others and share "in the 
total sum of the realized natural assets of the others". 1 0 ^ 
There are many social unions - families, friendships, groups, associations - the 
essential elements being "a shared final end and accepted ways of advancing it 
which allows for the public recognition of the attainments of everyone". 1^ The 
just or nearly just society is itself a social union, a social union of social unions, and 
its f inal end is the acceptance, support for , and development of just institutions seen 
as good in themselves. The members of such a society "have the common aim of 
cooperating together to realize their own and one another's nature in ways allowed 
by the principles of justice" , and in so doing "individually and collectively their 
nature as moral persons is most fu l ly realized, and with it their individual and 
collective good" . 1 0 8 
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Individual life-plans are "adjusted to the plans of others by mutually acceptable 
principles" expressed in the public institutions of society, "a superordinate plan" 
which is not a dominant end to which all others are subordinate, but the realisation 
of the principles of justice in which all participate and regard as good. This Rawls 
deems to be "the preeminent form of human f lourishing" 1 1 ^, because we both 
appreciate the moral virtues of others applied to upholding the just society, and 
because these just institutions, which all are dedicated to support, allow individuals 
to achieve their particular ends. "The public realization of justice is a value of 
community". 1 1 1 We achieve what we can, joining our activities to others' in 
contribution to the common culture. Thus each person does not seek to be complete 
in himself but to f ind fulf i lment in "willing and meaningful work within a just 
social union of social unions in which all can freely participate as they so 
inc l ine" . 1 1 2 
It is important to place Rawls' remarks about the common end of society in the 
context of his interpretation of justice as fairness as a theory applicable to the 
political institutions of society, regulating men's relationships to one another as 
citizens. Unity is based not on one comprehensive philosophical, moral or religious 
doctrine but on an overlapping consensus of a political conception of justice held by 
all, with basic institutions which satisfy these principles and citizens who have an 
effective sense of justice. "Social unity so understood is the most desirable 
conception of unity available to us; it is the limit of the practical best." A 
society based on the principles of justice as fairness is a good for citizens since it 
secures their basic rights and liberties - it is a political good; and secondly, when the 
shared final ends (such as support of just institutions) depends "on the cooperation 
of many to achieve i t , the good realised is social".1 ^ 
Justice as fairness is an essentially liberal conception; the contract device serves to 
emphasise the political tradition from which the theory is derived. It assumes 
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conflicting and incommensurable conceptions of the good, and tries to establish the 
basis for cooperation among people holding such diverse beliefs. Rawls counters 
charges of abstract individualism which may arise as a result of his use of a 
hypothetical contract situation by pointing out that i t is a device to help us to 
reason, presupposing no metaphysical doctrine of the person. Political persons, 
persons as citizens, are free in three ways. Firstly, they have the moral power and 
the right to have, and to revise, their own conceptions of the good, and this is a 
power recognised in others. This is in contrast to societies in which basic rights may 
depend on, for example, religious affiliations. Secondly, "they regard themselves as 
self-originating sources of valid claims. They think their claims have weight apart 
f rom being derived f rom duties or obligations specified by the political conception 
of justice . . . m 1 ^ Thirdly, "... they are regarded as capable of taking responsibility 
for their ends . . . " ^ They wil l adjust their ends to keep them within the boundaries 
set by the principles of justice, in a system of fair cooperation, given their 
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"prospects and situation in society". I have already pointed out that the least 
favoured might feel their life plans to be severely and unfairly restricted, and 
might need to be persuaded that their lot is the best possible. 
This political conception of the individual is, like justice as fairness, a liberal view. 
Justice as fairness is not a moral ideal governing all aspects of l i fe . It is assumed 
that there wi l l exist conflicting conceptions of the good, but people as citizens 
accept the constraints which are imposed as a result of the application of the 
principles of justice, without necessarily being committed to the moral ideals of 
liberalism such as individual autonomy and individuality. That is to say, as citizens 
we are committed to toleration of others' beliefs and conceptions of the good and to 
the idea that they are free to choose for themselves. "Justice as fairness tries to 
present a conception of political justice rooted in the basic intuitive ideas found in 
the public culture of a consti tutional democracy , i n contrast to the 
comprehensive moral ideals of the liberalism of Kant or M i l l , for instance. Indeed 
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he rejects the notion of a political society united in its belief in any such 
comprehensive doctrine. "This possibility is excluded by the fact of pluralism 
together with the rejection of the oppressive use of state power to overcome it". 
I t may be concluded, then, that justice as fairness would be accepted solely for 
prudential reasons, a modus vivendi, stable only until self-interests are threatened. 
But Rawls believes this not to be so, that citizens would consider the just society as 
a good in itself. Justice as fairness is a moral conception, albeit restricted to the 
basic structure of society, having "conceptions of persons and society, and concepts 
of right and fairness, as well as principles of justice with their complement of the 
virtues ... this conception of justice provides an account of the cooperative virtues 
suitable for a political doctrine ..." 
The political conception expresses values; for example, it explains why certain issues 
such as liberty of conscience or the prohibition of slavery are accepted by all the 
rival comprehensive doctrines and are not open to public debate. These values can 
be asserted i f some insist that a certain question, such as salvation of souls, is 
important enough to justify civil strife. The doctrine of liberty of conscience is 
asserted and "we deny that the concern for salvation requires anything incompatible 
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with that liberty". Toleration, reasonableness and a sense of fairness are "very 
great" virtues, and when they sustain a political conception of justice they constitute 
a notable public good. Even i f the liberal conception is accepted at first as a modus 
vivendi he believes there would be "a tendency for the essential cooperative virtues 
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to develop" , fostering an allegiance to the liberal political conception of justice 
and a belief in "the possibility of a reasonably harmonious and stable pluralist 
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society". The values and ideals of the publicly held conception of justice would 
10/1 
"normally outweigh whatever other values oppose them" ; that is, the values of 
comprehensive doctrines which may oppose the virtues of freedom of conscience, 
toleration, the idea of society as a cooperative venture between free and equal 
citizens. 
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The idea is that starting f rom the intuitive notion of society as a system of social 
cooperation between free and equal persons with different conceptions of the good, 
social unity is founded on "a political conception of justice to regulate the basic 
structure of society" , which limits "the conceptions of the good which are 
i 
permissible". Rawls writes that "to f ind a shared idea of citizens' good that is 
appropriate for political purposes, political liberalism looks for an idea of rational 
advantage within a political conception that is independent of any particular 
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comprehensive doctrine and hence may be the focus of an overlapping consensus". 
I f , then, justice as fairness establishes the basis of social cooperation and i f its 
public realisation is a value of community, and i f it is affirmed by an overlapping 
consensus of religious, philosophical and moral doctrines, could it not be accepted as 
an ideal by communitarians who seek common values? I wi l l argue that Walzer's 
theory of spheres of justice fails because he regards the state as the ultimate 
community, and that in the modern liberal democratic state no values are held in 
common sufficiently strongly to form the basis of an acceptable theory of 
distribution. Rawls' theory of justice is rejected by both Nozick and (for very 
different reasons) by Walzer, who believes that a system of justice must be based on 
the actual society - its beliefs and historical experiences - for which i t is intended, 
and that no set of basic primary goods is "correct" for all societies. As Schaefer 
writes, "it does not appear possible to devise adequate principles for the regulation 
of a particular society, knowing nothing of that society's dist inguishing 
characteristics". 1 2 8 
Rawls, of course, has argued that his theory is applicable primarily to contemporary 
liberal democracies, but this would not alter Walzer's position since he (Walzer) 
believes that in arguing for principles of justice men should not try to detach 
themselves f rom reality but bear in mind common understandings and choices 
already made. Moreover Walzer would not accept the difference principle because 
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he believes that the polity has to make much more specific decisions about the 
nature and quantities of the goods which need to be distributed to sustain 
citizenship. 
The construction of the theory through the device of the original position concerns 
Nagel, who asks "why should parties in the original position be prepared to commit 
themselves to principles that may frustrate or contravene their deepest convictions, 
12Q 
just because they are deprived of the knowledge of these convictions?" Craig 
argues that the theory's bui l t - in individualism prevents Rawls f rom considering 
communal conceptions of justice. Toleration defends "... a kind of pragmatic social 
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peace purchased at the price of the serious and f u l l pursuit of other values". The 
parties in the original position cannot choose a conception of justice which embodies 
an idea of the good l ife because they haven't the knowledge necessary to make this 
choice. He is arguing that liberal contract theory with its emphasis on individual 
liberty and freedom of conscience, and which treats men as ends in themselves, 
capable of reaching their own decisions about the good, is an attempt to "make 
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morality function in a mass society". But men wil l only reach their potential as 
social beings in a good society with commonly held values, in which the individual 
is known and respected, and cares for his reputation. Schaefer writes that 
"different regimes rest on different conceptions of justice ... Each of these 
conceptions reflects a somewhat different view of the common good, and ultimately 
of the good of the individual human being. One cannot, therefore, evaluate a 
particular conception of justice except in light of a critical analysis of the 
substantive view of the good on which it depends and of an empirical observation 
of the facts of political life". He is arguing that within the liberal state of 
Rawls people are not free to pursue certain conceptions of the good because the 
principles on which the basic structures of society are founded are not compatible 
with such conceptions. He asks how much cooperation can exist among men with 
irreconcilable aims or severely different beliefs. 
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This question of the presence or absence of shared values in a political community 
cannot easily be settled within the context of contemporary liberal democracies. 
Recognising this, Rawls has attempted to limit his theory to a political conception in 
order to enable people with irreconcilable differences to live together. Although he 
has written that the priority of the right over the good sets limits on which 
comprehensive doctrines are permissible, the principles of justice must sustain "ways 
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of l i fe that citizens can a f f i rm as worthy of their f u l l allegiance". His political 
conception of justice contains political ideas of the good which can be shared by 
free and equal citizens whilst not presupposing any comprehensive doctrine. He 
believes that justice as fairness is not procedurally neutral since it is based on 
principles that are substantive, but i t is neutral in that all citizens are allowed to 
advance their aims equally with no particular conception of the good being 
favoured. 
Obviously there may be some people whose conception of the good is such that they 
are not prepared to tolerate divergent views, and in these cases it is d i f f i cu l t to see 
how cooperation is possible. Schaefer argues firstly, that not all can pursue their 
conceptions of the good equally under justice as fairness because of the very 
formulation of the two principles and the way they regulate insitutions, and 
secondly, that some regimes may work very well based on different conceptions of 
justice and the good. Rawls preempts the development of such regimes by insisting 
on his concept of the right being prior to the good. Rawls is particularly open to 
attack in this way because he presents his arguments in the form of a rational 
discussion. The principles are chosen because they are rational. His critics claim 
the choice of principles is inevitable given his starting point. No such criticism 
could be made of Nozick, who simply states his ideological starting point - i t is not 
open to logical contradiction as Rawls' theory is. Similarly Hobhouse simply 
assumes a set of values based on persons as members. 
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Although there is indeed a diversity of views about virtue, morality and the good, 
this is something of a distraction since Rawls' principles are to be applied to liberal 
democratic societies which do not recognise a generally held conception of the good, 
but which wi l l tolerate all conceptions as long as they are not imposed on others. 
Toleration is a virtue in the liberal state, which does not use its power to impose a 
doctrine on those reluctant to have it thrust upon them. The role of the state is 
wider than that of the nightwatchman state of Nozick. It has to uphold the 
principles of justice. This involves redistribution and other adjustments to the 
economic system in accordance with the second principle, as well as regulation of 
social and political institutions to ensure fair equality of opportunity, freedom of 
expression and so on. But just how di f f icu l t it is in practice to separate the 
metaphysical, moral and religious from the political in contemporary liberal 
deomocracies was neatly illustrated by a Bradford councillor. In a television 
interview he suggested that moslems who objected to Salman Rushdie's novel should 
"leave all that behind them in the mosque". I took him to mean that in the mosque 
they could believe and say what they liked about Rushdie and his book, but outside, 
in the political sphere of freedom of expression, they must allow him to give voice 
to views repugnant to their deeply held beliefs. How far is i t possible to tolerate, in 
the name of political freedom, what is intolerable to those basic convictions which 
give value and meaning to one's life? And this is a problem for anyone; even 
liberals can have strong beliefs, but perhaps uncertainty is a more typical liberal 
condition! 
Barry argues that liberalism includes the idea "that every doctrine should be open to 
critical scrutiny and that ... no religious dogma can reasonably be held with 
certainty". ^  Could those without a liberal outlook support liberal institutions and 
"liberal policy prescriptions" such as freedom of worship and expression; could 
they accept justice as fairness as a political theory? 
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Believers tend to have clear ideas of right and wrong which are not open to 
compromise. Moral convictions, says Barry, cannot be treated as mere preference, 
yet the principle of neutrality puts all belief systems and conceptions of the good on 
an equal footing, "but to accept that this is how things ought to be organised, it is 
necessary to have an outlook that is, in broad terms, liberal". Although Rawls 
does not treat beliefs as preferences he thinks that they should be held as private 
opinions but, writes Barry, anyone who regards the teaching of the RC Church, for 
example, as a matter of personal opinion "must already have swallowed a large dose 
of l iberal ism". 1 3 7 
He concludes that a liberal outlook is a necessary condition for supporting liberal 
institutions. (Obviously some may accept liberal values for prudential reasons, 
recognising the nature of the society they live in, rather than as a matter of 
conviction). And justice as fairness is not simply a political conception. As Rawls 
himself says i t includes moral values and ideas of persons with the capacity to 
respect one another and to cooperate in a scheme of mutual benefit. 
Despite Rawls' arguments about the political nature of justice as fairness and the 
engendering of public virtues within a cooperative society, I consider that a society 
based on Rawlsian principles would be prone to instability. I have argued that the 
operation of the difference principle would give greater incentives to those who 
would not cooperate on any other basis, and could lead to great inequality. I have 
been particularly critical of Rawls' distinction between liberty and the worth of 
liberty. 
Rawls' theory is under attack f rom Nozick on the one hand and the communitarians 
on the other. It is to the latter that I now turn my attention, specifically to the 
ideas of Michael Walzer. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Walzer, Liberalism and Community 
Thus far I have examined the contrasting theories of Nozick, Hobhouse and Rawls. 
Nozick considers individuals to have inviolable rights which define boundaries 
which may not be crossed. These rights set limits on the actions of other individuals 
and governments. Moreover principles of distributive justice are based not on an 
end-state but on the individual's right to a particular holding, his entitlement being 
just i f the process of g i f t and exchange has not been abused. Since the state is not 
an agency for achieving desirable ends it follows that i t can make no claim on the 
individual. The welfare of others - whether or not and how much to contribute - is 
a decision for each individual to make for himself. Hobhouse, on the other hand, 
believed that true freedom is to be found in the collective l i fe . Individuals have 
both rights and obligations, the latter defining that which is due f rom one to 
another. We have responsibilities to others as members of the same community, 
regardless of our individual consent, and it is the larger community, the state, which 
maintains and promotes a harmonious social l ife and through which we provide for 
the security and well-being of others. 
I noted the tension between individual rights and the claims of community within 
Hobhouse's theory of the common good and the same tension is present in Rawls' 
theory of justice. This is inevitable in a social liberalism which wishes to reconcile 
the equal freedom and rights of the individual with membership of the state, given 
that this membership is not the result of a conscious voluntary decision. Rawls, of 
course, uses the hypothetical consent argument - the principles are those to which 
we would have agreed had we been in the situation of the parties in the original 
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position. Society is a cooperative venture f rom which all must benefit. He argues 
that we have a natural duty to obey just institutions, regardless of any consensual 
act, and that such natural duties give support to the notion of society as a 
cooperative venture. However, he has not succeeded in eliminating the strains 
between the competing demands of the individual and the community because the 
principles are devised to meet the demands of liberal individualism, not for a 
cooperative society. And insofar as Rawls calls his theory "political", he sets limits 
on the extent to which a modern liberal state can be regarded as a cooperative 
community with shared values. 
Simmons argues that Rawls' natural duty to support just institutions w i l l not suffice 
to bind us to a particular community since we are bound to support all just 
institutions wherever they may be.* Communitarian critics of liberalism believe 
that the values of community, with its traditions and shared understandings which 
give meaning to our lives, are undermined by individualism and its expression in 
contract theory. Michael Walzer writes that "the political community is probably the 
closest we can come to a world of common meanings". (Note that i t is as a political 
theory that Rawls believes his principles could form the basis of community values.) 
I wish to take issue with Walzer on his understanding of the state as a world of 
common meanings. I wi l l examine the development of his thought as it is expressed 
in "Obligations : Essays on Disobedience, War and Citizenship" published in 1970, 
and "Spheres of Justice" published some thirteen years later. It wi l l be seen that 
Walzer moves f rom the position that the citizen in the modern state is alienated 
f rom the state, with obligations to the state which are secondary to those he has to 
the groups of which he is a member, to the belief that the state is the embodiment 
of a collective consciousness which transcends all differences of interest and which 
redistributes the resources of the members in accordance with some shared 
understandings of their needs. Strong and weak, rich and poor are connected 
through the social contract interpreted as a moral bond. 
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I t should be noted that "Obligations" is a series of essays f rom which I have tried to 
extract common themes and integrate them into a coherent whole. However, the 
very form of the book means that many questions arise which are not properly 
answered. It is not a rigorously argued treatise, whereas "Spheres of Justice" is a 
systematic exposition. One of the distinguishing and recurring themes in Walzer's 
writings, to which I wi l l return, is that i t is a mistake to attempt to formulate 
universal principles of justice; rather principles should be derived f rom concrete 
situations. 
Walzer is a consent theorist, but in "Obligations" he argues that f u l l consent is only 
given through active political participation. Moreover the kind of political activity 
which he envisages in this early work wi l l inevitably result in conflicting 
obligations. I intend to discuss certain themes and questions arising f rom 
"Obligations" and contrast these with the arguments presented in "Spheres of 
Justice". Initially I wi l l examine his theory of the origin of obligations, his notion 
of consent, his description of the relationship between citizen and state, and his 
solution to the problem of political participation and obligation. 
Obligations 
Most obligations have their origin in consent. However throughout his essays Walzer 
is careful to distinguish two types of obligation, one of which is clearly not 
dependent on consent. And i f this is the case for one set of obligations, what is 
different in the second (i.e. political obligation) to justify his argument that i t not 
only depends on consent, but on consent defined in a particular way? 
The first set of obligations is to society, and these obligations are incurred by the 
very fact of residence, of daily intercourse and the relationships which arise 
therefrom. Even oppressed minorities and prisoners of war wi l l develop such 
"obligatory ties"'*. These relationships lead to understandings f r o m which 
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obligations follow, including an ultimate obligation to defend society. Thus an 
"alienated citizen", that is, a non-participant in the political process, nevertheless has 
obligations: "He is bound to those actions necessary for the safety of the social l i fe 
he shares"^. Although Walzer is quite explicit in his insistence on the separation of 
state and society, nevertheless there arise certain minimum obligations to the state, 
for he writes that "residence in a democratic state does, I think, generate a prima 
facie obligation to obey the laws of that state - in part because of the benefits that 
are necessarily accepted along with residence, in part because of the expectations 
aroused among one's fellow-residents, and finally because of the universality of 
obligation in a democracy, from which no resident can easily exclude himself'**. 
What Walzer means by the phrase "universality of obligation" is unclear in this 
context, given that the main thrust of his arguments is directed against, and 
minimises, our political obligations in the present democratic state. However, 
Walzer believes that residence gives rise to obligations to the state in exchange for 
benefits received, especially the security which makes social l i fe possible; and the 
obligations which we owe to our fellow-residents, arising out of direct relationships 
with them, are not to be taken lightly. "Moved by love, sympathy, or friendship, 
7 
men in liberal society can and obviously do incur ultimate obligations." 
o 
The second type of obligations, political obligations, are "incurred through action"; 
and include the obligation to defend the state (in contrast to society). These are the 
obligations of citizenship - a commitment to society and its political system, "to the 
survival of the particular organization and also to all those purposes beyond 
survival that the organization sets for itself"^. The f u l l obligations of citizenship 
are only incurred by those who share in ruling and being ruled. The two types of 
obligation described by Walzer are not equivalent to Rawls' notion of duty (to obey 
a just state) and obligation (incurred by political activists). 
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To understand fu l ly just how these obligations are incurred i t is necessary to 
understand Walzer's notion of consent, the source of just power. Political consent is 
not one specific action - a promise, the making of a contract between strangers. 
Rather it is signified by a series of actions, freely made, over a period of time. 
These actions demonstrate a commitment to fellow-citizens or to those with whom 
we share a common group membership. Our moral knowledge is acquired in a 
group; commitments to principles are commitments to other men. A member of a 
group incurs obligations when there is a shared self-consciousness, and when he is 
involved in decision-making and public acts in support of the group's ideals. 
Certain actions, then, both demonstrate the existence of the group and at the same 
time obligate the actors. 
Obligations result f rom group membership and actions because "action is the crucial 
language of moral commitment"1^. To generate such obligations a citizen must be a 
participant in the moral l ife of the community. That is to say, in Walzer's 
restatement of social contract theory, "the individual's contract is obviously not a 
founding act; nor, I think, is it simply a solemn promise upon which all subsequent 
obligation is based...Rather, the contract must involve some acknowledgement of the 
reality of the common life and of the moral transformation which i t makes possible 
...the common life must be lived before i t can be said to generate ultimate 
obligation" 1 1 . 
It is important to note that group membership is not subjugation to some collective 
wi l l , or blind obedience. "A theory of consent and obligation must include a view of 
the consenting self : the person who incurs and carries the obligation has to be and 
continue to be ... an autonomous and responsible man or woman" . 
It does seem to me that the distinction between a person's private obligations (to 
friends and family) and his political obligations is d i f f icu l t to sustain in Walzer's 
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description, since political obligations are incurred in the moral l ife of the 
community. The citizen is self-directing only in the group, which (in an ideal 
participatory democracy) wi l l influence policy and hence the citizens' private lives. 
11 
Euben says that the distinction is only possible i f politics is defined in a very 
limited way, because even in a liberal society the polity is the most all-embracing 
association and which is ultimately responsible for sustaining the physical, material, 
cultural and moral l i fe of its members. It is therefore misleading to oppose state 
and politics to society and morality. Decisions in the political sphere set a tone and 
direction for every aspect of human intercourse, and we shall see that this is the 
argument which Walzer makes in "Spheres". Carole Pateman argues that "liberal 
theorists have been able to distinguish "political" obligation f rom other obligations 
precisely because it is owed to the state, or concerned with the political sphere and 
not everyday l ife ... When theorists argue that political obligation is owed to fellow 
citizens and turn to the everyday l ife of individuals in voluntary associations in 
their arguments about consent, the long tradition of liberal theory is being 
challenged"^. She correctly points out that for Walzer the group is more important 
than the state, both morally and politically, and that the horizontal relationships 
between group members are part of political obligation, from which she concludes 
that "Walzer's participatory pluralist conception of consent and political obligation 
cannot be confined within the bounds of liberal theory and practice"^. 
In "The Problem of Citizenship"^ Walzer argues that the citizen has come to be seen 
as the recipient of benefits, most notably security, provided by the state, whereas 
social contract theory suggests that citizens are bound to each other, bound to 
protect each other. It could be argued that in contract theory the benefits each 
citizen receives are the result of his own action in being a party to the agreement, 
and that such a contract suggests a relationship of mutual dependency and restraint, 
and a willingness to obey the state insofar as i t is instrumental in achieving the 
desired end. However, as Walzer says, the relationships of the obligated persons are 
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unclear. The horizontal relationship implied by contract theory is contradicted by 
the idea of the citizen as recipient of benefits. Exactly to what, and to whom, is the 
citizen obligated, and to what extent must he obey the state? I f , in his opinion his 
protection is inadequate then he would be obligated neither to the state nor to his 
fellow-citizens. Essentially the citizen, in this view, is passive and private. 
But i f citizens complain about authority and try to participate in decision-making 
(as they should do - i t is the citizens, not their instrument, the government - who 
should make decisions) then a rather different view of citizenship emerges. The 
contrast is between the passive and powerless citizen and the participant citizen 
concerned for the common good. 
Participation and Consent 
Participation is the key to Walzer's theory of political obligation and consent. The 
attenuation of the relationship between ci t izen and state, even in l iberal 
democracies, means that opportunities for express consent are rarely available. " I f 
consent theory is to be taken seriously, it must suggest some way of submitting 
oneself to a government other than by pledging allegiance to i t , taking out 
17 
naturalization papers, or becoming an active participant in its politics." The 
answer has been found in the notion of tacit consent. The acceptance of benefits 
implies an agreement to obey the laws and keep the peace, since these are the 
conditions which make the benefits possible. In this case the obligations of the 
visitor would be the same as the obligations of the citizen. Walzer rejects Locke's 
distinction between express and tacit consent in which both bind to the same extent, 
the former perpetually, the latter temporarily. Since government by consent implies 
the possibility of a reconsideration of one's political allegiances the bond of express 
consent is not perpetual. Tacit and express consent d i f fer in character, not 
duration. The duties of tacit consent are limited to preserving the peaceful social 
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order - the obligations to society incurred through residence and normal daily 
intercourse. Ultimate obligations to the polity are only incurred through the 
expressions of consent and participation which make one a citizen, involving a 
commitment to the polity as well as to society. 
This whole question of tacit consent and obligations arising f rom ordinary daily l i fe 
is a problem in these essays. Walzer clearly states that he wi l l not recognise any 
obligations other than those based on consent, which is signified by "some act of our 
o w n " . How, Euben asks, is tacit consent "an act of my own"? "It seems to me 
simply not demanding enough to say that a man tacitly consents when he is involved 
in personal and social relations, for that is as much as to say that any man who lives 
i q 
in a society tacitly consents to it." . 
It is important to note that a participant citizen is one committed to the polity and 
its purposes, but that the purposes of the state, even though they are just, wi l l not in 
themselves obligate citizens. "In the context of consent theory we do not say that 
the government is just, therefore the citizens are obligated, but rather that the 
citizens have committed themselves, therefore the government is just." Walzer 
defines a just government as one whose citizens have consented to i t - who have 
actually exercised their right to consent to it . "A just government must be one to 
which or within which consent is possible. But this is a necessary, not a sufficient 
condition of political justice. Governmental powers are exercised by right only i f 
01 
we have actually granted that right." 
At this point we again confront a major problem in consent theory. Euben rehearses 
Pitkin's argument that consent theory directs our attention to the wrong place. We 
should be looking at the nature of the government (as Rawls does). As Euben says, 
consent theory cannot help us to decide what commitments to make, "for it is really 
a method or procedure; consenting may legitimise any state of affairs, and 
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questions about what may be legitimately consented to are not usually raised by 
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consent theorists." Rawls overcomes the problem by arguing that we have a 
natural duty to obey a just state, a just state being one which adheres to principles 
we would have agreed to in the original position. Walzer's position is very clearly 
stated. "Consent theory suggests a procedural rather than a substantive ethics ... It is 
a way of describing how particular men come to have obligations... , and in "The 
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Obligations of Oppressed Minorities he argues that an oppressed citizen has the 
right to say "no" to a law because he has not helped to make i t , whereas free and 
equal citizens are bound to obey every law. This seems to overlook the problems of 
the free citizen's attitude to legally valid but iniquitous laws, and the oppressed 
citizen's attitude to a just law, which he surely has no right to disobey. 
I f an oppressed citizen chooses to participate then he incurs obligations, but these 
obligations are limited, for Walzer writes that insofar as activists begin to exploit 
the democratic system successfully, so they begin to acquire obligations. The 
implication seems to be that participation is not enough; there must be a positive 
outcome - the beginning, should we say, of a lessening of injustice. This same 
argument seems not to apply to the free and equal citizen not affected by the 
injustice. Yet what is the position of such a citizen who supports the oppressed 
minority, who has participated, but has been unsuccessful in his attempt to rectify 
an injustice? Why is he bound to obey every law, pay every tax, whilst a minority 
with whom he sympathises remains oppressed, and when some of the state's actions 
conflict with "a core of deeply held ideals"?^ 
Group Membership 
In fact, obligations to the state do have their limits, even for free and equal citizens, 
because in Walzer's model free and equal citizenship is exercised within groups, and 
when obligations to the group conflict with obligations to the state, there is a duty 
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to disobey the state (but not to challenge the existence of the state itself). This is 
not simply a matter of the obligation to the group taking precedence because in the 
group one's participation and effectiveness in decision-making is greater. Within 
the group the citizen is sharing his moral knowledge and convictions, and when the 
group argues that the law is over-extended it is questioning the morality of the 
state's action. Incidentally, because of the nature of the pluralist state, "there can 
be no possible judge of this disagreement" . Participation in the state's decision-
making has therefore incurred no more than a prima facie obligation to obey. 
Moreover the obligations a citizen has to the group can themselves, in certain 
circumstances, be overridden for moral reasons. A person joins a group, makes 
commitments for particular reasons and can break these commitments " i f these 
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reasons ever seem ... to lose their force" . A citizen cannot be forced to sacrifice 
personal integrity too often without destroying "the moral balance" between it and 
obligations to comrades. 
Walzer, then, tends to over-emphasise the obligations generated by participation, 
which is no guarantee of moral rectitude. Obligations within the group are stronger 
than those owed to the state both because of the greater degree of participation, and 
because of the moral nature of the group. Participation in the group is proof of 
one's citizenship, and paradoxically bestows the right to disobey the state. But 
obligations to the group, too, ultimately depend on the group's decisions and actions, 
as judged by the individual. As Euben says "consent ... is not enough to make a 
commitment into an obligation ... what intrude are judgements about the moral value 
of what I have consented to and this remains so even when consent is signified 
through active participation. To put it more clearly, even i f participation signifies 
consent to the decision-making procedure, this consent can be withdrawn i f the 
decisions are unjust. 
115 
Walzer is attempting to f i nd a balance between moral anarchy and moral imposition. 
The citizen is neither free to break his obligations at random, nor should he simply 
obey, since this would reduce him to an automaton. To avoid the former, Walzer 
argues that responsibility is always "responsibility to someone else and is always 
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learned with someone else" . The group provides the ambience within which those 
responsibilities can be known and felt. He feels this so strongly that he says we 
need "to supplement our most intimate bonds. That means, to incur other obligations 
to live and possibly to die for other men and women ... this is the heart of the 
matter: to be obligated to live for the political community ... is to have a reason for 
living" . Yet what happens when, despite the fullest participation, the citizen 
disagrees with the group's (not the state's) decisions? The individual is an 
autonomous and responsible person whose integrity can lead to the breaking of 
political obligations. What, then, has happened to the notion of shared morality? I f 
morality becomes "merely personal" the individual loses his connection with a 
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universal order J , yet, as Walzer says, groups are composed of individuals who 
determine the shape of their moral lives. 
The group is the source of the citizen's morality, and at the same time group 
membership is proof that the citizen's morality is part of a shared consciousness. 
But when, as a matter of integrity, a person feels it necessary to curtail his group 
membership because of deeply-held principles, i t is necessary to ask what is the 
source of such principles? In fact, they are formed in the culture and society which 
we have inherited, and which we are instrumental in changing through our own 
actions. Participation may make us adjust or change our principles, i t might deepen 
them. But our participation is the result of the principles we hold. They, not 
participation nor consent, obligate us, they tell us what commitments to make and 
break. I f a government's actions conform to our principles of justice then we ought 
to obey, regardless of our participation. The citizen must make the necessary 
judgements, and ought to participate to change an unjust condition. 
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The Distant State 
Because Walzer's theory of obligation depends on participation, i t is obvious that the 
civil liberty of all citizens is "the necessary condition of political obligation and just 
12 
government . Complete political obligation is rare because of the nature and scale 
of the modern state - a distant power "never again f i rmly within the grasp of its 
citizens"^ who have "no reason for feeling obligated"^. And again, he writes that 
"the state has simply outgrown the human reach and understanding of its 
citizens" . The scale of organisations "restricts the access points of individual 
citizens to the decision-making process and narrows or distorts the view any one of 
them can have of the process as a whole" . 
Liberalism, argues Walzer, emphasises the distinction between state and society. The 
liberal state's citizens are private persons; "it represents the triumphant solution to 
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the problem of governing a society of strangers" . Yet democracy requires 
cooperation, and its legitimacy lies in self-government. The problem is that most 
citizens are largely inactive, whilst the active are only minimally effective and not 
necessarily representative of the whole citizen body. 
The democratic ideal of self-determination is an illusion: "liberal theory knows 
nothing of an alienation more profound than political alienation, but that is a 
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condition it seems almost designed to specify" . The illusion produces a sinister 
result. In the modern democratic state the best expression of consent is political 
participation, which is a pledge to abide by the decisions of the people. "Actual 
participants in a democratic political process are generally not surprised to be told 
that they have committed themselves to abide by its results" . Yet, because their 
participation is largely ineffectual, citizens do not in fact decide, but they are 
implicated in the decisions made. The ideal has become an ideology, and i f we 
insist on defining citizenship with all its moral and political implications we do not 
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describe reality. His whole argument, then, raises doubts about the existence of 
political obligation in the modern liberal state. 
What is the nature of citizenship in the modern state? There are degrees or classes 
of citizenship, and Walzer chooses to focus on three particular groups. Firstly, the 
oppressed citizen, already mentioned, whose "obligations depend upon the ways in 
which he chooses and manages to involve himself in the larger community"^. 
Secondly, the alienated citizen. On the one hand there is the alienated citizen who 
chooses not to participate. He wants a peaceful l ife in the state f rom which he is 
estranged. "He is bound to those actions necessary for the safety of the social l i fe 
he shares, but not to actions dictated by "reason of s t a t e " " ' * O n the other hand 
there is the alienation of the citizen who does participate, but whose participation is 
essentially trivial. This alienation is not self-imposed, and the participation fits the 
ideology of citizenship, not its ideal. Such a citizen "is unlikely to experience 
conflicts of obligation, and for this reason he is widely regarded as a "good" citizen. 
I f the state stands over him as an alien force he does not know it; he thinks it is his 
o w n " ^ . This is the passive, private citizen, who enjoys liberty and protection in 
exchange for obedience to law. I have already outlined Walzer's argument against 
such a view of citizenship - " i f the citizen is a passive figure there is no political 
community"'*'*. 
Finally, there is the pluralist citizen who shares in ruling and being ruled through 
his group memberships. I f such groups make no claims against the state then these 
citizens are "simply bound, bound without complications, to obey the laws they help 
in making"'*'*. It is this pluralism which "enables us to describe the citizen as a 
communal man and a participant at the very moment when citizenship by itself does 
not seem to permit either description"'*^. Through his membership in secondary 
groups the individual establishes relationships with other citizens and with the 
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whole political community, and with the state. Walzer argues that these groups have 
standing with the state (i.e. they are recognised by the state as an appropriate means 
of mediating between state and people, a legitimate vehicle for political expression) 
and that they protect the individual. It is in the group that the citizen is self-
governing, can participate, and can influence policy. "Self-determination is an 
indirect process made possible by the participatory politics of church members, 
union members, party members, and so on . "^ 
Because groups have a role in policy formation, the participant citizen is genuinely 
implicated and his membership generates real obligations. But "pluralist mediation 
loses its moral and political value"'*' i f the group's business is trivial or i f popular 
participation plays a limited part in group membership. It should be noted that the 
relationship of many group members to their group's leadership is as attenuated as 
that between citizen and state. In this case the citizen is alienated within the group. 
In Walzer's opinion most examples of contemporary pluralism are faulted in one of 
these two ways. However by equating obligation so strongly with participation he 
overstates his case. An individual may join a group as an expression of genuine 
support for its aims and ideals whilst being content to leave policy-making to others. 
Support wi l l be withdrawn i f the aims of the group change. In other words w i l f u l 
membership in a small group does not necessarily entail active participation in 
decision-making. 
In a genuinely pluralist state, group members are self-governing, free, public-
spir i ted , and their actions are s ignif icant . Moreover pluralist membership 
overcomes the di f f icul ty of obligation to a state in which membership is inherited. 
Walzer thinks that the absence of choice about our membership in the state makes 
"the wilfulness of that membership seem to have only minimal significance"^. 
Group membership is deliberate, the resulting obligations are self-imposed. By 
joining certain groups the citizen is stating the limits of his obligation to the state. 
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It is in the group, not the state, that men aim for their highest ideal, and therefore 
the group is more important than the state to the citizen. 
Questions of loyalty and obligation are complex when a group member is asked to 
give his support over a range of issues. As a member of a group functioning in an 
ideal way he wi l l have had an opportunity to help to formulate policy on each 
issue, but in the end he wil l have to make decisions about his obligations in the 
light of his intensity of feeling about them all. The citizen in an election is in a 
similar position - he may indicate a preference for one package over another, or 
vote on one issue of overriding importance. Whichever i t is he wi l l be told 
afterwards that he has approved a whole range of government's actions. 
The size of the group is important. In a small group the individual has more 
opportunity to influence the decisions made; i t is within his grasp, he feels he has 
control over his own affairs. But the complexities of obligation may well remain 
unless the group has very narrow aims. 
Walzer points out another very significant problem. Pluralism "builds moral and 
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political conflict into the political system" . Membership prevents alienation, but 
the citizen's obligations to the group may well come into conflict with the actions 
of the state, especially when the state is not "articulated in a genuinely pluralist 
way"^. It is worth noting again that even when participation is at its most 
effective, political obligation to the state is not total. A citizen's ultimate obligation 
is to the group, and he wi l l act accordingly, save only that he does not threaten the 
state itself because it recognises and protects the status of all groups impartially. 
The state is neutral. "Al l that the pluralist state can do is to judge the claims made 
by each group in the light of the pluralist system itself and its security."^' No man, 
no group has more of a conscience than any other. But of course this really tells us 
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nothing at all about how the state does decide between the conflicting interests of a 
multiplicity of groups, nor how it should decide. 
Walzer argues that the state cannot tolerate disobedience because this would nul l i fy 
the decision procedure, and as Pateman says " i f the authority of the liberal 
democratic state is not to be brought into question i t must be the state that judges 
legitimacy" . However the citizen's ultimate obligation is to fellow group-
associates. I f he is bound to disobey the state for grave moral reasons, consent 
through participation is not in itself sufficient to obligate the citizen to accept in 
advance the outcome of the decision procedure. This would only be possible were 
there general agreement on substantive moral issues. It may be that Walzer 
believes this would be the case, for although he has argued that in liberal society 
there has been the "replacement of a belief in a common substantive rationality by 
an emphasis on procedural rationality" , Euben is correct in saying that Walzer's 
"espousal of consent is compromised by a clear priority of values which tend, on the 
whole, to be liberal democratic ones"^. Walzer recognises that pluralist 
participation is very likely to bring the citizen into conflict with the state, but 
equally the citizen can come into conflict with his group. The whole problem of 
political obligation arises when there is profound disagreement on moral issues, and 
consent theory (including consent defined as participation) does not solve this 
dilemma, in which the decision-procedure is redundant, although toleration and 
respect for others as self-directing beings put limits on our actions. It is the 
decisions which the state and the group make which are important. 
I t is also necessary to ask whether the state can be neutral. I f i t was without values, 
it could not decide between competing claims, assuming the claims were compatible 
with the freedoms and rights necessary to pluralism. Walzer argues that the state 
"must consider the claims themselves, weigh their contents and their likely 
effects"^ but this does presuppose certain values, and it conflicts with his 
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observation that in questions of political morality in a pluralist state there can be 
no possible judge. 
Pateman argues that Walzer's position "is ultimately deeply ambiguous"^; i t is 
uncertain whether he is defending liberal democracy or is subversive of i t . 
Liberalism creates alienation and the attenuated relationships within the state are a 
sufficient argument for a radical reconstruction. "It never becomes clear whether or 
not he regards genuine consent as present, or possible, within the framework of 
liberal democratic institutions" , Pateman writes, for even though Walzer's aim is 
to provide institutions within which the citizen can be "a participant in a free state, 
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concerned for the common good" , she notes that "he does not face up to the 
question whether genuine consent and participatory pluralism is compatible with 
the authority of, and political obligation within, the liberal democratic state"^. A 
condition of potential conflict (conflicting loyalties and obligations for citizens 
individually, and conflict between the state and its secondary associations) is more 
preferable for the citizen than alienation. The citizen, says Walzer, is safer in his 
groups, is more responsible; he rules and is ruled; his effectiveness is increased; he 
has protection and responsibility. As Bernard Crick has written, "However d i f f icu l t 
i t makes government, we want active citizens making their own decisions 
cooperatively; not simply well-treated inhabitants or subjects voting for welfare..."^ 
Walzer believes that political participation is necessary for complete fulf i lment and 
he accords politics moral primacy. Yet, in Euben's words, this is "to contradict 
pluralism by denying apolitical men moral recognition"^, which Walzer clearly does 
not want to do, since he insists on the right to passivity, and that justice is done to 
non-participants as moral persons. Because membership must be voluntary i f i t is to 
result in obligations, Walzer believes that "citizens always have the right to choose 
between participation and passivity. Their obligations follow from their choices 
and do not precede them, so the state cannot impose one or other choice; i t cannot 
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force the citizens to be self-governing men and women" . The activists must not 
believe that they are representative of the non-activists. But genuine pluralism 
would require a very high proportion of activists, and even the non-participants 
would have a role as critics of the actors. This may not seem too different f rom the 
role of the citizens voting in an election now. In voting they make their judgement 
on party policies, and parties respond to this judgement. However, Walzer obviously 
has something more in mind because "the modes of criticism wi l l become the forms 
of their participation" and then the citizen wi l l begin to take on responsibilities 
and incur obligations. 
I have already argued, of course, that obligations do not follow f rom this choice of 
participation or passivity. Choosing passivity wi l l not relieve a citizen of the 
obligations he has to his fellow-citizens - obligations to help shape his own l i fe and 
that of his community. The citizen need not have an ideology, nor an ideal vision 
of society, but must simply recognise his duties. There is no right to passivity 
because we are not just private persons. Walzer is correct in saying that through our 
normal human activities and relationships we incur obligations, and although the 
extent and nature of our obligations to the state are called into question, this does 
not lessen our duty to use the opportunities for participation which do actually 
exist. There is no right to abrogate one's freedom, to leave decision-making to 
others. Euben thinks this is so because of necessity - we need collective action for 
the common end of containing forces which must be restricted or which wi l l deny 
us choice and responsibility. Karen Johnson suggests that Walzer is mistaken in 
tying membership and hence obligation to consent. Membership is a status involving 
the acceptance of rights and duties but it does not depend on consent. She quotes 
Sir Ernest Barker on Plato's Crito: "What Plato means is that every man who regards 
himself as a member of the state has thereby really and implicitly, though not 
verbally and explicitly, subscribed to the obligations of membership. He has 
claimed rights and has had them recognised; he has acknowledged duties and is 
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bound to f u l f i l them. This is implied in membership of the state." As Johnson 
says the state is, or could be, a normative association - i.e., one based on shared 
values. "We are born into a particular state, we grow into membership in i t , and we 
are as a result likely to be tied to our fellow-citizens by a bond of shared 
experiences, attitudes and beliefs which is at least potentially the basis for a 
commitment to the political community and the exercise of an active citizenship."^ 
But to tell us what the state could be is no help at the present, and Walzer's whole 
point is that these common bonds of citizenship (i.e. the citizen-state bond, the bond 
which would unite us as members of this state) have been destroyed by liberal 
individualism. The state cannot be a "normative association" for a person who feels 
alienated. 
It is clear, then, that in this early work Walzer believes that citizens have become 
alienated f rom the state, which is beyond their reach; that individuals in the liberal 
state are essentially private and inactive. The solution to the problem of political 
obligation is to be found in active participation in associations and groups, 
membership of which wi l l enable citizens to establish relationships with one another 
and with the state. The group is more important in the life of the individual than is 
the state; groups are the source of moral knowledge. Obligations to one's fellow-
citizens qua group members are prior to obligations to the state, which is neutral 
between groups, although it is not clear how a neutral state can mediate between 
conflicting claims. Note that Walzer said that the state would never again be f i rmly 
within the grasp of its citizens. He has made a clear distinction between the state 
and other groups; the citizen seems to have no direct connection with the state, 
which yet embraces all the groups of which he is a member. 
In examining Walzer's theory of complex equality as he expounds it in "Spheres of 
Justice" and some later wr i t ings ,^ it wi l l become clear that his views on the state 
have changed profoundly, so that it becomes the normative association which 
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Johnson spoke of, the repository of shared values and collective understanding. His 
changing views on the nature of the political community and of the relationship 
between the individual and the state are of particular interest. When Euben, 
commenting on Walzer's distinction between private and political obligations, 
argued that the polity, even in a liberal state, was the most all-embracing 
association, which was responsible for sustaining the moral and cultural l i fe of its 
members, he anticipated the position taken by Walzer in "Spheres". 
The theory of complex equality, the subject of "Spheres of Justice", states that no 
social good should be used as a means of domination but should be confined within 
its own sphere. How social goods are distributed within spheres and where the 
boundaries are drawn between spheres are matters for the political community to 
decide. Rights are derived f rom the shared conceptions of the nature of social 
goods within particular communities. I wi l l simply outline the argument as i t is 
applied to some spheres such as offices and religion, looking a little more closely at 
questions of membership, community and welfare. 
The Liberal Individual 
Walzer has wr i t t en that Marx believed the l iberal ism had created egotistic 
individuals separated f rom the community and this egotism "was a social product -
required, indeed by the relations of production and then reproduced in all the 
spheres of social activity. Society remained an organised whole even i f its members 
had lost their sense of connection" . Separation had to be overcome. Walzer, too, 
now believes that "the contemporary social world is still an organic whole" . The 
liberal world of "the individual, free within his or her circle of r ights"^, separated 
f rom all other individuals except through connections established by w i l f u l 
agreements, is a mythical world. "The individual who stands wholly outside 
institutions and relationships and enters into them only when he or she chooses and 
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as he or she chooses : this individual does not exist and cannot exist in any 
conceivable social world... The individual does not create the institutions he or she 
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joins...the individual lives within a world he or she did not make" . There is a 
deep connectedness between the spheres of social l i fe , not only in the way these 
spheres and their institutions have been shaped, but because the same people inhabit 
several spheres - trade unionists live in neighbourhoods, send their children to 
schools, academics may hold public office and so on. But most importantly, as we 
shall see, all are bound together as members of the political community, which is the 
all-embracing all-important sphere in Walzer's new theory of the state. "Institutions 
are responsive to their own internal logic even while they are responsive to systemic 
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determinations." 
He wi l l argue that the liberal achievement in securing freedoms (academic, 
religious, individual) is real and valuable. The myth of individualism has a 
purpose: "It rules out state interference in institutional l i fe , since the state is in its 
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nature coercive" . Separation "is a morally and politically necessary adaptation to 
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the complexities of modern life" but this "art of separation" should serve socialist 
principles - men and women enjoying their social roles. Institutions must be 
protected not only f rom state power but f rom the power of wealth. Equality and 
liberty can coexist when spheres are protected and when private government (made 
possible by the separation of spheres) has been abolished. He writes that "it is with 
the critique of private government that the leftist complaint against liberalism 
properly begins" . By protection of spheres Walzer means that in a "modern, 
complex and differentiated society" success in one institutional setting should not 
be convertible into success in another. We should recognise that freedom is not the 
liberal individual making his own agreements but people in their social settings; we 
separate institutions, not individuals. "Individuals should be free indeed, in all 
sorts of ways, but we don't set them free by separating them f rom their fellows." 
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The liberal theory of individual rights seems to have a firmer foundation for 
political philosophy, he argues, but men and women live in societies, and they are 
free when they live in autonomous institutions, free f rom domination, living in a 
state free f rom external controls, which is internally free, and when they 
participate in free churches, universities, unions and so on their freedoms consist 
of rights in different settings or spheres. "Each freedom entails a specific form of 
equality or, better, the absence of a specific inequality ... and the sum of the 
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absence makes an egalitarian society." In "The Moral Standing of States" he writes 
that "the moral understanding on which the community is founded takes shape over 
a long period of time. But the idea of communal integrity derives its moral and 
political force f rom the rights of contemporary men and women to live as members 
of a historic community and to express their inherited culture through political 
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forms worked out among themselves" . 
"Marx's vision of individual and collective self-determination requires...the existence 
of a protected space within which meaningful choices can be made. But space of 
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that sort can only exist i f wealth and power are walled in and limited." The 
meaningful choices referred to are made within social settings - they are not the 
choices of the liberal individual, for the idea that a person can make and break 
agreements and feel free to break bonds and ties is "endlessly disintegrative" , and 
"the goal that liberalism sets for the art of separation - every person within his or 
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her own circle - is literally unattainable." Further Walzer does not base his 
argument on any idea of natural rights, but on a certain conception of social goods, 
and rights follow f rom these shared conceptions. Rights are local in character. This 
is not strictly true since Walzer recognises some universal rights, in particular the 
right not to be deprived of l i fe and liberty; and there is implied in his theory one 
right which by its nature is prior to any shared conceptions, and that is the right to 
contribute to an understanding of shared conceptions and common values. At the 
root of this particular right is Walzer's belief in equality - the recognition of each 
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other as human beings, different, yet alike in having bodies, minds, feelings, souls. 
This is not a literal equality enforced by a state constantly interfering to correct 
imbalances which would arise f rom our very natures, just as classical utilitarianism 
would lead to domination by planners. Rather Walzer's egalitarianism is freedom 
from domination. "Men and women are one another's equals (for all important 
moral and political purposes) when no one possesses or controls the means of 
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domination." 0 
Social Goods 
Human beings come together to share, divide and exchange. We derive our place in 
a given order and our reputation f rom other men and women. Membership, power, 
knowledge, wealth, rewards, work are distributed through different political 
arrangements, but no state power can possibly regulate all exchanges, and there are 
different criteria for distributing different social goods - desert may be appropriate 
in one sphere, free exchange in another. Nor is there only one just distributive 
system, although he himself argues in favour of pluralism and his theory of 
separation, like Rawls' theory of justice, is intended for contemporary American 
society. Just as he has rejected the notion of a set of ideal universal rights 
applicable to all men in all societies, so he rejects the Rawlsian argument for 
principles of justice (just distribution of social goods) which would be chosen by 
rational persons in a hypothetical original position. In the real world ordinary 
people may well be able to set aside their particular interests but they cannot 
divorce themselves f rom their historical and cultural background. "What choices 
have we already made in the course of our common life? What understandings do 
we (really) share?"8 3 
Furthermore he is critical of Rawls' attempt to formulate a system of justice and of 
just institutions which wi l l eliminate the effect of natural assets in the distribution 
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of income, wealth and other social goods. Rawls believes that a person's assets, 
including the character "that enables him to make the effort to cultivate his 
abilities"^ depend upon social circumstances which are not of his making. He 
"cannot say that he deserves and therefore has a right to a scheme of cooperation in 
which he is permitted to acquire benefits in ways that do not contribute to the 
D C 
welfare of others" . But i f men and women are not deserving of merit, i f even the 
"the capacity to make an effort" is an arbitrary g i f t , then, Walzer asks "How are 
we to conceive of these men and women once we have come to view their capacities 
and achievements as accidental accessories...? The reflexive forms of recognition, 
self-esteem and self-respect, our most important possessions, ... must seem 
meaningless to individuals all of whose qualities are nothing but the luck of the 
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draw" . Rawls' abstract principles are applicable to people abstracted f rom their 
qualities, to goods abstracted f rom their meanings, "but it seems doubtful that such 
distributions can possibly do justice to persons as they are, in search of goods as 
they conceive them." How can we give public honour and recognition without a 
notion of desert? he asks. Maclntyre, too, considers the absence of any reference to 
desert in Nozick and Rawls a serious omission (see Chapter 6). For a person to 
perform honourably he must be a moral agent, responsible for his performance. The 
virtues of the ordinary person going fai thful ly about his duties should be 
recognised. There is not just one principle of justice. Walzer contends that "the 
principles of justice are themselves pluralistic in form; that different social goods 
ought to be distributed for different reasons, in accordance with different 
procedures, by different agents; and that all these differences derive f rom 
different understandings of the social goods themselves - the inevitable product of 
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historical and cultural particularism" . The conception and creation of goods 
precede their distribution: "goods with their meanings - because of their meanings -
are the crucial medium of social relations ... distributions are patterned in 
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accordance with shared conceptions of what the goods are and what they are for" . 
Hence the focus of his investigation is on the origin and meaning of social goods, 129 
rather than on the process of distribution and the agents of distribution, or on 
rights and needs. He proposes a theory of goods as the basis of distributive justice, 
a theory with six propositions: 
1. All the goods with which distributive justice is concerned are social goods -
their value depends on their social setting and is publicly determined. 
2. "Men and women take on concrete identities because of the way they conceive 
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and create, and then possess and employ social goods' . We are born into a 
history of transactions and distributions. 
3. "There is no single set of primary or basic goods conceivable across all moral 
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and material worlds" . 
4. "It is the meaning of goods that determines their movement. Distributive 
criteria and arrangements are intrinsic not to the good-in-itself but to the social 
good... All distributions are just or unjust relative to the social meanings of the 
goods at stake"7 . 
5. "Social meanings are historical in character; and so distributions, and just and 
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unjust distributions, change over time" . It may appear that some goods could 
be distributed for their essential rather than social meanings if the same good 
seems to be distributed in the same way in different societies over a period of 
time, but the definition of the good may itself vary, e.g. what is an office, even 
if there is agreement that offices should be distributed to the most deserving 
candidate. "There is no merely intuitive or speculative procedure for seizing 
upon relevant reasons" . 
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6. "When meanings are distinct, distributions must be autonomous. Every social 
good or set of goods constitutes, as i t were, a distributive sphere within which 
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only certain criteria and arrangements are appropriate . In practice what 
happens in one sphere effects what happens in another so we look for "relative 
autonomy", which still means there are different standards of distribution "for 
every social good and every distributive sphere in every particular society; and 
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these standards are often violated ... by powerful men and women." 
The Dominant Good 
In most societies one social good or set of goods is dominant. That is, the use of that 
good is not limited by its intrinsic meanings. The dominant good determines values 
in other spheres, and its owners can use the dominant good to acquire other social 
goods which ought to be distributed according to their own criteria. The dominant 
good is a monopoly i f it is held by one person or group who wishes to exploit its 
dominance to convert the dominant good into other goods. In other words in our 
society we ought to ask is there anything money cannot buy! 
The dominant group is the ruling class, which wi l l be "challenged by other groups in 
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the name of alternative patterns of conversion" . They may claim that the 
dominant good should be more widely shared, which would end the monopoly and 
prevent other social goods being monopolised since no one would have the means to 
convert the dominant good into other goods on a sufficient scale. They may claim 
that the existing pattern of dominance or monopoly is unjust - that a new good, 
monopolised by a new group, should replace the dominant good. But Walzer 
concentrates on a third proposition - that dominance is unjust, that there should be 
autonomous distribution of all social goods. He proposes a complex egalitarian 
society in which different social goods may be monopolised but the monopoly would 
be confined to the distributive sphere of the monopolised good; no particular good 
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would be convertible into other goods, and inequalities in one sphere would not be 
reflected by inequalities in another. The same group would not monopolise 
different spheres, as long as the autonomy of the distributive spheres was 
maintained. He considers that the outcome would be to localise social conflicts "and 
the resistance to convertability would be maintained ... by ordinary men and 
women within their own spheres of competence and control, without large-scale 
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state action" . In this interpretation "equality is a complex relation of persons, 
mediated by the goods we make, share, and divide among ourselves; it is not an 
identity of possessions. It requires then, a diversity of distributive criteria that 
mirrors the diversity of social goods" and the whole theory rests on the belief 
that we have certain shared conceptions of social goods f rom which we can 
determine the principles of distribution of each good. These same shared 
understandings lead us to resist unjust conversions - for example buying and selling 
of offices. He states his distributive principle thus: "No social good x should be 
distributed to men and women who possess some other good y merely because they 
possess y and without regard to the meaning of x " ^ . No particular share of social 
goods is specified, nor is any particular system of distribution recommended. 
Different spheres require different distributive criteria. Free exchange, need and 
desert are all considered in different spheres. The outcome is the distribution of 
"different goods to different companies of men and women for different reasons 
and in accordance with different procedures" . It is our common understandings 
that lead us to this theory of separation of goods, which would not be applicable to 
a hierarchical or plutocratic or other form of society in which goods would not be 
differentiated. (That is, distribution would reflect the hierarchical, plutocratic or 
other structure). 
Walzer contends that his principle of complex equality in the sphere of welfare 
distributes goods according to need, and the principle of justice is transgressed i f 
needed goods are provided in proportion to people's ability to pay. "Needed goods 
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are not commodities" . Once we have a common understanding of the importance 
of the provision of a particular good such as medical care, then a decision not to 
provide it for all at an adequate level (given sufficient resources) would be unfair, 
although goods in excess of the level of adequacy may be sold. In other words, to 
maintain the integrity of distribution within this sphere, the dominant good in a 
society (in our case, money) must not be allowed to distort the provision of goods 
which ought to be allocated according to the criteria of need and membership. 
Payment of money instead of goods to the poor reinforces the dominance of money 
as the rich bid up the price of services. 
Possession of money, then, should neither entitle nor enable the possessor to acquire 
certain goods. Although it is a universal medium of exchange, certain transactions 
should be "blocked exchanges". Thus rights cannot be bought or sold, nor human 
beings, nor political power, nor justice. When the possession of money is necessary 
for f u l l membership, for people to be "socially recognised and effective 
persons"*^, when commodities become symbols of belonging, then citizenship is 
degraded and devalued. Since the market wi l l always produce inequalities, simple 
redistribution of income to enable all citizens to compete in a free market would 
not produce a stable condition of equality. Alan Ryan has written that "where 
there has been a cry for equality i t generally turns out on closer inspection to be 
a cry for j u s t i c e " ^ . Moreover Walzer believes that there are "activities more 
central to the meaning of membership than owning and using commodit ies"^, 
although the market is an appropriate mechanism for attaching values to a great 
variety of goods and services. His point is that money accumulated by the 
successful entrepreneur should not enable its possessor first ly, to have undue power 
in the marketplace itself and thus distort the principle of free trade, and secondly, 
to buy social goods such as political office which are not properly for sale. 
Conversely no-one should "be cut o f f f rom [the market's] possibilities because of his 
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low status or political powerlessness . Rawls, like Walzer, recognises that the 
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person with private means may use these means to unfairly control public debate; 
"compensating steps must, then, be taken to preserve the fair value for all of the 
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equal political liberties" , and this may include the wide distribution of wealth 
(although his two principles do not, I believe, secure the required end). 
In Walzer's system of complex distributive equality the wealthy would be deprived 
"of the means of capturing political power..."*^. Furthermore capitalist owners still 
have power over workers' lives beyond any rights which risks of ownership may 
entail, and which offend conceptions of democratic citizenship. The workers take 
risks, bear the costs of failure but not the rewards of success. He argues for justice 
in exchanges, enabling workers to bargain as equal partners (a free market being a 
place where equals make bargains), and for worker-owners making their own 
decisions about wages, production, organisation. "Democratic decision-making ... is a 
way of bringing the market home, connecting its opportunities and dangers to the 
actual effort , initiative and luck of individuals..."**^. 
The dominance of money outside its proper sphere is prevented by blocking 
desperate exchanges between unequal partners, by redistribution through taxation, 
and by ensuring that ownership does not include the right to "sustained control 
over men and women"***. The sphere of money is a different "type" of sphere to 
that of membership, security, office, welfare, education, kinship and divine grace. 
Some of Walzer's spheres are akin to the groups mentioned in "Obligations". Thus 
family, school, religion, trade unions, are all affiliations in which moral knowledge 
is gained and shared, although it may be said that the significance of these 
institutions would be greatly enhanced either in societies with an undifferentiated 
conception of social goods (where, for example, the state was also a community of 
faith); or in societies in which these groups are opposed to the state as described by 
Walzer in "Obligations". Spheres are different to groups in that they encompass 
many many people. For example, the sphere of education includes all teachers, 
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pupils and parents and not simply those connected with one school; the sphere of 
religion includes people of all faiths and is therefore qualitatively different to a 
group of members of one religious community with direct social relationships with 
one another. 
In contemporary liberal democracies, where money is dominant, the market is a 
sphere of strangers; in a society in which religion was the dominant good people 
would be deeply connected through their beliefs. Liberal citizens may have these 
deep connections within other spheres and groups, but not within the dominant 
sphere of money and not, as I shall argue, within the state misrepresented as a 
repository of shared values. 
Since money can be transferred into inappropriate spheres, especially the purchase 
of political office, there exists to an extent an undifferentiated conception of social 
goods. At its extreme this would mean that an individual's education, for example, 
would depend entirely on ability to pay and would serve an ideological purpose, the 
reinforcement of the dominant values. Although the influence of the successful 
entrepreneur may seem appropriate to a society of strangers whose main 
preoccupation is to generate wealth for individual consumption, i t cannot be 
appropriate for a community which values membership as a means of mutual 
support, although it might be possible to argue that the free market is the most 
efficient way to generate the wealth and goods necessary to sustain membership. 
However i f the driving force of the market is individual success, how can this be 
reconciled to the notion that the generation of wealth is for the benefit of all, that 
society is a cooperative venture? Rawls attempts this through the difference 
principle. Walzer merely talks of a "pool of wealth ... to which everyone contributes 
according to his available resources" . So "whatever we take to be the entailments 
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of membership" must be paid for by everybody according to their means. I f this 
requires a substantial proportion of income it may well be d i f f i cu l t for a free 
135 
market based on individual enterprise to exist in a state dedicated to extensive 
redistribution, since the system of incentives required by the market wi l l fa i l . 
Walzer wants to l imit the influence of the market in order to enhance his vision of a 
cooperative society. Thus his market is a sphere for worker-owners, cooperatives, 
small-scale entrepreneurs. 
Distributive Criteria 
Walzer comments on the appropriateness of different criteria for distribution 
within other spheres. Thus, for example, in the sphere of office distribution is 
regulated by the political community as a matter of justice. Offices are positions in 
which all citizens have an interest and they should not become the preserve of an 
elite. Justice in this sphere entails giving all citizens equal access to offices (or to 
the opportunity to be candidates for training), and in preventing off ice holders 
having influence and power beyond the limits of their offices. The wealthy should 
not be able to buy offices, nor should they be given to family and friends. 
In the sphere of education schools "provide a context ... for the development of 
critical understanding and for the production, as well as the reproduction, of social 
c r i t i c s " a n d therefore should not simply reflect the prevailing social, economic 
and political order. Because all citizens have a right to the knowledge necessary to 
be able to f u l f i l their roles as citizens, schools must be open to all. This is simple 
equality in the sphere of education in democratic states, based on the need for this 
basic knowledge. Its important function is to teach children "to be citizens first -
workers, managers, merchants, and professionals only afterward"*^. Complex 
equality in this sphere is shaping educational facilities to an individual's capacities 
and needs once a core body of knowledge is grasped. An educated elite must not be 
allowed to dominate office, and i f schools are enclosed communities (i.e. protected 
f rom undue political or economic pressures), and with a common curriculum, "then 
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the sphere of education is likely to be a highly egalitarian place" , rather than a 
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sphere which reproduces "the basic structure of a class society" . 
It is inappropriate for the state to support a system of education which accentuates 
racial or other divisions. I f segregation is involuntary then the situation needs to be 
corrected through applying principles of complex equality in the spheres of income, 
employment, housing and so on. I f it is voluntary - that is, i f groups divide along 
racial or other lines quite willingly, and not because of any lack of opportunities, 
then the schools must respect these wishes whilst working "to bring children together 
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in ways that hold open possibilities for cooperation" . People should not be 
forced together in the name of integration. I wi l l discuss the problem of such a 
heterogeneous society in relation to Walzer's theory of the state, but i f groups of 
citizens identify so strongly with one ethnic or religious group that they are 
unwilling to either live with people outside the group or have their children 
educated in schools with children of different backgrounds, then the point is clear 
and one must regard the state as a mediator between groups, fostering those 
qualities of toleration and mutual respect, rather than common identity, which wi l l 
enable diverse people to live together in peace.* 
The Unify ing State 
Although social goods are distributed across political boundaries within which 
monopoly and dominance are not confined, Walzer still believes the political 
community to be the key association, for i t is "probably the closest we can come to 
a world of common meanings. Language, history, and culture come together ... to 
*It is important to point out that my main concern is not with the difficulties 
arising in a society composed of people from different cultural backgrounds, but 
rather with the diversity of opinions held by liberals and others from the same 
cultural background, and more particularly, within liberalism itself. This point 
will be discussed in the following chapters. 
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produce a collective consciousness ..." , although historical and pol i t ica l 
communities do not always coincide. Sharing and distribution may take place in 
smaller units that the state, but it is within the sphere of politics that we can 
establish our common bonds and values, mediate the claims of smaller groups, shape 
our destiny, make decisions about distributive criteria, mark o f f the boundaries 
between spheres. 
I note here the development of the different perspective in Walzer's conception of 
the state to which I have already drawn attention. In his earlier work the state had 
a very limited role. Shared understandings, the development of moral principles, 
took place within groups and the state was, in principle, neutral between groups. 
Now the state has a much more intrusive role. In "Liberalism and The Ar t of 
Separation" Walzer writes that the state "is not so much a nightwatchman protecting 
individuals ... as it is the builder and guardian of the walls, protecting churches, 
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universities, families, and so on from tyrannical interference" , but more than 
this i t is the group within which decisions about the common life are made - not the 
citizen protected f rom the state but the citizen-body as the all-embracing and 
u n i f y i n g group. "The state is constituted by the union o f people and 
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government" . And it is now clear how the state can mediate between competing 
claims, since i t is not neutral and value-free but the guardian of our culture, our 
common life and its values, including the meanings we attach to social goods. 
I t is interesting that Walzer now feels able to attribute such a crucial role to the 
state, and that such a relationship between citizens and state, and between 
individual citizens and the citizen body as a whole, through the state, is possible. In 
an essay in "Obligations" he wrote that to be obligated to live for the political 
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community would be to have a reason for living , but the point he was making 
was that the citizen in the modern state was too alienated f rom the state to have 
such an obligation to the political community as embodied in the state. Reasons for 
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living for fellow citizens were to be sought in group memberships, whilst "civic 
friendship [has been] replaced by more impersonal forms of union . Now, 
however, Walzer sees the political community as the embodiment of a collective 
consciousness. He still believes obligation is owed to fellow citizens, not to 
government, but now it appears that this is to the whole citizen body through its 
expression in the state, rather than to group members. He writes that "national 
character, conceived as a fixed and permanent mental set, is obviously a myth; but 
the sharing of sensibilities and intuitions among members of a historical community 
is a fact of l i f e " ^ . I do not wish to overstate Walzer's argument for the state, but 
there is a distinction between a neutral state mediating between groups and the state 
as "the closest we can come to a wor ld of common meanings". Walzer's 
communitarian perspective is clearly stated. Briefly, liberalism, founded on a 
theory of individual rights, is disintegrative since it sustains the myth that 
institutions only exist as the result of a series of voluntary agreements between 
individuals who join and leave as they please. In fact institutions, including the 
state, have developed historically, changed through generations. We inherit them, 
they form part of our common experience and culture. We do not take decisions as 
isolated individuals but as members - of families, churches, unions - which were in 
existence before we were born, just as we do not "wholly shape the obligations [we] 
125 
assume , nor re-create the institutions to which we belong. As group members we 
interact within and between spheres. Some spheres consist of the groups themselves 
- the spheres of kinship and religion for example, but in other spheres we (group 
members) meet and part as strangers (in the market for example), but it is as group 
members, especially as members of the all-embracing political community, that we 
seek to control and mark o f f the proper sphere of activity of the market, the 
church and so on. 
Now Walzer values individual freedom. "Men and women are free when they live 
within autonomous institutions." He recognises that we have different interests 
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to pursue, different conceptions of the good (although there must be limits to the 
conceptions of the good we can hold i f the idea of the state as the embodiment of a 
collective consciousness is to have any real meaning). Political freedom is "an 
absolute value, for without that men and women with different ideas and interests 
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cannot share a common life" , but, he continues, "individual liberty is meaningless 
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until it is incorporated within particular forms of social life..." . "This 
incorporation is the socialist project. Socialism is the effort to sustain older values 
within a social structure that accommodates liberated, that is, free and equal 
individuals . These liberated individuals "must determine the shape of their 
1 10 
common life" . Hence socialists are advocates of community seeking community 
for the sake of knowledge and self-management, not brotherhood, which belongs to 
the sphere of friendship. Individuals come together in cooperation to pursue a 
common l i fe , to build a world to their liking, and decisions about these matters are 
taken in the political sphere. These are liberated individuals joined in various 
enterprises shaping the whole environment in which their groups and spheres of 
activity are located. 
In the last chapter I drew attention to Walzer's objections to Rawls' theory of 
justice, and to the problems of finding commonly held shared values which would 
be useful in determining distribution of social goods in contemporary liberal 
democracies. There is an obvious connection to be made between, on the one hand, 
Rawls' cooperative political community comprised of groups with diverse moral and 
religious and philosophical ideals, which are united in their commitment to 
toleration and to the principles of justice which secure rights and liberties within a 
society conceived as a cooperative venture; and on the other, Walzer's attempt to 
describe a world in which freely associating adults live in diverse groups within the 
larger political community which is the embodiment of their common lives, and it 
is within the political sphere that the common life is sustained. 
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I am very sceptical about this interpretation of the modern nation-state. I t suggests 
there are values shared sufficiently deeply to form the basis of agreement about 
the distribution of social goods, and about concepts such as rights and duties. Yet 
the heterogeneous state is composed of different religious, ethnic, regional and 
linguistic groups whose historical and recent experiences are as often divisive as 
unifying. Walzer himself recognises that we have different conceptions of the good 
and that politics is a sphere of hostility as well as cooperation. Civil society seems 
to be radical only in its pluralism. It suggests a readiness to welcome all-comers, 
demanding f rom them nothing more than tolerance and mutual respect. Liberal 
individualism, destructive of common values, is yet tolerant of all groups. 
Toleration is an essential element in a theory of individual rights. 
Are there values held in common which wi l l enable us to agree on decisions about 
the distribution of social goods, or is the political sphere, in reality, merely the 
battleground where groups with very different values vie for political power, bound 
together only in their respect for democratic institutions? It is important to note 
that Walzer has in mind more than a just procedure for deciding between claims. 
The political community is supportive; all are entitled to whatever is necessary to 
be part of that community. However appeals to common values are usually false 
appeals, dangerous jingoism in pursuit of ideological ends, and they are often 
associated with attacks on a distinctive group whose presence is said to be 
destructive of the common culture. I am not denying the real ties of community or 
the power of appeals to a common heritage, but I am saying that the modern liberal 
democratic state is not and cannot be a common enterprise. Its citizens do not have 
a common end, except in the most general terms - common security, for example 
The citizen body has no common life to shape. 
As an illustration I point to Walzer's argument that the degree of pollution we 
should live with is a decision for the community - citizens shaping one aspect of 
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their common l ife . In reality it is an argument about the conflicting interests of 
citizens in their other roles - as manufacturers interested in profi t , as employees 
wanting to retain jobs, as parents worried about children's health. I t is not 
impossible to imagine the manufacturer who willingly foregoes profi t for the sake 
of the community, but it is more probable that this wi l l be an area of conflict, a 
battle to be fought. Thus the values on which one person bases his opinion about 
an issue may be very different to the values of another person involved in the 
argument, and people of different religious and ethnic groups may have yet other 
values. 
Does this cast doubt on Walzer's whole enterprise, for without common values can 
we even begin to erect walls between spheres, never mind agree on the distributions 
within spheres? I think it does. Walzer has not made a case for the state as he now 
conceives i t as opposed to his earlier account of the state outside the reach of its 
citizens. He is constructing a theory of a democratic socialist state in contrast to 
Nozick's individualist minimal state. The venture is not Utopian, he suggests, for 
the necessary arrangements are within our grasp. But the success of this common 
enterprise would depend on an agreement with Walzer's conception of equality and 
freedom. There is no such agreement. Nozick would f i nd "spheres" of justice 
unnecessary - all free exchanges between individuals are legitimate; no one has to 
provide for the needs of strangers. Walzer thinks some goods must be provided to 
members on the basis of need. Nozick would say that redistribution without consent 
is theft; he has no sense of a political community, of citizens bound together 
through common concern for one another. 
Moreover the state as i t is cannot be the proper locus for Walzer's theory, because 
the pol i t ica l sphere is the arena w i t h i n which groups w i t h d i f f e r e n t and 
incompatible values reach agreement, or make compromises, or suffer defeat. I am 
not saying that it is impossible to imagine a society in which money does not buy 
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privilege, or that there are no common values, only that contemporary liberal 
democratic states cannot be such a society. So the answer to the disintegrative 
trends of liberalism should not be sought through investing the state with the 
features of community. Walzer himself writes "so long as adults associate freely, 
they wi l l shape diverse communities and cultures within the larger political 
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community" , and the state "rests upon the cooperation and mutual involvement 
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of all the groups" . Despite these comments he no longer writes of groups as being 
the appropriate means of mediation between state and people. Rather than as group 
members protecting ourselves against the state, he now sees us as citizens protecting 
the integrity of groups and spheres, albeit as citizens who are also group members, 
active in inter-connecting spheres so that church members, for example, wi l l 
criticise decisions made in the political sphere f rom their own moral standpoint. 
Political Community 
Walzer believes, as does Rawls, that the political community is itself a good, perhaps 
the most important good distributed. It is the "bounded world" within which people 
share and exchange goods among themselves. The nature of this community is self-
determined and its constitution is a matter for the group to decide. "The primary 
good that we distr ibute to one another is membership i n some human 
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community" . The membership decisions we make concern the present and the 
future - whom shall we admit? What kind of society do we want? Although 
institutions are inherited they can be changed, and when citizens decide who to 
admit or bar f rom their state they are determining the character of their common 
life . Walzer argues that i f the state has a very open immigration policy then 
neighbourhood groups wi l l close in and protect themselves, whereas strict 
immigrat ion control would allow neighbourhoods to develop "as i n d i f f e r e n t 
associations, determined solely by personal preference and market c a p a c i t y ^ , since 
the distinctive culture of the community as a whole would be undisturbed. He 
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writes, "the distinctiveness of culture and groups depends upon closure and, without 
it, cannot be conceived as a stable feature of human life... If this distinctiveness is 
i « 
a value ... then closure must be permitted somewhere" . 
However this surely serves to reinforce my point that the modern western state 
cannot be considered as having a distinctive culture with a set of common values. 
The use of zoning laws in the USA is an example of communities trying to establish 
or safeguard their own identities, but even very strict immigration control would 
not make one community of people with different class, religious and regional 
experiences. Once admitted, all those living within a state, subject to its laws, must 
be allowed to fully participate in the political processes which direct their lives. 
"The processes of self-determination through which a democratic state shapes its 
internal life must be open, and equally open, to all those men and women who live 
within its territory, work in the local economy, and are subject to local law . 
One interesting aspect of the communitarian perspective is worth mentioning here, 
in its contrast to a theory of individual rights. Walzer argues that wide-ranging 
participation in the decision-making process leads to actions which the community 
can take. In some cases these actions will only marginally affect citizens 
considered as a whole. However they may well seriously affect the lives of 
individual citizens who may face additional competition for resources such as 
housing, jobs and welfare, and who may feel their own local community to be under 
threat. Should the individuals concerned be compensated for having to bear the 
costs of the wider community's decisions? 
Walzer believes that it is "as members somewhere that men and women can hope to 
share in all the other social goods - security, wealth, honour, office and power - that 
i "in 
communal life makes possible . Members of a political community, which has 
been shaped over time, are bound to one another - not to their government -
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through a contract. But the contract is a metaphor. "The moral understanding on 
which the community is founded takes shape over a long period of time" . 
Members of a community provide for one another. We need community itself - the 
bonds of culture, religion and politics; "it is only under aegis of these three that all 
the other things we need become socially recognised needs ... the social contract is an 
agreement to reach decisions together about what goods are necessary to our 
common l i fe , and then to provide those goods for one another ... the signers owe one 
another more than mutual aid... They owe mutual provision of all those things for 
the sake of which they have ... joined forces in a particular community... , and 
they wil l have come together in the first place for security and welfare. Thus 
every political community is in principle a welfare state; all members must bear 
some burden, and it is the sharing of duties and obligations which makes a political 
community. This is a noticeable contrast to Nozick's minimal state which provides 
security but welfare is left to voluntary effort and individual conscience. Walzer 
could not regard such a state as a political community, since there is no common 
agreement to sustain membership. On the other hand, i t is d i f f icu l t to agree with 
Walzer's argument that what people need from one another - "material goods that 
have, so to speak, a moral and cultural shape"^ - they wi l l seek or expect to f i nd 
primarily through the state. 
Necessary social goods should be provided to all on the basis of need to sustain the 
membership of the needy, and to "uphold the underlying equality o f 
membership" 1^ 1, but the community must decide what goods to provide to whom. 
The extent of provision is a political decision for the whole community to make. 
Decisions might be about providing facilities for all (street lights, hospitals) or 
about distribution of certain goods to particular people in need. The decisions wi l l 
d i f fe r between communities depending on cultural perceptions and understandings, 
not on any theory of individual rights. Thus, as I have noted, he rejects a Rawlsian 
principle of distribution made by detached individuals. "In a world of particular 
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cultures, competing conceptions of the good, scarce resources, elusive and expansive 
needs, there isn't going to be a single formula, universally a p p l i c a b l e " N o , nor 
even a single formula commonly accepted within a single state! He writes, "here 
then is a more precise account of the social contract: i t is an agreement to 
redistribute the resources of the members in accordance w i t h some shared 
understanding of their needs ... the contract is a moral bond. It connects the strong 
and the weak, the lucky and the unlucky, the rich and the poor, creating a union 
that transcends all differences of interest.. ."^; and again, "from each according to 
his ability (or resources); to each according to his socially recognised needs. This, I 
think, is the deepest meaning of the social contract" He also writes that social 
meanings are not necessarily harmonious. Lower caste members in an Indian village 
may be angry and indignant about the prevailing system of distribution. The point 
is that all should be able to contribute to the debate on social meanings. 
Since I have argued that Walzer's notion of the state as a community of common 
values is mistaken, at least in respect to values sufficiently well-defined and 
accepted to be used as the basis for redistribution of certain goods, i t follows that 
he has not described an adequate alternative to traditional contract theory as a 
means of connecting individual citizens to the state, and this would obviously be the 
case i f social meaning were simply to provide the setting for a debate about 
redistribution, as in Britain today. That is, the fact that we agree to conduct our 
affairs in a particular way and to uphold constitutional procedures does not mean 
we have other deeper common understandings. Walzer believes a community is a 
community because its members share common understandings about the meaning 
and distribution of the goods necessary to sustain membership. I t may well be 
thought that a set of Rawlsian principles would better connect the strong and the 
weak in a society which is deemed to be a cooperative enterprise, albeit a 
cooperative o f strangers or o f persons who might have conf l i c t i ng or 
incommensurable conceptions of the good. 
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Walzer's earlier theory of obligations to fellow-citizens through secondary groups is 
better suited to the idea of common values, since it is within the smaller group that 
these values are strongly held and sustained. In a recent article Walzer has written 
that "people need to be bound more tightly together, made responsible for one 
another, and that can only be done through groups much smaller and more 
intimately experienced than the political community..."14^. It would therefore be 
reasonable to assume that the relationship between citizen and state would be that 
described by Walzer in "Obligations", but this is not so. "The state is the instrument 
with which the members of a civil society, acting as citizens, struggle to give a 
particular shape to their common life"*^\ The significance of groups, especially as 
the primary focus of political obligation, is diminished once the state is conceived 
as a community of shared understandings. For if citizens are fully participating 
members in the process of reaching understandings about their common life, and if 
the state is the vehicle through which these decisions are made and upheld, then it 
would follow that political obligations would be owed to fellow citizens as members 
of the larger all-embracing group, i.e. the state. 
For Walzer the state is not now a neutral institution, an impartial mediator. The 
state and its officials guard the boundaries between spheres and prevent the 
tyrannical use of power, but it is the agency of the citizen body. Walzer believes 
that citizens should participate in a democratic decision-making process. All have a 
right to be involved in decisions about membership, about distribution of goods 
(there will always be strains between spheres, controversies about the position of the 
boundaries), about shaping their lives in the workplace, and this kind of citizenship 
is unimaginable in a hierarchical society. 
Because of the crucial role of the state as the agent of distributive justice, its power 
must be restrained. More often than not "state power is colonized by wealth or 
talent or blood or gender; and once it is colonized, it is rarely limited"'^. State 
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officials behave tyrannically when they discriminate against some citizens, or try to 
control spheres outside their authority. Political power is the power to make 
decisions about a common l i fe and such decisions properly belong to citizens. This 
is the deep meaning of citizenship. I t is not simply a device to prevent the 
usurpation of power by any particular group. I f ownership, expertise, religious 
knowledge and so on are confined to their spheres - that is, i f the owner, expert 
and priest are not invested with special knowledge or power - then "there is no 
alternative to democracy in the political sphere"14**. 
Democracy is not a form of simple equality since the faction with the most 
persuasive debaters and the most ski lful politicians wi l l win the day, and the losers 
must accept the decision. Simple equality in a democracy consists in the right to 
participate and the right to vote, but the power to vote falls "well short of the 
capacity to determine destinations and risks" . Politicians depend upon an 
accumulation of votes, which they try to obtain through all the organisational 
activities - parties, interest groups etc. - which have been developed to persuade 
voters. Walzer believes citizens should fu l ly participate in all forms of political 
activity. "The citizen/voter is crucial to the survival of democratic politics, but the 
citizen/politician [i.e. participator] is crucial to its liveliness and i n t e g r i t y " F u l l 
participation in secondary groups was a key element in Walzer's early writings on 
obligation. Now he argues that those who win political power must regularly submit 
themselves and their policies for the approval and consent of the citizens. The right 
to participate, the knowledge that they can participate, is central to citizens' self-
respect. Participation enables citizens to resist violations of rights in all spheres. 
Moreover the citizen must be able to take responsibility for what he says and does. 
"Deprived permanently of power ... he is deprived also of this sense of h i m s e l f ' ^ 1 , 
as he would be i f he was reduced to a mere spectator by push-button politics, or i f 
he was poor in a society which allowed the rich to dominate the political sphere. It 
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is the reaching of decisions together which is so important to Walzer's conception of 
a society of members. 
In any society tyranny is appropriating things in a manner which violates common 
understandings of distribution. Complex equality is maximum differentiation 
between spheres, and this is appropriate to our society. The political arrangements 
1 SI 
best suited to this theory are those of "a decentralised, democratic socialism" - a 
constrained market, demystified civil service, public schools, protection of religion 
and family, workers' control etc. Citizens need to defend their institutions and 
"their own sense of meaning" . "This is the socialist form of the old liberal hope 
that individuals secure in their own circles won't invade the circles of others" 
That is, we would see ourselves not as isolated individuals but as members of 
different groups. The individualist view of freedom, the idea of individuals 
entering into institutions and relationships as and when they choose, says nothing of 
the understanding of "social cohesion; nor do they make sense of the lives 
individuals actually live, and the rights they actually enjoy, within the framework 
of on-going ins t i tu t ions"^; and he goes on to say that " i f men and women enjoy 
their different social roles they are more likely to respect the settings within which 
the roles are played". ^  Earlier I drew attention to Pateman's observation that i t 
was d i f f icu l t to know whether or not Walzer was subversive of liberal democracy. 
He believes that all should be able to participate in political society, that the free 
market should be limited and the economy open and accessible to all, and that 
"members of political society and economy are collectively responsible for each 
1 S7 
other's welfare" . But citizens achieve their ends through liberal democratic 
institutions and, like Rawls, his idea of justice is not associated with the good. 
(Although, as I have already pointed out, the assertion that liberal citizens are 
entitled to form their own conceptions of the good is somewhat at odds with the 
description of the state in which a just distribution of social goods is made possible 
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because of shared perceptions about the nature of the goods in question.) This is 
Walzer's attempt to adapt socialist principles to a democratic setting. 
It is the place which Walzer assigns to the state within this scheme, its description as 
an all-embracing unified group, the repository and guardian of common values and 
understandings, with which I have grave misgivings. 
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CHAPTER 5 
Dworkin on Equality : a postscript to Rawls and Walzer 
A note on terminology 
This chapter is based on several essays written by Dworkin and collected in "Taking 
I 2 Rights Seriously" , and "A Matter of Principle , and on some courteously 
antagonistic correspondence between Dworkin and Walzer in the New York Review 
of Books in 1983. It is not intended to demonstrate any chronological development 
in Dworkin's ideas, but merely to serve as a useful focus for further comments on 
Rawls and Walzer. 
When Dworkin talks of liberals and conservatives he uses these labels in the context 
of contemporary American politics. The conservatism is that of the moral majority 
and George Bush, the liberalism that of Rawls, more akin to social democracy than 
to the laissez-faire liberalism reincarnated as Thatcherism which has dispensed with 
the social conscience which led to the modification of this strain of liberalism. 
There are difficulties, too, in defining equality, the subject of this chapter, the first 
part of which summarises an argument between Walzer and Dworkin about how to 
establish principles of justice for a society - shared meanings versus abstract 
principles; the second section is a very brief look at Dworkin on Rawls, and in 
particular his argument that there is a fundamental assumption underlying Rawls' 
deep theory of justice. The third section explains Dworkin's interpretation of the 
liberal version of equality. 
Firstly I must put this discussion into its proper context. In the last chapter I 
examined Walzer's conception of complex equality, which states that social goods 
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should be distributed according to the social meanings attached to those goods in 
any particular society. For example, should medicine be distributed according to 
need, or should distribution be left to market forces? I maintained that in the 
contemporary liberal democracies of Britain and the USA we have no shared 
conceptions which are of use to us in deciding how to distribute such goods. We 
have very different, mutually exclusive - indeed mutually hostile - principles of 
justice (or, perhaps, ideas of what justice requires, to use Dworkin's phrase). 
Recently Sean French talked of "the unbridgeable ideological gulfs in the British 
scene" and wrote "that we are all arguing from irreconcilable premises"4. 
Derivation of Principles 
Dworkin accuses Walzer of relativism, of failing to enunciate clear principles of 
justice against which actual distributions and practices can be judged. Distributions 
for Walzer are relative to the meanings attached to the goods in a particular society. 
Dworkin makes the same criticism that I made about the nature of diverse opinions 
within a society. He writes, "the ideal or complex equality he defines is not 
attainable or even coherent, and the book [i.e. Spheres of Justice] contains very little 
that could be helpful in thinking about actual issues of justice: It tells us to look to 
social conventions to discover the appropriate principles of distribution for 
particular goods, but the very fact that we debate about what justice requires, in 
particular cases, shows that we have no conventions of the necessary sort" .^ 
Political argument begins where shared understandings fail - where there is 
disagreement there is no shared social meaning, but Walzer believes that 
disagreements within a cultural tradition demonstrate the existence of shared 
meanings rather than deny them. I do not believe this to be so, and Walzer offers 
no convincing arguments to substantiate his claim. For example, disagreements 
about how much health care should be provided, to whom, and how it is to be 
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funded, reveal opposed ideological positions rather than shared understandings. 
Dworkin suggests that if the disagreements are within a single tradition then Walzer 
cannot choose between one interpretation of what justice requires or another - there 
are no abstract principles against which they can be judged. He argues that Walzer 
provides no real argument about how health care should be distributed - no genuine 
argument based on principles of justice. Walzer, for his part, replies that his 
argument is made - it is "historical, sociological and contingent",^ but Dworkin 
writes that Walzer's theory ignores one of our fundamental traditions "...that justice 
is our critic not our mirror", and that his relativism "is faithless to the single most 
important social practice we have: the practice of worrying about what justice really 
is". Rather than leave justice to "convention and anecdote" we must argue for a 
theory of justice "by finding and defending general, critical principles of the 
appropriate sort", and he mentions his own preferred principle, a version of 
complex equality which "...must permit inequalities that can be traced to the choices 
people have made about what kind of work to do, what kinds of risks to take, what 
kind of life to lead"9. 
Here, then, are the two sides of the debate. Walzer, writing in 1988, said "...I have 
been arguing ... against the claim that moral principles are necessarily external to 
the world of everyday experience, waiting out there to be discovered by detached 
and dispassionate philosophers. In fact, it seems to me, the everyday world is a 
moral world, and we would do better to study its internal rules, maxims, 
conventions, and ideals, rather than to detach ourselves from it in search of a 
universal and transcendent standpoint"1^. 
On the other hand Dworkin rejects the idea that we share a common moral tradition 
from which we can derive principles of justice. Although the moral majority and 
liberals may share some traditions (for instance, the idea that the state must act 
justly towards all), at a more concrete level "they disagree sharply about the role 
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that justice permits or requires the state to play in the moral lives of its citizens" 
If we take sides we are making a moral judgement, "the kind of judgement that 
would make no sense if justice were simply a matter of convention. So the idea of a 
shared moral tradition cannot do the work Walzer wants; if society is divided on 
some issue, the tradition runs out where the dispute begins" . He is not denying 
that arguments for principles of justice are made within particular societies, and 
will take account of "the relevant features of a community under discussion" and 
its understanding of the goods being distributed, "but the principles of justice we 
use to decide which features of a community are relevant to a just distribution of 
its goods ... must be principles we accept because they seem right rather than because 
they have been captured in some conventional practice. Otherwise political theory 
will be only a mirror, uselessly reflecting a community's consensus and division 
back upon itself"^. 
Dworkin on Rawls 
I mentioned Dworkin's own theory of equality to which he made reference in his 
review of "Spheres of Justice". In an essay on Rawls^ he argues that a particular 
conception of equality underlies Rawls' theory of justice. The construction of the 
theory shows it to be rights based rather than goal based or ideal based. "The basic 
idea of a rights based theory is that distinct individuals have interests that they are 
entitled to protect if they so wish"^. In the original position individuals argue for 
a conception of justice which they as individuals would find acceptable. Such a 
theory presupposes that rights are fundamental and not the result of convention, 
legislation or hypothetical contract. The basic right of Rawls' deep theory cannot 
be the right to any particular goal. Such a right might be produced by the theory 
but the original position itself cannot be justified on the assumption of such a right 
because the parties do not know they have such an interest or rank it above all 
others. He concludes that the basic right of Rawls' deep theory must be an abstract 
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right, but i t is not the right to liberty, because everyone's general liberty wi l l 
decrease any individual's likelihood of getting what he wants. Such a likelihood is 
increased by restraining others' liberty. So any right to liberty must be the right to 
particular liberties which are the product of the contract, not a condition of it . On 
the other hand, all the parties in the original position have the right to be treated 
equally, and this right "is enforced by the fact that no-one else can secure a better 
17 
position by virtue of being different in any ... respect" . 
However, the parties in the original position qualify the value they give to equality. 
Material equality is subordinate to political equality, and material inequality may 
be justified i f the condition of the worst o f f is thereby improved. He points out 
that Rawls has said that "equality as i t applies to the respect which is owed to 
persons irrespective of their social position" is fundamental. I t is fundamental, 
according to Dworkin, in the sense "that individuals have a right to equal concern 
and respect in the design and administration of the political institutions that govern 
19 
them" , and "the original position is well designed to enforce the abstract right to 
equal concern and respect, which must be understood to be the fundamental concept 
20 
of Rawls' deep theory . I t is not "a product of the contract, but a condition of 
• • 21 admission to the original position" . It is a natural right owed to all persons as 
persons. Whilst Rawls argues that liberal democratic institutions wi l l best ensure 
that the demands of equal consideration are met, i t is open to critics of liberalism to 
22 
show he is wrong, but there is no "more radical concept of equality . 
Dworkin has transposed his own conception onto Rawls' theory, but Rawls rejects 
this interpretation. He suggests that his theory is applicable to the political sphere -
a basis for general agreement in a "society viewed as a system of fair cooperation 
for mutual advantage" . We may hold certain ideas, opinions, beliefs about people 
in a metaphysical sense, which we must put aside when thinking of people as free 
and equal in a political sense. Now, we know that Rawls considers equal concern 
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and respect to be fundamental, and the original position is designed to yield moral 
principles which ensure and reinforce each person's self-respect, principles which 
are formulated by the parties in the original position who themselves enjoy equal 
representation as moral persons. And yet he is not prepared to concede Dworkin's 
point that "justice as fairness rests on the assumption of a natural right of all men 
and women to equality of concern and r e s p e c t . T h e original position is not a 
device to test the natural right to equal concern and respect, but to examine 
"fundamental intuitive ideas" which are "implicit or latent in the public culture of a 
democratic society" . 
Could Dworkin, then, not level against Rawls the same accusations that he made 
against Walzer, those of moral relativism, of simply holding up a mirror which 
merely reflects a community's ideas back on itself? 
Rawls has written that Dworkin's classification scheme, rights-based, duty-based, 
goal-based views, is too narrow. Rather, "justice as fairness is a conception-based, or 
... an ideal-based view..." °. It takes "certain fundamental intuitive ideas such as 
27 
those of persons as free and equal" and works them up into idealised conceptions. 
The original position models not the natural right to equal concern and respect (as 
Dworkin would have i t ) , "but of the essential elements of these fundamental 
intuitive ideas as identified by the reasons for principles of justice that we accept 
on due reflection. As such a device, i t serves to combine and then to focus the 
resultant force of these reasons in selecting the most appropriate principles of 
28 
justice for a democratic society" . In other words principles of justice are derived 
from a community's present shared understandings. Intuitive ideas and present 
convictions are tested through the original position and the condition of the veil of 
ignorance. 
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Walzer, too, examines shared meanings, although his method is less rigorous than 
Rawls'. And for Walzer justice in a society would lie in being true to its shared 
meanings and its conventions. The social critic is committed to his own society and 
criticises i t f rom the standpoint of the principles it professes to hold. Are social 
goods distributed as they ought to be according to the meanings attached to them? 
He seems to accept, as Dworkin says, that shared meanings are just - a society 
simply has to be fa i thful to them. Rawls, on the other hand, wishes to test these 
conventions, to ask whether our present practices are just and reasonable. The test 
takes place in a bargaining situation, the original position. The source of criticism 
is rational discussion. 
Equal Concern and Respect 
I now turn my attention to what Dworkin himself has to say about the right to 
equal concern and respect, which he regards as a fundamental liberal value, the 
"nerve of liberalism" as he puts it . 
29 
Liberalism is an "authentic and coherent political morality" with a constitutive set 
of moral principles which includes a belief that inequalities in wealth should be 
reduced; that government intervention is necessary to reduce unemployment; that 
restraints on free speech should be opposed, and so on. Firstly, he rejects the notion 
that liberals tend to value equality more than liberty, and that conservatives tend to 
value liberty more. Liberty is not quantifiable. We cannot say that more liberty is 
lost through traff ic restrictions than through limits on freedom of speech. We 
cannot say that freedom of speech protects more liberty, valued for its own sake, 
than does "the liberty to drive as [we] wish" . Therefore we value fundamental 
liberties such as freedom of speech because of something else that they protect. "But 
i f this is so", he writes, "then we cannot explain the difference between liberal and 
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conservative political positions by supposing that the latter protect the commodity 
•3 1 
of liberty, valued for its own sake, more effectively than the former" . 
A government may treat its citizens equally according to two distinct principles. It 
may treat them as equals in the sense that all are entitled to equal concern and 
respect; or, i t may treat them equally in the distribution of certain resources. How 
far governments should try "to secure equality in some particular resource, for 
example, in monetary wealth" , is a matter of argument. Liberals may certainly 
value equality in this second sense more than conservatives, but i t cannot be argued 
that they value equality in its first , and more important, sense than conservatives 
do. The first principle is constitutive (valued for its own sake) for both liberals and 
conservatives. In the second sense it is derivative for liberals - a strategy to achieve 
the constitutive position. 
Sometimes treating people as equals (that is, as entitled to equal concern and 
respect) means treating them equally, but the conservative believes that in many 
cases treating people equally would not mean treating them as equals. "So", he 
writes, "we must reject the simple idea that liberalism consists in a distinctive 
weighting between constitutive principles of equality and liberty . However 
Dworkin does pursue the question of what i t means for a government to treat people 
as equals, entitled to equal concern and respect. 
One argument holds that the principle is satisfied only i f the government is neutral 
on the question of the good l i fe , showing no preference for one conception over 
another. A second argument considers that a government cannot be neutral on this 
question "because it cannot treat its citizens as equal human beings without a theory 
of what human beings ought to be"^ and "...the content of equal treatment cannot 
be independent of some theory about the good for men or the good l i fe , because 
treating a person as an equal means treating him the way the good or truly wise 
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person would wish to be treated. Good government consists in fostering or at least 
recognising good lives; treatment as an equal consists in treating each person as i f 
he were desirous of leading the l ife that is in fact good, at least so far as this is 
possible" 3 5. 
He argues that i t is the first conception of equality which is liberalism's constitutive 
political morality. A liberal would argue that resources and opportunities be 
distributed equally as far as possible, as any other principle of distribution would 
assume that some people's preferences, ambitions, talents were more worthy than 
others of greater concern and value. A neutral distribution would allow everyone to 
choose their own lifestyle; between more work and less leisure, for example, or 
between more and less expensive tastes. I f everybody had the same tastes and 
talents, the same conception of the good l i fe , then the principle of equality would be 
satisfied by equal distribution, through government, of everything to be distributed. 
I f everybody had the same tastes and talents but different conceptions of the good 
l i fe then liberals could satisfy the principle of equal treatment through, first ly, the 
economic market as a mechanism for deciding what should be produced and how i t 
should be distributed; and secondly, representative democracy for collective 
decisions about the regulation of conduct. 
In these circumstances the market determines the prices of goods and of labour. 
Hence a person's own distribution is "a function of the personal preferences of 
others as well as of his own, and it is the sum of these personal preferences that 
fixes the true cost to the community of meeting his own preferences for goods and 
activities . Although Walzer knows the "anti-egalitarian consequences of free 
17 • • enterprise in practice" , he considers that "under the special condition that people 
d i f fe r only in preferences for goods and activities, the market is more egalitarian 
than any alternative of comparable generality" . 
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Of course, in the real world we do not start with the same talents and abilities, and 
our choice of work is limited, as is our choice between work and leisure. Some start 
with more material wealth than others and some have special needs which l imit 
their chances in competition for jobs, and they may require additional resources to 
satisfy identical requirements. Dworkin writes, "these inequalities w i l l have great, 
often catastrophic, effects on the distribution that a market economy wil l provide. 
But, unlike differences in preferences, the differences these inequalities make are 
indefensible according to the liberal conception of equality" . That is to say, the 
able or talented or just plain lucky individual has no moral right to a greater share 
of the resources that are available to the community as a whole. I f the market is the 
sole mechanism for distribution, many wi l l not acquire the means to pursue their 
reasonable l ife plans. 
This argument is based on the rights of the individual to equal concern and respect, 
and Dworkin is examining which distributive system, f rom a liberal point of view, 
satisfies this right. Rawls argues for equality of distribution (and for inequality 
when all, particularly the least wel l -off , would benefit). His theory, too, is founded 
on individual rights, but in the context of a society perceived as a cooperative 
venture, in which all share and to which all contribute. 
Like Hobhouse and Rawls, Dworkin believes that a liberal economic system should 
limit inequalities arising f rom differences in talent and ability and so on, whilst 
allowing inequalities which reflect true choice of goods and opportunities. It may 
be a reformed or modified market system, with redistribution through taxation; i t 
may be a socialist system, but whatever the choice its purpose is "to achieve the best 
practical realization of the demands of equality i t s e l f ' ^ . His notion that an 
unequal distribution is necessary to ensure equal concern and respect is not unlike 
Rawls' principle that an unequal distribution should benefit the least favoured. 
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It w i l l be impossible to achieve a perfectly just distribution but we can judge, to an 
extent, how far a society falls short of the ideal. Moreover no citizen should be 
asked to make undue sacrifices for the sake of other individuals or for the sake of 
the community and its institutions. For example, i t may be argued that welfare 
benefits lead to economic decline which in turn leads to cultural decline. So 
welfare benefits to the poor and unemployed should be withdrawn, the economy 
w i l l prosper and everyone wil l be better o f f in the long run. Dworkin dismisses this 
as "simply a piece of utilitarianism, which attempts to just i fy irreversible losses to a 
minority in order to achieve gains for a large majority" 4^. 
A citizen may make sacrifices on behalf of a community i f he feels part of i t , and 
i f he is able to participate in shaping i t , and i f the promised prosperity wi l l benefit 
his immediate community, be it family or race or whatever. But this means that a 
government which asks for sacrifices, which denies to some the equal resources due 
to them f rom considerations of equal concern and respect, must adequately 
compensate those who make the sacrifices. The unemployed must be given generous 
provision f o r retraining or f o r public employment, and oppor tuni ty and 
encouragement to become socially integrated and to take part in political affairs. 
" I f government pushes people below the level at which they can help shape the 
community and draw value f rom i t for their own lives, or i f ... their own children 
are promised only second-class lives, then it forfeits the only premise on which its 
conduct might be jus t i f i ed" 4 2 , he writes. Or, as Galbraith puts i t , we must "reflect 
the needs and aspirations of those outside. To do otherwise is to leave the 
unfortunate to a kind of voiceless despair, to say in effect that they have no place 
in the democratic process..."4''. I f , as some economists predict, the economy fails as a 
result of these measures to ensure that no-one is cut o f f f rom social l i fe or the 
political process, "we should simply have to tailor our ambitions to the future 
accordingly. For society's obligation runs first to its living citizens. I f our 
government can provide an attractive future only through present injustice - only 
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by forcing some citizens to sacrifice in the name of the community f rom which they 
are in every sense excluded - then the rest of us should disown that future, however 
attractive, because we should not regard i t as our future either"^. 
The citizen, then, should feel part of the community and has the right to help to 
determine its present course and shape its future. "Treating people as equals 
requires an ... active conception of membership."^ Representative democracy is 
justified because it enforces the right of each person to respect and concern as an 
individual. The problem is that, in practice, majorities may disapprove of the 
particular wishes of a minority, and may violate its right to equal concern and 
respect, simply because they disapprove. They may legitimately restrict behaviour 
which limits the preferences of others. He concludes that a scheme of individual 
rights is necessary in order to prevent inegalitarian results arising f rom the 
economic and political institutions which seem best fit ted to protect the basic right 
to equal concern and respect. But these rights "are not to be understood as 
representing equality in contrast to some other goal or principle served by 
democracy or the economic market. The familiar idea, for example, that rights of 
redistribution are justified by an ideal of equality that overrides the efficiency 
ideals of the market in certain cases, has no place in liberal theory. For the liberal, 
rights are justified, not by some principle in competition with an independent 
justification of the political and economic institutions they qualify, but in order to 
make more perfect the only justification on which these other institutions may 
themselves re ly"^ . The system of rights must not be seen as compromising some 
other goal of the political and economic systems. The market economy is justified 
only because, and only to the extent that, i t meets the demands of the right to equal 
concern and respect. 
A conservative, Dworkin argues, believes that "treating a person with respect 
requires treating him as the good man would wish to be treated"^, and he (the good 
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man) would wish to be treated in accordance with the principles of the virtuous 
society, a virtuous society being one in which citizens have a shared conception of 
virtue. "They believe their community, in its social and political activity, exhibits 
virtues, and that they have a responsibility, as citizens, to promote these virtues. In 
that sense they treat the lives of other members of their community as part of their 
own lives."^ But unlike a socialist or Marxist with a vision of an ideal society, the 
conservative believes "that his own society, with its present institutions, is a 
virtuous society for the special reason that its history and common experience are 
better guides to sound virtue than any non historical and therefore abstract 
deduction of virtue f rom first principles could provide"^. This is an Oakeshottian 
conservatism, valuing what we know and are used to. 
Hence the by now familiar institutions of the market economy and representative 
democracy wi l l appeal to the conservative, as to the liberal, but for very different 
reasons. Whilst the liberal believes that the talented have no special right to greater 
resources, the conservative believes "the economic market, in practice, assigns 
greater rewards to those who, because they have the virtues of talent and industry, 
supply more of what is wanted by other members of the virtuous society; and that 
is, for the conservative, the paradigm of fairness in distribution"^. 
I may say, in passing, that a neo-laissez faire liberal like Nozick would simply see 
the free unfettered market as the place where individuals could buy and sell 
whatever they legitimately owned at a price fixed according to the laws of supply 
and demand. There is no right or wrong outcome. The free market may result in 
the destruction of the community. Laissez-faire liberalism was modified not only 
because some individuals could not properly develop their capacities but because of 
the dangers to society of having a large impoverished class. 
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In the political sphere the conservative wil l approve of the institution of democracy, 
since i t allows the community "to reaffirm, as a community, its public conception of 
virtue"^ * by electing a government with a particular set of values, which are 
encouraged - indirectly - through legislation. Although liberals and conservatives 
may both reach the conclusion that the free market and political democracy are the 
best available institutions for their particular purposes, the conservative wi l l 
modify the market only for reasons of expediency (when, as I have suggested, 
cohesion is threatened). They wi l l protect, through the establishment of property 
rights, those who succeed, the virtuous and talented, f rom the envious majority who 
may use the democratic process to disinherit them. Liberals would only allow 
property rights to the extent that sovereignty over a limited range of personal 
possessions is essential to personal dignity. Liberals would also allow some form of 
redis t r ibut ion to the less able on the grounds that the morally irrelevant 
considerations which help some to compete with more skill in the market should not 
determine the f inal outcome of distribution of resources. 
In other words, conservatives and liberals, whilst embracing the same institutions, 
wi l l modify them in very different ways. "They wi l l disagree sharply over which 
corrective devices, in the form of individual rights, are necessary in order to 
maintain justice, and the disagreement wi l l not be a matter of degree" , writes 
Dworkin. And we can recall in this phrase the criticism made of Walzer - that 
politics begins where shared conceptions fa i l . 
Dworkin has argued that liberalism's "constitutive morality is a theory of equality 
that requires off ic ia l neutrality amongst theories of what is valuable in life" , but 
this neutrality is not an indication that "there is no right and wrong in political 
morality."^. Liberalism based on equality is morally neutral to the extent that the 
demands of equal concern and respect require. "It rests on a positive commitment to 
an egalitarian morality and provides, in that morality, a f i r m contrast to the 
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economics of privilege." Michael Ignatieff, in a recent article, has said that 
conservatives (of Mrs. Thatcher's kind) "believe the polity exists to maximise private 
freedom but do not believe the polity should provide the means to enable all citizens 
to be free"^*\ but "the history of the welfare state in the twentieth century can be 
understood as a struggle to transform the liberty conferred by formal legal rights 
into the freedom guaranteed by shared social entitlement. Given the tendency of 
the market to generate inequality, the state was called upon, by its own citizens, to 
redress the balance with entitlements designed to keep the contradiction between 
real inequality and formal equality from becoming intolerable. From this history of 
struggle was created the modern social democratic polity: formally neutral on what 
constitutes the good l i fe , yet committed to providing the collective necessities for 
en 
the free pursuit of that good l i fe , however individuals conceive of it" . 
Dworkin believes that each individual who values his or her way of l i fe should be 
allowed the freedom to pursue that way of life without restraint. Liberals are 
indifferent to the way people choose to live their lives. A government which tries 
to enforce "private morality" undermines the self-respect of those with different 
C O 
ideas who cannot "accept that [their] way of life is base and degrading" . 
Citizens must be treated as equals because that is what is right. He refutes the 
argument that liberalism conceives of people as isolated individuals. It does not 
deny "that most human beings wi l l think that what is good for them is that they be 
59 
active in society" . He also denies that liberalism is self-contradictory in that i t is 
itself a theory of the good: "the liberal conception of equality is a principle of 
pol i t ica l organisation that is required by just ice, not a way of l i f e f o r 
individuals"^, he wrote, presaging Rawls' statement that justice as fairness is 
political, not metaphysical. 
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CHAPTER 6 
Obligations and Community 
Although Nozick, Rawls, Dworkin, Hobhouse and, possibly, Walzer may all be 
placed within the liberal tradition - concerned with individual self-determination, 
political equality, consent to government and democratic institutions and a (more or 
less) free market - i t is obvious that the extreme individualism of Nozick sets him 
apart f rom the social liberals and f rom the democratic socialism of Walzer. Nozick's 
theory of justice does not embrace a vision of a political community with collective 
ends acting through its agent, the government, to ensure the welfare of all its 
members. But this is the central concern of Hobhouse, Rawls and Walzer and their 
purpose is to resolve the inevitable tension between ind iv idua l rights and 
community needs which their theories entail. 
It is the state which has a crucial role in securing justice, which for Hobhouse is to 
be found in the collective life; for Rawls in a cooperative society designed to 
maximise the position of the least advantaged; for Dworkin through equal concern 
and respect for all citizens; and for Walzer through complex equality achieved 
through the separation of spheres. How principles of justice are derived is a matter 
of controversy, but underlying them are conceptions of the individual as self-
directed, and certain ideas about the relationship between individuals and the social 
and political communities of which they are members. Each of the theories I have 
outlined is a description of the liberal democratic state as it should be (because of 
the conceptions these writers have), and as i t could be i f any one of the sets of 
principles were to be generally accepted. 
I intend to draw together certain strands, recurring themes, f rom the previous 
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chapters, concentrating on the conceptual development of notions of political 
obligation, the strength of communal bonds, and the state as community. 
I start with a discussion of the significance of political obligation in the theories I 
have examined, since how we are said to have obligations illuminates each writer's 
understanding of the state and of the relationship of citizens to the state and to 
each other. I suggest that obligation to the state can be based solely on the justice of 
its actions, solely on consent, or on a synthesis of these two; that is, consent is a 
necessary but not sufficient condition - the state must also uphold moral principles. 
This leads to some further thoughts on Rawls, Walzer and Hobhouse, and I end this 
section with some summary thoughts on equality, liberty and the nature of the state. 
In the second part I briefly outline Maclntyre's critique of liberalism and his 
argument that in liberal societies moral disputes cannot be resolved since we lack 
any shared conceptions of the good. Walzer suggests that the communitarian 
critique is partially correct, that liberalism is inherently disintigrative, and that the 
inclination to self-destruction needs correction. However, his endorsement of 
Rawls' social union of social unions as an ideal seriously weakens his description of 
the state as a community of shared values. 
In conclusion I argue that actual liberal democratic states are not, and are unlikely 
to become, all-embracing political communities of citizens united in some common 
enterprise. 
Pateman and Political Obligation 
I have broached the question of political obligation, f rom the voluntarism of Nozick 
in the setting of the minimal state, through Hobhouse for whom obligations are 
inescapable, via Rawls and duty to the just state, to Walzer for whom obligations are 
rooted in community. The challenge for liberals is to just i fy in voluntarist terms an 
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individual's relationships (especially political) when this self-directed individual is 
situated within a social setting which is not freely chosen. But this is to raise the 
familiar problem of political obligation - how individuals can be said to have 
consented to be governed. Resolving this dilemma involves j u s t i f y i n g the 
establishment of the state itself as necessary (for security, for example, or to 
promote justice), and then to explain how, subsequently, citizens come to accept the 
authority of the state. 
As I have shown there are very different answers to the even more fundamental 
definitions of equality and justice - what is due to and f rom individuals as 
individuals, and as citizens. This in turn leads to differing explanations of the 
necessity for , and purpose of the state, and of citizens' relationships to it . 
Carole Pateman, whose arguments I shall use as a useful framework for the 
following discussion, believes that political obligation is a permanent and insoluble 
problem in the liberal democratic state.1 The ideal of self-assumed obligation 
demanded by the liberal conception of the free and equal individual lies behind 
contract theory, but this has been corrupted to become merely tacit consent and 
hypothetical voluntarism. The corruption of the contractural relationship serves to 
stabilise the potentially subversive nature of the liberal ideal. Since Pateman argues 
that obligations can only be self-assumed through deliberate and explicit acts of 
one's own it follows that political obligation is problematic. 
She argues that abstract individualism, the conception of individuals as though they 
can be separated f rom their social institutions, is "both a reflection of, and an 
abstraction f rom, aspects of liberal democratic social l i fe , and this reflection of 
the market economy is then used to suggest that individuals "naturally" act purely 
out of self-interest and have a possessive morality. Fulfilment of obligations is then 
a matter of subjective judgement. Individuals thus conceived would be able to deny 
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that promises bind, for to talk of individuals abstracted f rom reality as making 
promises or having obligations is nonsensical since any such conception depends on 
convention or moral laws or principles. The individual abstracted f rom any social 
setting "could never agree that there are good reasons for any general constraint 
upon individual action or the individual's w i l l " . 
Taken to its extreme, abstract individualism conceives of all relationships as 
contractural. Gauthier believes that the ideology of contemporary societies is 
developing towards a radical contractarianism4, an argument rejected by Beran, 
who writes that "love of country and love of people... are among the best reasons for 
voluntarily entering political and marital relationships"^. Beran himself vigorously 
defends consent theory, arguing for a specific act of consent to be made by each 
individual. 
Both Gauthier and Pateman could have illustrated their theses with an account of 
Nozick, whom I described as the ultimate consent theorist. Starting f rom a position 
of the inviolability of the individual, Nozick describes how the state could come 
into being without any person's rights being transgressed. Rights are not dependent 
on social convention but define the limits of social relationships. In the context of 
political obligation I argued that the notion of consent was hardly relevant to 
Nozick's theory, since the state comes into existence through a series of individual 
contracts with a protective agency, rather than as the result of a deliberate decision 
to institute a polity of a particular nature. That is, i t is seen as a purely economic 
process, the result of market forces. Nobody consents to the principle of a monopoly 
of force residing in one agency, nor to the principles of the entitlement theory of 
justice. 
Problems of the relationship between citizen and state which occur when the state is 
invested with a wider role or described in quite different terms - as being, for 
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instance, an all-embracing community in which common values are shared and in 
which resources are redistributed to fellow-members - are avoided. However, other 
questions of a pressing nature arise such as the constitutional status of an 
unrestrained monopoly and how i t , too, could be controlled through market forces 
once competition has been eliminated; the involuntary nature of the contract 
between the agency and unwilling independents, and between the monopoly agency 
and those born after i t had been established as the minimal state; and the absence of 
any recognit ion of obligations and attachments to others acquired through 
membership in families and communities. The minimal state has no moral purpose; 
it is composed of self-interested individuals whose obligation is limited to the idea 
of moral side-constraints - the obligation not to transgress another's space. 
Consent and Morality : three possibilities 
Political obligation is a specific obligation owed to the state. It may be possible to 
say, following an argument of Raphael, that the state is necessary for the 
achievement of certain common aims and the fulf i lment of our responsibilities to 
others as members of a community. In this case we would have a political 
obligation based not on the moral worthiness of the state's actions, but on its 
necessity to our own moral lives. "The obligation comes f rom the presupposed moral 
obligation to promote the ends of justice and the common good together with the 
recognition that the state is a necessary means to those ends"**. Consent in the form 
of acquiescence to the state as this necessary agent "adds to the state's power the 
authority or right to give orders" , but consent is not the source of the obligation. 
The state's actions must be directed towards fu l f i l l i ng its proper ends. 
But i f we accept, for the moment, that political obligation can only be self-assumed 
then the citizen has no automatic obligation to the state in which he was born or 
lives, no matter how virtuous the state. Political obligation would only be incurred 
through our knowing and deliberate consent or, for Pateman, through our 
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continuing active participation in decision-making. 
We now have three possibilities: 
1. Our obligation to the state is based purely on its actions judged by their 
consistency with moral principles. 
2. Our obligat ion to the state depends only on our consent or 
participation. This is the necessary and sufficient condition for this 
obligation. However, moral and political obligations may conflict. 
3. Participation and consent are necessary to political obligation but not 
sufficient. Political obligation also depends upon the state's adherence 
to principles of political morality. 
The first possibility has nothing to say about a particular form of state or its 
institutions. Although Pitkin writes that a legitimate government is one to which 
citizens ought to consent, nevertheless their obligation depends not on consent but 
on the nature of the government. " I f it is a good, just government, doing what a 
government should, then you must obey it; i f i t is a tyrannical, unjust government 
trying to do what no government should, then you have no such obligation . 
I f political obligation depends on our participation then the form of the state must 
be such that participation is a reality. On the other hand consent could be to any 
form of state, or to any government regardless of its purposes. I am simply trying to 
suggest here that a very narrow definition of political obligation might be possible. 
However, whether decisions are made through active participation, or by the 
government to which we have consented, they would have to be judged against 
moral principles, so that political obligation could be outweighed by moral 
considerations. For Nozick and Pateman consent is the key feature of political 
obligation. I have made some comments on Nozick already; Pateman does not 
exclude considerations of moral principles. 
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In the third case the political and moral become inseparable, so that our obligation 
to the state would depend both on its form (for Pateman, the f u l l participatory 
social democracy) and on its decisions and actions. 
Contract Theory 
Pateman argues that contract theory has two parts, the first being an agreement to 
form civil society, and the second an agreement "to alienate to a government of 
Q 
representatives the right to make political decisions . Nozick's primary concern has 
been to demonstrate how the state itself is established (although not by any 
hypothetical agreement as understood in traditional consent theory), whereas 
Pateman considers the second stage to be the most important in liberal argument, the 
question being how do individuals consent or voluntarily obligate themselves. 
Pateman calls this second stage a promise to obey, the alienation of an individual's 
political rights. The Lockean contract has the two stages described by Pateman: 
firstly, the agreement to establish a political community, institute a political 
authority and so form a bond of political obligation. This first stage is a contract 
of horizontal relationships and is a logical necessity (though formal and abstract) 
preliminary to the second stage, in which political authority is given up to 
representatives. The vertical relationship between individual citizens and the state 
replaces the bond between citizens. 
Locke's theory thus represents a shift f rom the general problem of justifying 
political obligation which arises f rom the notion of free and equal individuals, to 
an emphasis on the second stage of the contract. Having established the legitimacy 
of the liberal state he then seeks to answer the question "how i t can be plausibly 
maintained that individuals consent to a form of political authority that is already 
assumed to be jus t i f i ed"^ . For the majority consent is tacit, inferred f rom their 
remaining in their native country and going about their everyday business. Of 
course, we f ind i t d i f f icu l t to agree that political consent can be so inferred. Walzer 
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suggests that certain obligations are incurred through residence and normal daily 
intercourse, but these are limited to preserving the peaceful social order. However, 
the idea of tacit consent is very necessary to Locke because, Pateman argues, 
"usually there is no question about political obligation and consent because there is 
no question that the authority of the liberal state is justified. The task of the 
theorist then becomes that of showing how individuals can be said to give the 
consent that ought to be given. Unless hypothetically voluntarist arguments, 
however implausible, are accepted, problems about political obligation are opened 
up that Locke, and his successors, regard as closed"^. 
Rawls and Hypothetical Consent 
But this changes the nature of the argument. Expressed in these terms it suggests 
that the authority of the liberal state is not to be found in the consent of its 
citizens, otherwise we would have to say that i f there were problems with consent 
then there would necessarily be problems with the authority of the liberal state. 
And this is the crux of the matter because liberal theorists do have problems in 
showing how consent is given. Thus, Pateman says, Locke postulates a situation in 
which people consent to a government with certain purposes, and any government 
carrying out these purposes therefore has the inferred consent of its citizens. 
Pitkin, too, writes of the Lockean version of consent, "... you are obligated to obey 
not really because you have consented; your consent is virtually automatic. Rather 
you are obligated to obey because of certain characteristics of the government - that 
i t is acting within the bounds of a trusteeship based on an original contract" , the 
terms of which are, to Locke, self-evident. 
Obligation, then, depends on the nature of the government, not on any special 
relationship between citizen and government. As Pitkin says in her defence of the 
doctrine of hypothetical consent, you must obey a good, just government. This 
Pateman believes to be at the opposite extreme of liberal theory to abstract 
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individualism, since it "claims that i t is a sign of philosophical disorder even to 
1 
suggest that there could be general problems about political obligation" . 
Now Rawls, too, formulates his theory of political obligation in the same terms, 
although the or iginal position "is an example of the most radical abstract 
individualism"^. Although the basis of obligation is the hypothetical contract, 
consent is not a necessary condition of political obligation. Pateman argues that i t 
is an attempt to show that the state is rational and necessary and that therefore 
political obligation is unproblematic. 
The principles of justice "distinguish between those aspects of the social system that 
define and secure the equal liberties of citizenship and those that specify and 
establish social and economic inequalities"^. This is the liberal separation of social 
and political l i fe which has a special significance in Rawls' theory because only 
those who gain political office, who are likely to be "the better placed members of 
society"^, have a political obligation. The remainder have only a natural duty to 
uphold the just constitution, and this leads Pateman to say that for Rawls political 
17 
obligation is "a largely irrelevant concept . As Zwiebach says, even i f a social 
contract is needed in the original position, in fact our obligation (or duty) to the 
state derives f rom our considered judgements, our agreement that the two principles 
are indeed rational and fair and morally compelling (and evident in the constitution 
and practices of the state!). This is the first of the three possibilities! Pateman 
believes that Rawls' choice of the two principles "depends on the prior assumption 
1R 
that the existing liberal democratic state is just or nearly just" , or as Zwiebach 
puts i t , "Rawls* whole theory of rational action is based upon presuppositions that 
have grown out of market-liberal social science, such as the notion that rationality 
requires that men wil l be moved to maximise advantages and minimise or hedge 
19 
against risks" . 
174 
The natural duty to support just institutions does not depend on voluntary acts 
because, Rawls argues, this would introduce the possibility of instability. "This" 
writes Pateman, "is a fairly breathtaking argument f rom a writer who claims to be 
20 
working within the social contract tradition , and she denies that the parties in 
the original position would accept an involuntary duty, arguing that "in a just 
institution there is a good reason to assume an obligation to do what is necessary to 
21 
keep the institution in being" . Or as Beran argues, Rawls is committed by his 
theory of justice to a scheme of voluntary membership and to "the further claim 
that obedience to a particular state is conditional on voluntary acceptance of 
membership... And this voluntary acceptance of membership can generate a self-
22 
assumed obligation to obey the state" . 
Pateman believes that Rawls can only include everyone in his account of political 
obligation "at the cost of reducing his argument to a completely abstract series of 
21 
conceptual points..." . However, i t is clear that Rawls recognises the difficulties in 
trying to identify voluntary acts which can be clearly understood to incur political 
obligation for the majority of citizens in contemporary liberal democratic states. 
Furthermore his account of political obligation should not be separated f rom its 
wider context; justice as fairness establishes, and is accepted as, the basis of social 
cooperation in a state whose citizens have incommensurable ideas of the good, and 
who wi l l recognise a duty to uphold a constitution and those basic institutions 
which make this possible. 
Pateman's critique of tacit and hypothetical consent theories is based on her own 
conviction that all obligations must be voluntarily assumed, and in order to just ify 
her position she distinguishes between "ought" and "obligation". It may be that we 
ought to perform certain actions but have no obligation to do so unless we make a 
specific undertaking through a deliberate act such as a promise. ( I am inclined to 
the opinion that this is an example of the abstract individualism which Pateman has 
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criticised!) There can be no obligations, even moral obligations, which are not the 
result of our own acts, because otherwise we would simply be consenting to 
preexisting obligations. This, she argues, is closely connected with the idea of tacit 
consent "for i f "obligations" that ought to be recognised, or consented to, exist 
independently of individuals' actions, it is an easy step to the inference that such 
recognition is given"^. 
However, what we ought to do, as Pateman would agree, is derived f rom our social 
l ife. Those who want to live this social l i fe accept, for instance, that they ought not 
to tell lies. They have an obligation to tell the truth. I t makes no sense to argue 
about whether or not this is a self-assumed obligation; all that is needed is to see 
that this is an essential part of the social l i fe we wish to share. Similarly, other 
aspects of living together bring obligations. This does not mean that there is no 
room for individual judgement, because the extent of obligation is often open to 
argument, or because our moral rules and codes are constantly changing. We ought 
not to harm others. We have an obligation not to do so. In Rawlsian terms we have 
a duty not to harm others, since this is not a matter of voluntary acceptance. Hence 
we have a duty to support just institutions, he argues. Voluntary acceptance of a 
duty adds nothing to the fact that i t is a duty. 
I f the state is conceived and subsequently justified as a voluntary arrangement 
entered into by free and equal individuals, then its authority can only be justified 
in terms of the self-assumed obligation of its citizens, which is morally binding. 
This is why Pateman claims that political obligation is always problematic and that 
the liberal principles of freedom and equality are subversive in character. Consent 
theory offers a solution but i t is always necessary to ask how this obligation is 
acquired. I t is always possible for those who have consented to withdraw their 
consent. 
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This leads Beran to argue that membership is not automatic. The state, to be 
authentic must be a voluntary association; this follows f rom a natural right to self-
determination. Those who do not wish to accept membership of the state can 
emigrate, secede, enter a dissenter's territory or claim resident alien status. In his 
insistence that people make such a choice, Beran is taking too little account of those 
family ties, personal friendships and cultural roots which bind people together 
despite political systems. The cost of severance is high. In ignoring such bonds he, 
too, is in danger of reverting to an abstract individualism. For most people these 
ties are far stronger than those between citizen and state, to the extent that Walzer, 
in his early work, suggested that they generated obligations prior to the obligation 
to the state. The exclusion of dissenters would enable the creation of a unified state 
whose citizens shared the same principles of justice, but at a price. Rawls, on the 
other hand, overcomes the difficulties which Beran brings on himself because he 
does not insist on trying to make the state a literal voluntary association. Those 
who accept the rationality of the two principles and live in a just state become part 
of the state as a cooperative enterprise. 
Pateman believes that arguments such as Rawls' have resulted in a change in the 
concepts of political authority and obligation f rom being conventional, implying 
voluntary acceptance and rejection, to becoming natural and therefore involuntary 
in that acceptance and rejection are inappropriate terms in which to discuss the 
natural order. These arguments not only presuppose the state as an ethical 
association but assume that this conceptual point applies to actual states. They are 
"implying that the liberal state is as necessary to its citizens as two internally 
related concepts are necessary to each other" , and that therefore political 
obligation is un-problematic, whereas there are always questions to be answered 
about the specific forms of states and their institutions. Although political 
obligation is postulated on the notion of individual freedom and voluntary consent, 
in practice this is reduced to political obedience embracing everybody. 
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Pateman's own solution to the problem of political obligation is f u l l participation in 
a democratic non-statist environment. But her emphasis on participation ignores the 
fact that, in practice, i t is the clash of moral principles which causes the real 
problem of political obligation. Just as voluntary acceptance of a duty does not 
alter the nature of the duty, so decisions reached through participation do not 
necessarily accord with principles of justice. Decisions reached by the majority 
must be evaluated in the light of certain moral principles and only then can the 
extent of the obligation be decided. As Pateman herself writes, "there is no 
guarantee that participatory voting wi l l actually result in decisions in accord with 
27 
the principles of political morality" . In discussing the validity of law Hart wrote 
that "the certification of something as legally valid is not conclusive of the question 
28 
of obedience" . 
Pateman herself is very confused on this point. She criticises the private nature of 
the liberal state "which can be evaluated only in terms of the procedure and its 
2Q 
requirements" , adding that "part of Rousseau's critique of liberal contract theory 
is that is does not and cannot give expression to the ideal of social l i fe as a 
voluntary scheme based on self-assumed obligation, because it cannot f ind a place 
for substantive principles of political right that are freely chosen and adhered to by 
citizens themselves" . And later she writes that "a democratic theory of political 
11 
obligation must include some principle of political right" by which citizens can 
know whether they ought to assume obligations consequent upon decisions being 
taken. In other words even f u l l participation is not the last word to be said about 
political obligation, although expressed in this way by Pateman it sounds rather 
strange since surely one of the purposes of the discussion procedure, i f the issue is 
morally contentious, is to decide on a morally right course of action so that those in 
the minority at the end of the debate have already made their judgement, as have 
the majority. That is to say, they do not decide afterwards whether the decision 
accords with principles of political morality, although the minority may decide to 
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abide by the decision for various reasons. 
It is not exactly clear what the content of the principles of political morality would 
be for Pateman, although they are decided by the citizens themselves, and can be 
amended and changed. "Citizens are bound by the political obligation and political 
authority they have created for themselves, but they also remain superior to 
them" . What the citizen ought to do depends upon certain principles but this does 
not mean that consent is irrelevant, because the citizens have agreed to these 
principles in the first place and can change them. "It is because principles of 
political right, and the rules and laws that govern social and political institutions, 
can provide an internal and voluntarily assumed constraint that... can be amended 
or revoked, that i t makes sense to speak of social l i fe as a voluntary scheme" . I 
have said that certain principles of morality arise f rom the very fact of living 
together as a social or political community, and Pateman argues that these principles 
are freely chosen. However, I am uncertain about the process through which this 
choice is made. They are not, and could not, be the result of majority decision-
making, for example. 
However, once moral principles are established and accepted, i t is d i f f i cu l t to see 
why a person's obligation should depend on his participation. He need only 
participate when the principles themselves are being questioned. Otherwise it is 
sufficient to judge the outcome. A decision not in accord with accepted principles 
cannot obligate any citizen, regardless of active participation in the decision, or 
consent to i t . A decision which conflicted with these principles should be 
disregarded. 
Political decisions, like laws, must be submitted to moral scrutiny or, in Pateman's 
term, principles of political right. I f these principles are generally accepted and 
understood, then Pateman's distinction between ought and obligation is unhelpful. 
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Does the person who knows he ought to assume an obligation but does not do so, 
therefore have no obligation? The individual who disagrees with the general 
opinion that he ought to assume an obligation in a particular case is in the same 
position as one who is said to have the obligation but disagrees. The problem is 
simply pushed back a stage. Instead of asking why we have certain obligations we 
ask why we ought to accept certain obligations. Who is to decide? Who is to 
censure? In a participatory democracy the individual would be more likely to do 
what he ought, according to Pateman, but although arbitrariness and uncertainty 
may be decreased the underlying questions remain, and these centre around our 
acceptance or rejection of certain moral principles and their application in 
particular cases. 
Pateman and Walzer - a widening gap 
In asking questions about morality and political principles I suggested that political 
and moral obligation might be separated. Is such a distinction possible? It is a 
central feature of liberalism that the private and political are distinct. Pateman 
argues that the liberal social contract of Locke, for example, was designed to 
preserve the social and economic inequalities of the capitalist market economy 
whilst giving "an appearance of legitimacy to the dominance of some over others"^. 
Natural independence is exchanged for formal equality before the law, creating an 
appearance of political right and obligation. Once the contract is made, liberal 
theorists argue, social inequality can be disregarded. I have criticised Rawls for the 
distinction he makes between liberty and the worth of liberty. In distinguishing 
between political duty and obligation he recognises that some, because of their 
involvement or privileged position, wi l l be more f i rmly bound to the institutions of 
the state. As Pateman argues, the private sphere is supposed to be a voluntary 
cooperative venture, but inequalities in distribution, authority, power and influence 
are determined by the wealthy, whose formal equality of citizenship is worth more 
than that of the poor, who cannot compensate for the inequalities. 
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The separation of spheres is the central feature of Walzer's theory of complex 
equality. I have discussed Walzer's early theory of political obligation, in which 
consent is signified through a series of actions, a commitment made over time, and 
our pr imary pol i t ica l obligations are to our f e l l o w citizens through group 
membership, the groups being the source of moral knowledge. Walzer's ideal of 
group membership is akin to Pateman's answer to liberalism, namely voluntary 
agreement between individuals in "a non-statist political community ... a political 
association of a multiplicity of political associations" . The political and social 
spheres, whilst distinct, are not separated. The political l i fe "is constituted by rules 
that are grounded in , yet transcend, everyday l i fe ..." , and is governed by 
substantive principles of political morality. 
However, Pateman criticises Walzer for failing "to explore the concept of self-
assumed obligation in terms other than consent ... Walzer emphasises the idea of 
membership based on explicit commitments, but he does not investigate how the 
commitment can be politically renewed ..." His attitude towards liberalism is 
ambivalent. Nevertheless his notion of participatory pluralism "shows how the idea 
and practice of self-assumed obligation can point the way to a new democratic 
conception of political l i fe and political obligation" . I argued that the distinction 
between private and political obligation is d i f f icu l t to sustain in Walzer's early 
theory and this, says Pateman, is a challenge to liberal theory. 
It is vital to remember that many obligations are incurred in the course of normal 
social l i fe , and that in contrast to the self-interested individuals of Nozick's theory, 
Walzer's citizens cannot make or break obligations at random. In the later 
development of Walzer's ideas he would seem to draw away f rom Pateman in several 
ways. Firstly, the idea that we are bound by our moral principles, rather than 
through consent and participation, is emphasised. This is a movement f rom the 
second to the first of my possibilities since rights and obligations have their origins 
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in moral understandings shaped over a long period of time. However, participation 
remains a crucially important element in his theory - reaching decisions together is 
an essential sign of membership. We are born into and live in societies whose 
institutions we did not make. Sy Levin, failed instructor, disappointed in his 
student's lack of commitment to principles and ideas, reflects, "although they were 
responsible for tomorrow, they had not invented the world or the values they had 
found in it" . I have already noted Pateman's observation that principles of 
political morality are freely chosen, although how this process takes place is unclear. 
Green contrasts the consent and the communitarian positions in these words: "The 
consent theorist often does tend to overestimate the role of the wi l l at the expense 
of communal traditions in establishing those moral relations that are constitutive of 
political l i f e " ^ , and later he continues, "It is wrong to think of our most important 
duties as being consequences only of our own wills; this is to drain them of the 
social dimension that explains their form and content"^. 
Walzer believes that moral principles may d i f fer f rom one society to another, 
arguing that they are the result of a long tradition, a continuing debate, so that we 
inherit certain ideas about the values and meanings of social goods. The social 
contract is a moral bond, and an understanding of how goods are to be distributed 
for the benefit of all. Whilst the political and social were integrated in his early 
writings on group membership, now his argument for the separation of spheres in 
order to confine inequalities to specific areas of activity so that political power is 
not subject to undue manipulation by the wealthy, stems from his interpretation of 
our understandings of these goods. 
Lastly, his conception of the state as the all-embracing political group emphasises 
the distance between his and Pateman's positions. He has moved away f rom a 
reasonable argument that citizens can share their lives and sustain their values in 
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groups, to the untenable proposition that a renewed democratic socialist state can 
encompass all its citizens in a unified society of shared understanding (untenable, 
that is, because the modern liberal state cannot be so transformed). 
Hobhouse: Obligation and Moral Authority 
The harmonious society of rational men envisaged by Hobhouse is a useful link 
between Walzer and Rawls, between principles of justice derived f rom tradition and 
those derived f rom rational argument. For Hobhouse, as for Walzer, rights and 
duties (what is owed to and from one another) stem f rom social relationships and 
f rom the experiences of community. They are not precedent to social l i fe but begin 
with, and are part of, social l ife; he is critical of the abstract individualism of 
Locke. Both Hobhouse and Walzer believe that all must contribute to the 
community's debate about its shared purposes and meanings. 
Although Walzer's liberal state, like Hobhouse's, encompasses the notion of a sharing 
community, a welfare state, Hobhouse's description of the principles of justice is 
more Rawlsian in character. Wealth is the result of common effort , development 
should be to the benefit of all, with distribution tending towards equality. We have 
an obligation to contribute to the well-being of others, to provide them with the 
means to pursue their ends. Like Dworkin, he rejects grave inequalities now for the 
sake of future benefits, and he writes that all persons must be equally taken into 
account in establishing the principles of harmony. Even so, the idea of the state as 
the embodiment of the shared common life and common values is closer to Walzer's 
conception of the state than to Rawls' political community which unites those with 
irreconcilable ideas of the good. 
A person is a member of many groups, but Hobhouse's concern is with membership 
in the state. Consent is not a condition of membership of a community. "The 
community, in fact, is not a voluntary association which men can enter and leave as 
183 
they choose, but its organisation is a necessity of social l i fe , and imposes itself 
A O 
accordingly on the reluctant . 
The doctrine of consent does not mean literally that every individual must consent 
to the government. "What the doctrine contemplates, of course, is a population 
desirous of an ordered common l i fe , but no less desirous to choose its own order and 
form its own organised community"^. Although he considers the question of a 
group breaking away from a larger association, he does not consider individual 
dissent, perhaps because "man needs society for the fulf i lment of his own being"^. 
Is i t possible to derive a principle of political obligation f rom Hobhouse's system of 
social justice and the principle of harmony and the inescapable obligations owed to 
others? In Chapter 2, I made some comments on the settlement of competing claims 
in Hobhouse's theory. This is a problem because his principle of harmony envisages 
a community of rational men, selfless in motive, living in a peaceful community. 
There is always a tension between this ideal and the real world of imperfect men 
who need incentives and punishments to guide them towards right behaviour. 
Hence political obligation wi l l also be a problem. Why? 
Obligation stems from the very fact of being members of a community. Social 
justice demands that society is directed to the welfare of all, and the government is 
the agent through which this end is achieved. The state secures benefits for all and 
protects individuals against private oppression. The state's coercion is used to 
override individual coercion, and i t is used to extend liberty, not curtail liberty. It 
derives its authority and legitimacy from the pursuit of these moral ends. As 
Hobhouse says, political obligation is secondary to moral authority. Neither the 
lawfulness of the government nor the correctness of its decision-making procedures 
are sufficient conditions to obligate. Rather, we are bound to obey a government 
pursuing the common good - we judge its decisions by ethical principles. The first 
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possibility clearly stated. 
However, the di f f icul ty lies in defining the common good, and in how governments 
- themselves imperfect - make decisions about matters such as redistribution of 
wealth according to principles caught between idealism and realism. Our obligation 
must be severely limited, given these circumstances and the problems of ascertaining 
the common interest. 
In "Liberalism" Hobhouse says that "democracy is not founded merely on the right 
or the private interest of the individual ... It is founded equally on the function of 
the individual as a member of the community"^ A l l must help to form the common 
wi l l on which the common good is based. The purpose of political participation is to 
discover the common welfare, which is directed to the good of the individual as a 
member of society. However, political participation in a complex society is limited, 
and the decision procedure itself - the opinion of the majority holds - lacks the 
moral authority democracy demands. Democracy should be the political expression 
of the collective l i fe , but the nature of the societies in which we live, our lack of 
knowledge and our self-interest make it a poor reflection of the ideal. 
No matter how decisions are made, and Hobhouse (like Pateman, Walzer and 
Dworkin) is trying to ensure that all interests wi l l be considered, the important 
point is that decisions conform to moral principles. Pressed further i t may be that 
the necessity to participate ( i f only to guarantee that governments are made 
accountable to citizens), together with the requirement that decisions comply with 
moral principles, leads to the conclusion that participation and consent are 
necessary but not sufficient conditions of political obligation in liberal democracies 
- the third of my possibilities. Although Hobhouse and Rawls both favour active 
citizenship within democratic institutions, participation is not a defining element of 
political obligation, except in the narrow sense which Rawls ascribes to the term 
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"obligation". 
Walzer, however, believes that citizens must participate. Reaching decisions 
together binds members of a society. Obligations arise f r o m common 
understandings but all should contribute to the debate, and in this context political 
obligation cannot altogether be dissociated f rom participation. 
Equality. Liberty and the State 
Nozick, Walzer, Hobhouse and Rawls all assert the values of equality and individual 
freedom, the right of each person to further his or her own idea of the good. But 
they assign different meanings to the concepts of equality and liberty because of 
their perceptions of the individual and his relationship to the society in which he 
lives. Since the state is one of the social institutions into which we are born i t 
follows that they have differing ideas on the nature of the state and its role in 
securing equality and liberty, however they are defined. Their explicit or inferred 
theories of political obligation reflect these different views and illuminate their 
theories of justice. 
Thus for Nozick the state protects all equally; all have formal equality before the 
law and are equally free to pursue their own ends provided they have the means to 
do so, save only for the conditions imposed by the Lockean proviso, and that they do 
not interfere with others' like liberty. These limitations to their rights define their 
duties to others. Freedom is negative. The citizen has a contractural relationship 
with the state, which is not to be regarded as the embodiment of community values. 
Obligations are assumed voluntarily; cooperation between individuals for welfare or 
other purposes is a private matter, and the government wi l l not intervene to protect 
the weak or vulnerable or those otherwise unable to compete effectively in the 
market place for the means to achieve their ends. 
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Rawls argues that free and equal men wi l l accept the involuntary nature of the 
state i f i t is organised in accordance with the two principles of justice. In the 
cooperative Rawlsian state all may pursue their own life plans, and the principles of 
justice are designed to ensure that all are equally able to do so or, at least, to 
maximise the position of those in the least favoured circumstances. The tension 
between the two aspects of his theory - the state as a cooperative venture run for 
the benefit of all, but founded on principles chosen on a maximin basis by self-
interested individuals - is mirrored in the dual nature of political obligation, a duty 
for most, an obligation for those whom the system most favours. I say this is a 
mir ror of the tension between cooperation and self- interest because of the 
distinction made between liberty and the worth of liberty. Because some have a 
greater capacity to advance their self-interest, their worth of liberty is greater and 
they have more influence over events. Thus the formal equality of the first 
principle is compromised because of the inequalities permitted by the second 
principle. The ideal of the state as a cooperative of equal individuals is jeopardised. 
To avoid this particular problem Walzer suggests that inequality in one sphere 
should not be transferable to another. Hence the worth of political liberty would be 
the same for all citizens. Equality is freedom from domination. He emphasises the 
state as a historical community rather than as analogous to a voluntary association. 
We have obligations to each other as members of a community based on shared 
understandings, and as members of a community we care for each other's welfare. 
Individuals are not to be submerged in the group because all must contribute to the 
shared understandings of the community and because they are free to pursue their 
own ideas of the good, which they wi l l normally do as members - of a 
neighbourhood or an institution or an association - in whose decision-making they 
fu l ly participate, and which signifies their membership. The political community is 
the most important group since all are bound together within i t , and i t is the group 
within which decisions about the common l i fe are made. I t is the forum where 
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principles of distribution of goods are debated, decided and put into effect. 
For Hobhouse, however, the authority of the state is derived f rom the pursuit of 
moral ends rather than f rom consent or participation. Men and women are social 
beings, mutually dependent on one another, with inescapable obligations to others as 
members of a community. Rights and duties have their origin in social relationships 
in a harmonious society of rational men, and the system of rights and duties 
promotes the common good. The welfare of all must be taken into account, and this 
end is achieved through the agency of government. The worth of liberty and 
political equality is enhanced when the state corrects material imbalances so that all 
have a reasonable chance of self-development. 
The state is described by Nozick as a protective association with minimal functions; 
by Rawls as a cooperative run for the benefit of all; by Walzer as a community of 
shared understandings, and by Hobhouse as a harmonious society of rational men. 
Maclntvre and the Decline of Moral Tradition 
I have shown that within the broad swathe of liberal theory there are very different 
descriptions of social relationships and, more particularly, of the state. Are any of 
these accounts accurate representations of the liberal democratic states in which we 
live? Communitarians argue that liberal theorists misrepresent the nature of the ties 
that bind us together into communities. Alasdair Maclntyre's "After V i r t u e " ^ is a 
forceful rejection of liberal individualism, written in "updated state-of-the-art, 
theoretical language", (to use Walzer's phrase)^. 
Maclntyre argues that in contemporary liberal societies moral arguments cannot be 
resolved. Claims between liberty and equality, for example, in the end fa l l back on 
simple assertion. We live in an emotivist culture in which moral judgements are 
merely expressions of personal preferences, "a human relationship uninformed by 
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morality . The emotivist self criticises everything "from whatever standpoint the 
self has adopted ... To be a moral agent is, on this view, precisely to be able to stand 
back f rom any and every situation in which one is involved, f rom any and every 
characteristic that one may possess, and to pass judgement on i t f rom a purely 
universal and abstract point of view that is totally detached f rom all social 
particularity. [A description of the Rawlsian original position]. Anyone and 
everyone can thus be a moral agent, since i t is in the self and not in social roles or 
practices that moral agency has to be located"^. The emotivist self is contrasted to 
persons in traditional societies who are members of a family, a village, a tribe. 
Memberships define who and what a person is, what obligations and duties a person 
has, and one moves through life "toward a given end"^. No such bonds inhibit the 
emotivist self. 
Moreover moral debate is now envisaged "in terms of a confrontation between 
incompatible and incommensurable moral premises and moral commitment as the 
expression of a criterionless choice between such premises, a type of choice for 
which no rational justification can be given"^. This situation has arisen as a result 
of the rejection of a theology or philosophy which includes notions of "man-as-he-
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could-be- i f -he-real ised-his- te los . Human nature was to be improved and 
corrected, in which case it is pointless to look at human nature to "find a rational 
basis for ... moral beliefs" , but this is precisely what has happened, leading to "the 
unsettlable, interminable arguments of our own culture"^. Man is set aside f rom 
his social roles. We cannot say in virtue of what it is that a moral judgement is true 
or false. Now the individual is his own moral authority, but inherited rules of 
morality "have to be found some new status, deprived as they have been of their old 
teleological character . . . "^ and their expression of divine law. Hence the attempts 
to ground moral rules in practical reason or utilitarianism. 
He rejects arguments that there are universal rights applicable to all persons 
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everywhere, specifically Gewirth's attempt to show that an individual needs certain 
goods to exercise his rational agency and this necessity entails a right to these goods; 
the possession of rights presupposes "the existence of a socially established set of 
rules"^. Rights and utility "are a matching pair of incommensurable fictions", he 
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writes . 
In Heroic societies morality cannot be divorced f rom the social structure. Without a 
place in the social order a man cannot be known or know himself. "Morality is 
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always to some degree tied to the socially local and particular" . Our modern 
liberal society lacks moral unity, liberal citizens lack bonds of friendship which are 
possible only in a community which aims for the realization of the good of its 
citizens, and in which there is agreement on the nature of goods and virtues. In a 
population of even the modest size of f i f t h century Athens the bond of friendship 
had to be found in "a network of small groups of friends ... We are to think then of 
friendship as being the sharing of all in the common project of creating and 
sustaining the life of the city, a sharing incorporated in the immediacy of an 
individual's particular friendships. This notion of the political community as a 
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common project is alien to the modern liberal individualist world" , in which the 
individual detaches himself f rom relationships and chooses to accept or reject 
obligations. 
In fact we are born into particular societies and particular roles as members of a 
family, a church, a nation, our lives interacting with the lives of those around us. 
We inherit debts, expectations and obligations, which "constitute the given of my 
l i fe , my moral starting point. This is in part what gives my life its own moral 
particularity"^. We seek the good together, not limited by community but 
developing in our search for the good, and arguing about what is demanded by our 
tradition. "A living tradition then is an historically extended, socially embodied 
argument, and an argument precisely in part about the goods which constitute that 
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tradition" 
However in our society we cannot agree on a conception of justice, the necessary 
basis of a political community according to Aristotle. Thus the Rawlsian and 
Nozickian principles of justice are incompatible and our pluralist culture cannot 
weigh the merits of claims based on entitlement against those based on need, 
although modern philosophers claim that their rival principles are derived f rom 
rational argument. For Rawls a principle of equality with respect to need is 
paramount and how those in need come to be in that condition is not considered -
the past is irrelevant to present distribution. For Nozick entitlement is the primary 
concern - only past acquisitions are relevant in deciding claims of justice and 
present patterns of distribution need not be considered. 
But a claim based on need cannot be weighed against a claim based on entitlement. 
In real l i fe , argues Maclntyre, "it is the reference to desert which makes [people] 
feel strongly that what they are complaining about is injustice, rather than some 
other kind of wrong or harm" . Both Rawls' and Nozick's rules for a common life 
are made for individuals and "the identification of individual interests is prior to, 
and independent of, the construction of any moral or social bonds between them , 
whereas the notion of desert needs "the context of a community whose primary bond 
is a shared understanding both of the good for man and of the good of that 
community and where individuals identify their primary interests with reference to 
those goods''^. 
Rawls' theory of justice does not, of course, include a particular conception of the 
good because he believes that individuals may have (and have the right to have) 
their own conceptions of the good, and there wi l l be disagreement about these 
conceptions. There is no reference to community in Nozick's formulation of rights 
and theory of justice. To an extent, Maclntyre says, Rawls and Nozick are reaslistic 
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about modern society, a collection of self-interested strangers, and that is why they 
exclude an account of community "in which the notion of desert in relation to 
contributions to the common tasks of that community in pursuing shared goods 
could provide the basis for judgements about virtue and injustice"^. Appeals to 
desert conjoined to Nozick's theory ("I deserve to keep what I have earned"), or on to 
Rawls' ("Poverty of the needy is undeserved"), are appeals to "an older, more 
traditional, more Aristotelian and Christian view of justice"^. 
The positions of Rawls and Nozick could only be derived f rom their individualist 
premises, and yet f r o m this common starting point they have formula ted 
incompatible theories of justice. There is no rational solution, and no hope of a 
moral consensus in our society. We cannot invoke shared moral first principles in 
deciding between competing claims "for our society as a whole has none" . 
Government, rather than representing the moral community, merely imposes "unity 
on a society which lacks genuine moral consensus" . "Loyalty to my ... community 
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... becomes detached f rom obedience to the government which happens to rule me , 
and so political obligation becomes a problem. 
Maclntyre himself believes there is no adequate defence of the individualist 
position and that "the Aristotelian tradition can be restated in a way that restores 
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intelligibility and rationality to our moral and social attitudes and commitments" , 
and that i t is necessary to construct "new forms of community within which the 
moral l i fe could be sustained so that both morality and civili ty might survive the 
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coming ages of barbarism and darkness" . 
The transformation of liberal society into the sort of unified moral community 
envisaged by Maclntyre may or may not be possible. We have come to accept and 
value a state in which people are allowed conflicting viewpoints, and who 
nevertheless try to live together peacefully. It could be said, of course, that 
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liberalism increases tension between groups, each of which feels that its morality 
should prevail. I have argued, like Maclntyre, that we have no strongly held shared 
understandings which would form the basis for a general acceptance of principles 
of justice. Thus I pointed out that Rawlsian principles would be rejected (for 
different reasons) by both Nozick and Walzer. On the other hand I argued that 
Walzer was mistaken in believing that we intuitively "know" and agree upon 
principles for the distribution of social goods. Politics begins where these shared 
understandings fa i l , according to Dworkin, hence the need to refer to principles of 
justice deduced through rational argument. 
Walzer and the Communitarian Critique 
In discussing Walzer I classed him as a communitarian because of his belief that we 
are united in our shared understandings which are part of our cultural heritage and 
which are given expression in the political sphere. The very words used by 
Maclntyre in his description of a community arguing about its living tradition and 
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about the goods which constitute that tradition bring Walzer to mind. Gutmann 
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and Thigpen and Downing also include him among the communitarians, but 
Hirsch writes that "Michael Walzer ... discusses community f rom within the social 
democratic tradition, as part of a wide-ranging critique of liberal politics and 
society"^. As we have already seen Walzer is d i f f icu l t to categorise, but he clearly 
places himself within the liberal tradition. 
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He believes there are two communitarian critiques of liberalism . The first states 
that liberalism has created the society i t now accurately represents - a society of 
individuals with no shared traditions. Maclntyre, for instance, says that the 
theories of Rawls and Nozick are responses to actual liberal societies. I f that is the 
case "then we might well assume that liberal politics is the best way to deal with the 
problems of decomposition ... Why not accept ... the priority of procedural justice 
over substantive conceptions of the good, since we can hardly expect ... to agree 
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about the good?" 
However the second communitarian critique "holds that liberal theory radically 
77 
misrepresents real life" . We cannot escape from relationships; even in liberal 
societies people are bound to each other. 
Both arguments cannot be true, although Walzer believes both are partially correct. 
Liberal society is disintegrative. As he said in "Obligations" alienation is a 
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condition almost specified by liberalism . Four Mobilities (geographic, social, 
marital and political) undermine relationships and a sense of community, whilst 
representing "the enactment of liberty, and the pursuit of (private or personal) 
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happiness" . To this extent the first critique is correct. (Writing about the 
takeover by professionals of working class areas in London, Martin Linton points 
out that "... Battersea is f i l l ing up with people who are unconnected ... they don't 
80 
know its history ... What is more they don't care" ). The second is correct in that 
"the ties of place, class or status, family, and even politics survive the Four 
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Mobilities to a remarkable extent" , although the long-term trends of liberalism 
may eventually undermine these ties altogether. 
Walzer believes that Maclntyre is mistaken in describing philosophical controversies 
in liberal societies as a mark of incoherence, since the arguments take place within 
liberal tradition and are about liberal values. Our tradition is now a liberal 
tradition valuing compromise, procedural justice, freedom of speech. The ties which 
bind according to the second communitarian critique are the ties of liberalism, 
captured in "the language of individual rights - voluntary association, pluralism, 
8? . . . toleration, separation ..." . But since we are bound in this way within the liberal 
tradition how can it be said that liberalism prevents us f rom understanding these 
ties? Liberalism undermines itself in trying to build a world for "the eternally 
transgressive self , and for such a self no ties would bind: "the transgressive self is 
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antithetical even to the liberal community which is its creator and sponsor"' 
Because of this endless tendency towards disintegration liberalism needs to be 
countered by the communitarian perspective. But "American communitarians have 
to recognise that there is no one out there but separated, rights-bearing, voluntarily 
associating, freely speaking, liberal selves. It would be a good thing, though, i f we 
could teach those selves to know themselves as social beings, the historical products 
of, and in part the embodiments of, liberal values"^. 
We are born into many relationships such as class, race, religion. In liberal societies 
we can subsequently leave (some of) these groups (though it is obvious that we 
cannot easily disown racial, family or other ties even i f we affect to do so). "At its 
best", writes Walzer, "the liberal society is the social union of social unions that John 
Rawls described: a pluralism of groups bonded by shared ideas of toleration and 
democracy" . Since all groups are insecure by the very nature of liberal society (as 
illustrated by the Four Mobilities), then the larger union of unions may itself be 
endangered. In order to slow down its built in tendency to self-destruction, the 
liberal state must itself be of a particular type. It must encourage groups which 
O f . 
help to keep alive "underlying communities of feeling and belief" which are 
eroded by the Four Mobilities. The state encourages cooperative associations, 
discriminates against groups which would destroy liberal values. 
In short "liberalism is best understood as a theory of relationship, which has 
voluntary association at its center and which understands voluntariness as the right 
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of rupture or withdrawal" f rom associations, some of which we do not enter 
voluntarily. There is an apparent discrepancy between Walzer saying that there is 
no one out there but separated, voluntarily associating individuals, and his assertion 
that we are born into certain relationships, that is clarified, I think, by this 
explanation. We are f ree to leave, to walk away f r o m f a m i l y , f r iends , 
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neighbourhoods. But this, of course, is part of the problem. The liberal emphasis on 
individual self-determination encourages the idea that all relationships can be 
severed at wi l l . I f liberal selves are to be taught to be social beings, then their 
education should include some reinforcement of the notion of duty - freedom to 
walk away does not relieve one of obligations. Walzer, too, would surely insist that 
at least some of the relationships we are born into entail inescapable obligations. 
Thus relationships tend to be unstable and society to become fragmented, although 
it is worth pointing out that those features of liberalism which are disintegrative 
(for instance, toleration) also enable the heterogeneous state to survive. Liberalism, 
then, requires periodic correction, of which Rawls' social union of social unions is 
an example. In other words the idea of community is grafted onto liberalism. But 
the underlying bonds which make such a union possible are perhaps being slowly 
attenuated and to this there is no remedy other than curtailment of liberal rights. 
I t may be felt that the idea of a social union of social unions, of the state as a group 
sponsor, is more akin to Walzer's early ideas than to those expressed in "Spheres of 
Justice". Indeed Maclntyre's assertion that loyalty to the community has become 
detached f rom obedience to the state is reminiscent of the Walzer who wrote 
"Obligations". However the social union of social unions would embody the shared 
values of liberalism, and would not be the distant state beyond citizens' grasp. But 
i f this is the case, and the all-embracing political community, our world of shared 
understandings, is no more than the liberal state, embracing liberal values of 
toleration, free speech and equality, then it is impossible for Walzer to argue that, 
within this tradition, we share conceptions about the nature of social goods and 
agree about their distribution. 
When Nozick and Rawls dispute each others' theories of justice they both do so f rom 
a liberal perspective - that of the self-directing individual in pursuit of his own 
196 
conception of the good l i fe . However their disagreement about the very meaning of 
justice is so fundamental that Maclntyre's criticism of incoherence cannot be 
dismissed as mere difference of opinion about what is demanded by the tradition. 
The Liberal State : A Discordant Community 
How are we to proceed, then, i f both tradition and rational argument fa i l to provide 
a generally accepted theory of justice? Hobhouse envisaged a harmonious society of 
individuals integrated into a greater whole seeking the good in the shared l i fe . A l l 
willingly take part in this cooperative venture, recognising a public interest which 
takes precedence over self-interest. 
The idea of the public interest has been developed by Milne who argues that for any 
group to be a community all its members must be concerned for the well-being of 
fellow members. "Each must regard it as important that subject to the terms on 
which they are living together, every member should be able to live as well as 
possible. I f some are suffering, their fellow-members have an obligation to take 
practical steps to relieve their distress. This practical concern is required by the 
principle of "fellowship", a principle to which every member is committed in virtue 
of membership, There can be no community among people who are totally 
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indifferent to one another's lot" . Like Hobhouse, Milne believes that members of 
a community have an obligation to put public interest before private interest when 
the two conflict, and the public interest consists in establishing conditions "which 
wi l l enable every member, not just particular groups or classes, to live as well as 
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possible on the terms which define his status as a member" . It is the interests they 
have in common as members, and it is a social responsibility. In a complex society 
activities are regulated through government "to the extent that this is necessary to 
maintain and promote the public interest"^. ""Political obligation" is a specific 
form of the generic obligation of "social responsibility . Government is obliged 
to guard the public interest, the governed accept the government's authority. 
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Thus living in a community should guarantee to each member a certain status, and a 
l i fe appropriate to that status. Each and every l ife should be "instrinsically worth 
l i v i n g " 9 2 . 
But why should the liberal state be regarded as a community? On what terms do we 
live together, and why should any individual feel responsible for millions of 
strangers? 
Nozick, of course, denies that the state is a community - the terms he sets out are 
designed to protect strangers f rom one another. Hobhouse, Rawls and Walzer all 
believe that the state is a cooperative community in which we are all somehow 
bound to each other, not merely for prudential reasons but through some deeper 
understandings which we share. It is the acceptance of common values which makes 
a community of what would otherwise be merely an organised society of self-
interested individuals. Because Hobhouse and Rawls are liberals, who are concerned 
with individual fulf i lment and the individual's right to self-determination, their 
attempts to counter liberalism's disintegrative tendencies result in a certain tension 
between individual and community. 
Rawls argues that liberal society is composed of people with incommensurable ideas 
of the good. However they can live together as a community despite their diversity 
i f they accept justice as fairness as a political principle. In this sense justice as 
fairness would be the primary value which would hold the community together. 
The two principles could give practical expression to the meaning of fellowship 
since they explain how goods are to be distributed to the benefit of all in a political 
and economic system designed on terms of fair cooperation. The values of the 
political conception of justice would outweigh other values that oppose them. 
198 
Now the important point is that the two principles would not be accepted merely for 
prudential reasons, as a modus vivendi, but as values and ideals to be cherished in 
order to maintain a tolerant, harmonious, pluralist, cooperative society. Milne, too, 
argues that there must be some "ideas, beliefs [or] values which the members share 
[which] must be more important to them than those which divide them" . I would 
suggest that a Catholic, a Jew, a Moslem, a Methodist, for example, are happy in a 
liberal state because it allows them to hold their various beliefs, to worship in their 
own way, without let or hindrance. Liberal toleration means they do not have to 
choose between church and state but can live peacefully together. However, i t 
would be wrong to conclude that their primary loyalty is to the liberal state and not 
to their church or God. Furthermore, certain moral arguments such as those 
surrounding abortion or embryo research or nuclear weapons or homosexuality are 
not reducible to a concern about what is in the public interest. 
This is not quite what Rawls has in mind since he seems to think that one's political 
self can hold certain values which may be at odds with one's deeply held religious 
or philosophical beliefs. But as Jones points out, " I f I hold a philosophical or 
religious or moral belief that turns out to be at odds with the principles of justice, 
why should I give i t up?"^ Liberalism upholds the right of individuals to live in 
accordance with their own deeply held beliefs; individuals and groups may choose 
to ignore government directives, no matter what the position vis a vis principles of 
justice, i f they conflict with these beliefs, and Rawls recognises this. No matter 
how attractive the idea of the over-lapping consensus it is apparent that Rawlsian 
principles of justice would not be accepted by everyone. I do not simply mean that 
within liberal states there are conservatives and socialists and people of diverse 
cultural and ethnic backgrounds, but that within liberalism itself principles of 
justice are disputed. 
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In "Obligations" Walzer argued that a neutral state provided security to groups such 
as churches, families and trade unions. These groups were the source of moral 
knowledge and members' primary loyalty was to the group and not to the state, f rom 
which many were alienated. However i f the idea of the social union of social 
unions is adopted, then group members are not alienated f rom the state but support 
it because it upholds those virtues of toleration and equality which enable them to 
live together. I t is understandable that Walzer should endorse this Rawlsian idea 
once the state is described not as alien but as upholding a certain set of generally 
acceptable values. I have already pointed out that this would negate his conception 
of the state as expounded in "Spheres of Justice", but I had previously suggested that 
his theory was seriously flawed. 
Throughout "Spheres of Justice" Walzer uses examples to illustrate how particular 
communities understand and share social goods. A l l of his communities are small 
groups or minorities within states, some historical, come contemporary - the Israeli 
kibbutz, the medieval Jewish community, American blacks, neighbourhood schools. 
Since i t is within such groups that values and meanings are learnt and understood 
and shared, the idea of a social union of social unions seems an appropriate and 
f r u i t f u l way to describe the groups' relationship to each other. The state would be 
all-embracing, but i t would embrace groups with very different ideas about the 
nature of social goods and their distribution. 
This is not to say that the liberal cooperative values would be accepted merely as a 
modus vivendi, for they are to be fostered as a good in themselves, enabling diverse 
groups to live together without strife. (Although Bernard Crick has written that 
"politics thus arises f rom a recognition of restraints. The character of this 
recognition may be moral, but more often i t is simply prudential, a recognition of 
the power of social groups and interests...")^ My point is that these are the only 
values held in common. The meanings of social goods (including liberty and 
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equality as well as health and education, f o r example) and principles o f 
distribution, the very principles and requirements of justice, are still open to 
question. Arguments take place within the liberal tradition, and between liberals 
and others who live in liberal democracies. That is why appeals to the public 
interest, which "presupposes widespread agreement within the community about the 
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terms upon which its members are to live together ..." , wi l l fa i l in contemporary 
liberal states. It has little value as a source of reference i f there is no agreement 
about what constitutes living well together, or on the meaning of the good l i fe . It 
w i l l not help us to choose between irreconcilable ends or between conflicting 
accounts of principles of justice. 
The neutral state upholds the right of all individuals and groups to exist, carry on 
their affairs, participate in the political process. Different organisations and 
political parties offer rival conceptions of justice, rival distributive principles for 
consideration. Sometimes there is consensus, usually there is compromise. The 
intuitive thoughts we have on what is fair or unfair do not necessarily reflect deep 
understandings, but rather the views prevailing at a particular time in the context 
of the constant struggle for ascendancy between rival ideologies. 
We in Britain may want a caring society but we are divided on what exactly this 
means and how to set about achieving our goal. The state does not adjudicate 
between the claims of competing groups through reference to principles of justice, 
since the principles themselves are in dispute! For Crick the common good is the 
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practice of politics, "the process of practical reconciliation" , and it is the practice 
of politics together with a common interest in survival, rather than agreement on 
fundamentals, which holds together diverse groups. "The moral consensus of a free 
state is not something mysteriously prior to or above politics : i t is the activity (the 
go 
civilising activity) of politics itself . It takes place in societies too complex to be 
preserved solely by tradition. 
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Both the Nozickian invisible-hand theory of state formation and the Rawlsian 
original position as a device for establishing principles of justice, are ways of 
illustrating certain ideas about how the actual states we live in should be organised. 
Nozick's minimal state is unattractive because he conceives of all relationships as 
voluntary and fails to take account of human beings as group members with 
inescapable obligations. I t accentuates liberalism's disintegrative tendencies. 
Similarly, Mrs Thatcher believes that in contemporary Britain "There is no such 
thing as society, there are only individual men and women and there are 
famil ies"" , and in her address to the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland 
in 1988 she said, "It is on the family that we in government build our own policies 
for welfare, education and c a r e " ^ . Although the family is one of the basic groups 
within a social union of social unions this is clearly not what Mrs Thatcher has in 
mind - for her the family is an isolated unit. Welfare is a matter for the family or 
for private charities to which individuals may contribute i f they see f i t . Appeals to 
Christian virtues and traditional values are used both to strengthen appeals to 
individual self-sufficiency and (paradoxically) to counter liberal permissiveness. 
Rawls runs into difficulties because his cooperative society is developed f rom an 
individualist perspective. Nevertheless I have suggested that a Rawlsian social 
union of social unions could be a useful model for the liberal state. But I have also 
argued that a citizen's primary loyalty would be to other members of the groups 
which he needs in order to give meaning to his l i fe . This seems an unremarkable, 
even inevitable, conclusion given the real nature of the contemporary liberal state. 
Nozick's notion of side constraints could be usefully applied to group relationships 
within the state. 
Citizens are obligated to the state, in this case, because it upholds the right of 
groups to exist, save only for those which would destroy those liberal values which 
the state nurtures and preserves, and which all are obligated to uphold since they 
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enable all to contribute to the debate about which set of principles they should live 
by within their society ( i f there is such a thing!). They are attached to the liberal 
virtues of equality, individual liberty, toleration, freedom of speech (even when 
they do not like what they hear), and these are the basic terms on which they live 
together. Without the commitment, the obligation, to these values the pluralist 
liberal state would be very unstable. Ideally, they would accept these values as a 
good in themselves, but acceptance for prudential reasons is sufficient. There is 
always likely to be tension in a pluralist society since the result of liberal toleration 
is that many may feel that their values are threatened by others' freedom of speech 
or freedom to live their lives in ways perceived as inappropriate. Further, the 
encouragement and promotion o f groups may carry its own tendencies to 
fragmentation since it supports the separateness of identity of diverse cultural, 
religious and other associations. 
Walzer is correct, I believe, in arguing that liberal individualism and the right of 
voluntary association tend to the destruction of attachments which give meaning, 
comfort, security and status to people's lives, leading to alienation and a sense of 
loss. For this reason it is necessary to stress that the liberal right to individual self-
determination does not relieve one of the obligations arising f rom the special 
relationships into which one is born, or which one voluntarily undertakes. 
However political obligation is distinct f rom other social relationships, and this is 
part of the problem of political obligation according to Maclntyre. It is a 
relationship based on a formal equality before the law; i t establishes a connection 
between all citizens within a state and it is therefore unlike relationships of kin or 
religion or employment. We have a political obligation to our fellow citizens to 
respect the terms which enable us to live peacefully together, and to the state which 
upholds those terms. 
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Those citizens who do not hold liberal values would accept the terms for prudential 
reasons whilst no doubt, working for or hoping for a different kind of state, but 
there is no reason and no need to believe that all must or would accept a liberal 
theory of justice or liberal democracy as a political ideal. This is the extent of our 
commitment to each other as citizens in contemporary liberal democracies. 
The mistake, I believe, is attempting to portray the liberal state as more than it 
actually is - to make of it a community of citizens engaged, somehow, in a joint 
venture, rather than accepting it as a collection of individuals (with certain rights 
as citizens) bound together in many groups some of which overlap. This is not to 
say that the state as a caring community is not an ideal worth striving for , only that 
it is not the liberal state as it is, or as i t is likely to become. 
In a 1989 MORI poll respondents perceived Britain "to be a mainly capitalist society 
in which private interests were most important; a society where the individual was 
encouraged to be self-sufficient and where people were allowed to make and keep as 
much money as they could, and which emphasised e f f i c i ency rather than 
employment"^ 1 . Ideally the vast majority wanted a more caring society. However 
there were severe differences of opinion about how the caring was to be carried out 
- through self-help or state public provision. Nozick versus Rawls' economic system 
designed to connect the strong and the weak, or Hobhouse's and Walzer's community 
in which all are entitled to receive that which they need in order to live a f u l l l i fe 
within the community. In other words there is disagreement on the nature and 
extent of the obligations we owe to others, but the obligation to provide for the 
welfare of fellow citizens is central to the theories of Rawls, Walzer and Hobhouse. 
Nozick (and Mrs Thatcher) are marked o f f f rom the social liberals in that they do 
not believe that the state should be a community of caring people who express their 
concern and act it out through government. A Nozickian state could not, by 
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definition, be a community. Yet Rawls believes that his principles of justice do not 
conflict with our intuitive ideas, and Walzer clearly thinks we share a view of the 
state as a caring society. 
Unt i l there is agreement on one of these, or some other, fundamental theories of 
justice, on the idea of the state as a cooperative system in which the bond of 
fellowship embraces all its members who are dedicated to securing the best possible 
l i fe for all, then the state cannot be a community of citizens bound together by 
common values. 
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